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ABSTRACT
This dissertation tracks a particular public health program and examines the
economic causes and consequences of the institution of public health. I fol-
low the United States rollout of county-level health departments (CHDs) over
1908 to 1933 and track the short-run benefits, the long-run benefits, and the
factors that led to adoption. At the turn of the twentieth century, rural ar-
eas lagged behind urban centers in access to public health services, despite
the fact that there had been convergence in urban-rural mortality. With 60
percent of the US population living in rural areas, this lack of public health
was a population-wide problem. By 1908 the rural health problem drew na-
tional attention from the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) and
health-interested private organizations. These organizations targeted rural
health conditions by opening local public health departments that were op-
erated by the existing county government. This revolutionary approach ini-
tiated the first nationwide rural public health program in United States his-
tory. The rollout of health infrastructure improved sanitation and provided
access to child health services in under-served areas throughout the US. The
sanitation improvements included inspections, hygiene training, and instal-
lation of toilets, wells, and drainage. Health services appeared in the form
of exams, nutritional consults, immunizations, and midwife hygiene train-
ing. Local tax dollars provided the majority of funding for this program, al-
though supplemental support arrived from outside organizations including
the USPHS, state governments, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (RSC),
and the Sheppard-Towner Act.
Chapter 1. In the first chapter, Taxation, Inequality, and the Provision of Lo-
cal Public Health, I consider the factors that shaped the appropriation of ru-
ral public health. Using digitized county-level records on property values and
taxation, I argue that adopting regions had local governments centered around
the county as compared to the town or township. Within state, specific coun-
ties that adopted this program had more active local governments, as mea-
sured by county taxation, county debt, and measured property values. Next,
because CHDs provided a bridge between the rural and urban areas of the
county, I consider whether the CHDs were redistributive in nature. I find
that CHDs operated in areas with higher levels of land and income inequal-
ity, which is distinct from what related literature has established with educa-
tion spending. These results suggest that public programs based on local rev-
enue may help to mitigate disparities within the region of jurisdiction but may
exacerbate inequalities between adopting and non-adopting areas. External
funding from higher levels of government as well as private donors helped
to randomize the effort and spread the health services more evenly between
counties.
Chapter 2. In the second chapter, Explaining Declines in US Rural Mortality,
1910-1933: The Role of County Health Departments, I assess the short-run im-
pact of CHDs in terms of aggregate county-level mortality. Using two novel
datasets–CHD administrative records and US county-level rural mortality–I
track the rollout of CHDs throughout the United States and use variation in
when and where CHDs operated to identify the mortality benefits. With an
event study design, I establish that CHD entry led to a decline in infant mor-
tality, but provided little advantage to overall population health. For infants,
CHDs prevented two deaths per 1,000 births, which accounts for 8-10% of the
period-specific mortality decline. The effect is most substantial in rural-only
counties, as well as in the Midwestern region of the United States. In these
areas, infant mortality declined by three to four deaths per 1,000 births.
Chapter 3. In the final chapter, The Long-term Impact of Public Health Mea-
sures Targeting Children, I examine whether the public health initiative was
effective at improving adult human capital. While previous studies have es-
tablished the lasting detrimental effect of poor child health, fewer studies have
evaluated whether public health programs can mitigate these adverse effects.
To address this question, I estimate whether childhood exposure to a pub-
lic health intervention affects adult income, education, and health. The his-
torical vantage point of the CHD program allows me to follow exposed chil-
dren through adulthood and observe the life-cycle benefits, including the to-
tal lifespan. To estimate the long-term benefits, I use linked census data,
World War II enlistment records, and Social Security death records and ex-
ploit variation in the timing, location, and age of CHD exposure. Based on this
methodology, I find that children treated under the age of five show later-life
earnings improvements of three to four percent. I investigate the mechanisms
underlying the effect and demonstrate that higher earnings emerge from bet-
ter adult health, measured by cognition, body mass index, and the probability
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TAXATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE PROVISION OF
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH
1 | Introduction
What affects the successful provision of public goods? Two reasonable ex-
planations suggest that public goods are provided based on both the needs of
the constituents and on the propensity of governments to tax and redistribute.
A more subtle characteristic of locally administered services is the underlying
structure of the local government. In the United States, the prominent types
of local government, the county, the town, and the city, have distinct admin-
istrative processes and serve different constituencies. While there has been
a vast work studying local versus state, or state versus federal, fewer papers
have discussed why public goods might vary based on the prominent type of
local government.
In this paper, I study the factors that affected the adoption of a county-
level public good in the United States. I provide evidence that one of the
principal factor affecting adopting is the dominant level of local government
present in each state. In particular, I study the spread of the County Health
Department (CHD) campaign throughout the United States and find that ar-
eas providing this service had stronger county governments that acted as a
subdivision of local government between the state and municipality. While in
1
the early years of the program, CHDs were instituted to extend health services
to rural farming communities and villages, with the success of CHDs, counties
were solidified as the local government with enough scope to properly provide
public health.1 The county organization of services proved to be the smallest
feasible area that was "populous and wealthy enough to finance preventive
and educational work" (Lancaster (1937) p. 338). CHDs spread more read-
ily in states with stronger county governments, while states with entrenched
independent cities and municipalities were less likely to adopt this program.
To formally unravel the factors that affected the uneven adoption of the
CHD rollout, I consider participation at both the state and county level. This
characterization captures the reality that without state support, most coun-
ties did not adopt CHDs. County-level adoption was dependent on the state
health boards that provided the funding, consultations, and administrative
support necessary for successful health work.2 For states that did not adopt
the program, including Colorado, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, only a sin-
gle CHD appeared. Even when private funding was available, it more fre-
quently went through the state health departments. Private funds often came
with the goal of establishing a "method by which states and nations could be
induced to build up permanent machinery to take care of the whole problem
of public health" (Fosdick (1952) p. 38).
For state-level adoption, I argue that the preexisting structure of local gov-
ernment in each region explains the spread of the movement. In low adopt-
ing regions, including New England and the central Midwest, the township
instead of the county was the primary political unit and provided the local
1Mountin (1934) states that "...more recently the importance of the county in the scheme
of government has become recognized by students of government and by public officials;
consequently the county is being utilized more and more in the administration of many
public services; such as health, education, welfare, and highways for the contained cities
of the country, as well as the rural areas."
2Ferrell et al. (1936) and Duffy (1992)
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public goods including sanitary administration (Chapin (1900)).3 In the South
and West, on the other hand, "the county board of health has...been estab-
lished to look after the sanitary interests of the people outside of the incorpo-
rated municipalities" (Chapin (1900)). Due to the existing power difference in
local governance, the township-organized states commonly opted out of the
county-level service.4 To test this fact empirically, I use the taxation power of
local government and find that in adopting states, the share of the total tax
burden is higher at the county level and lower at the municipal level. Further,
the municipal taxes per capita are lower in adopting states. The weaker taxa-
tion power of municipal governments suggests that cities and towns had less
autonomy than the county-level government.
Since the prominent type of local government was uniform throughout
the state, this variation cannot explain within-state differences in county adop-
tion of the program. Instead for individual counties, the success of the move-
ment depended on the propensity of local governments to embrace and fund
the public health measures. I hypothesize that two underlying attributes will
affect the local appropriation of public health. First, I expect that poor health
conditions will be associated with CHD adoption. This is based on anecdotal
claims suggesting that public health frequently appeared as a reaction to the
threat of the epidemic disease. At the national level, health disasters brought
"acceptance of the supremacy of the Federal Government" (Furman p. 283).
At the state level, when the "presence or threat of a particular disease or dis-
eases was sufficient to arouse public apprehension, the state legislature might
respond by voting a specific appropriation or by delegating further responsi-
bility or authority to the board" (Duffy (1992) p. 223). The fear aroused with
3The regional differences in the political divisions was not a new occurrence, and evolved,
beginning with the local government in the colonial era (Chapin (1900) p. 6).
4These states include the New England states, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Ohio and Michigan later passed laws
that required the organization of county-level services to ensure rural areas received ser-
vices. See the Hughes Act in Ohio.
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epidemic conditions is expected to have the power to induce CHD adoption.
Despite these claims, I find no evidence suggesting that CHD appropriation is
dependent on the health conditions of the state or county. Considering mor-
tality in both the pre-rollout years and in the year before county CHD entry,
health conditions in treated counties do not appear statistically different from
untreated areas.
Second, I anticipate that CHDs were placed in areas with stronger local
governments that were more active in public good distribution. To test this
hypothesis, I measure the strength of local government with the per capita tax
revenue and the total debt per capita.5 Results suggest that adopting counties
were wealthier and had higher taxes per capita than areas that did not partici-
pate. Aside from the taxation level, adopting counties were more urban, more
populous counties with higher municipal taxes per capita. This adoption pat-
tern suggests that counties with a large enough population to cover the fixed
cost of services were more likely to adopt health services. At the same time,
the operation at the county level allowed services to extend to remote areas of
each county that were previously unreached by public health measures.
I then test whether private and public grants helped to randomize the ef-
fort and spread the health services more evenly between counties. I find that
while internal funds depended on county characteristics, external funds were
quasi-random in their allocation. The fraction of grants received from exter-
nal sources is unrelated to all demographic and financial factors beyond the
total size of the county population. This result confirms the anecdotal obser-
vation that the “grants of state and federal funds may make the establishment
and operation of local health departments possible in areas where a satisfac-
tory organization could not other wise be maintained" (Bishop et al. (1932) p.
21). These findings suggest that private and higher levels of public funds can
5Wallis (2001) suggests that public debt provides a measure of government activity.
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be effective at distributing public goods more evenly between wealthy and
poor areas. While county-level services can be more effective at implement-
ing services to serve diverse populations than municipal level-services, only
outside aid from public and private grants can help to alleviate the between-
country inequalities.
Based on the wealth of adopting counties, I then consider the implica-
tions for within-county inequality. To test whether CHDs were provided in
homogeneous counties with less inequality, I consider whether participating
counties were different in terms of segregation and the distribution of income
and wealth. Using Gini coefficients for both wealth and income based on the
1910 occupation score and farm size, I find that adopting counties had higher
levels of inequality than non-adopting areas. This confirms the median voter
prediction that in areas with high levels of inequality, constituents would vote
to redistribute public goods. This finding is distinct from related public goods
such as school funding, which according to related work in Ramcharan (2010)
and Vollrath (2013). These studies find school funding to be higher in ar-
eas with less inequality. Whether the difference between school funding and
health funding is due to the structure of government or the type of public good
is left for discussion at the end of this study. Overall the results suggest that
public health programs based on local revenue may help to mitigate inequal-
ity within the region of jurisdiction but may exacerbate disparities between
adopting and non-adopting areas.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section II covers the
history of the health investment and the public funding available. Section III
describes the data employed. Section IV discusses the state adoption, and
Section V discusses the county-level adoption. Section VI discusses inequality.
Section VII performs robustness checks, and Section VIII concludes.
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2 | Background
The Origin of County-level Services
The origin of counties as the default service provider for rural areas was
ingrained in the structure of local government before the beginning of the
CHD rollout. The administration level had roots in the local part-time health
boards of the nineteenth century, which were governed by either the county
or the township depending on the region of the country. The township level
was preferred in the North and Central United States and the county level for
the West and South. The distinction in services was established based on the
existing strength of local governments and was based on the structure of re-
lated services, including elections, assessment, and roads. For some states,
this was the county, and for other the town or the township.6
At the turn of the twentieth century, with health conditions in major US
cities improving due to the work of full-time health boards and investments
in health infrastructure,7 the part-time rural health boards were no longer
viewed as sufficient. The boards only had enough funds to employ a part-time
lay person as a reactionary effort when epidemics or health nuisances ap-
peared and rural health conditions had remained poor,8 with preventable ill-
nesses such as "measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, influenza, lobar pneu-
monia and diarrhea and enteritis account(ing) for a greater proportion of deaths
than in the cities" (Lancaster (1937) p. 330). Further, in many sections of the
country, rural infants had a lower likelihood of living to age one than in the
largest cities of the United States (Lancaster (1937)).
6See Lancaster (1937), Mountin (1934), Chapin (1916), and Duffy (1992).
7Altenderfer (1946) 134 cities having boards of health by 1873, and though many did not
initially have full-time health officers, by 1900 the majority did
8Duffy (1992) p. 227
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Despite the apparent need for public health and the political support of
the program, local health authorities in small towns and rural areas were un-
able to initiate the organization of full-time preventative health services in
the same way that urban centers had. In fact, "almost no rural county has
organized such a unit of its own will" (Lancaster (1937) p. 339). External
help was needed for both instruction and financial assistance of local authori-
ties. To this end, private and public organizations took an interest in support-
ing the coordination of county health services, with the first operations tak-
ing place in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Washington. These newly formed
CHDs, employed a full-time health officer, nurses, and inspectors, to provide
preventive sanitation and health services to rural areas. These county orga-
nization proved to be the smallest practical unit for rural health work, with
enough funds to support the staff needed for adequate health work (Lancaster
(1937) p. 338). The county-level public good spread more readily in states with
stronger county governments, while states with strong cities and municipali-
ties maintained their weaker town-based system.
Overall, the focus on county-level services was due to the viewpoint that,
"the town and village or other subdivisions of the county are usually too small
for a sound organization" (Bishop et al. (1932) p. 18). While the part-time
boards had been ineffective at both the county and township level, the township-
level services were particularly stunted due to the small population served.
These town and township units were "unable to afford the personnel or the
equipment needed to carry out a health program of any sort....The health of-
ficers employed are more often than not untrained, serve in their spare time,
are paid only nominal salaries, and are quite unconvinced of the value of the
scientific health measures recommended by the state department" (Mountin
(1934) p. 336). For township states, this meant a large number of tiny units
continued to operate with part-time officers. The appearance of these units
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was so numerous that at the beginning of the twentieth century Michigan
had 1,160 township health officers, Minnesota had 2,700 and Ohio had 2,500
local health authorities, and "in the New England town was everywhere the
health unit" (Lancaster (1937) p. 335). Eventually, some states recognized that
having numerous service providers hindered the provision of health. To over-
come this problem, despite being township-oriented states, Ohio and Michi-
gan passed legislation enabling county-level services to form.
Public and Private Support of the CHD Rollout
As US cities improved their health infrastructure and preventative ser-
vices, the urban-rural health gap became apparent through the increasingly
interconnected economy. There was a noted reversal in the spread of disease
where cities faced a reintroduction of illnesses through contaminated food
and water provided by rural areas. Ferrell et al. (1936) reports:
... frequent instances were observed in which cases of diseases developing in the city had
been caused by infection brought in through the medium of persons and of water, milk,
oysters, or some other food supply from a nearly or distant rural community.9
To help alleviate this problem, and improve conditions in rural areas, a 1908
address from President Theodore Roosevelt championed improvements in ru-
ral health through the Commission on Country Life (Engs (2003) p. 287). The
Commission pushed for the strengthening of local health boards, dedicated
to preventative measures and improvement of poor health conditions in rural
communities.
To support the county-level rollout, the United State Public Health Ser-
vice (USPHS) stepped forward as the first benefactor. The USPHS aspired to
eradicate typhoid fever in rural communities as typhoid easily passed through
9 Ferrell et al. (1936) p. 2
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interstate commerce. Ferrell et al. (1936) reports, "the disease (typhoid) was
spread through commerce and otherwise from rural community to city, from
city to rural community, from county to county within the States, and from
State to State." To combat this problem, in 1911 the USPHS piloted a CHD
in Yakima County, Washington to reduce typhoid fever. The program was so
successful that it was "given rather extensive publicity, including the printing
and distribution of 200,000 copies as a congressional document" (Ferrell et al.
(1936) p. 4). Based on this publicity, federal grants for rural health work ap-
peared. With the newly provided funding, the USPHS took the CHD program
to the impoverished southern states,10 spurring nutritional changes to reduce
pellagra,11 water sanitation to control typhoid fever, and mosquito control to
prevent malaria.12 Through these measures, the USPHS reduced instances of
all three ailments, demonstrating that full-time local health units improved
rural health. Results of initiatives were reported to show stark decreases in
illness-specific mortality for the districts involved.13
Simultaneous to this work from the USPHS, a 1909 gift from John D. Rock-
efeller spurred the study and eradication of hookworm in the South. The
RSC funneled money through the individual the state health departments to
aid the Southern CHD movement. This effort spurred a health department
in Guilford County, North Carolina (1911) and another in Robeson County,
North Carolina (1912).14 Following these pilot CHDs, the RSC started to pro-
vide more direct funding to CHDs budgets. To receive RSC support, counties
were required to provide half of the budget from internal funds, and the other
half would be filled by the state boards and RSC.15
10Lumsden (1911)
11A niacin vitamin deficiency
12Duffy (1992)
13Lumsden (1918) and Public Health Bulletin no. 615, 699, 788, 887, 964, 1047, 1118, 1259,
1339, and 1421
14Duffy (1992) claims the sources was school health, Ferrell et al. (1936) claims RSC
15 "...the county itself guaranteed 50 percent of the cost, the balance being met by the State
9
Figure 1: County Health Department Characteristics, 1910-1933
PANEL A: GROWTH OF CHD MOVEMENT
PANEL B: EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL FUNDS
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from
the History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in
U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222.
During the 1920s, funding sources appeared to target maternal and in-
Board of Health and the International Health Board." Fosdick (1952) p. 38-41, Ferrell et al.
(1936)
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fant health initiatives. The U.S. Department of Labor provided funding for
infant-specific initiatives through the Sheppard-Towner Act. Private donors,
such as Mary Breckenridge in Kentucky and the Children’s Fund of Michigan,
supported mother and child initiatives in specific states.16 The 1927 Missis-
sippi flood and Dust Bowl of the 1930s spurred additional health facilities in
affected areas.17 Funds were channeled in from the Red Cross, USPHS, and
other relief agencies.18
Left out of this narrative are the state boards of health, whose participa-
tion and investment was imperative for rural health work to succeed.19 Even
when private organizations provided grants for rural health, these funds fre-
quently were funneled through the state boards of health.20 The state health
officers also provided consultation services and were the central administra-
tors of the CHD movement. When outside consultation from the USPHS and
the RSC was available, it occurred alongside the state health officers.21 In ad-
dition to distributing private funds, and providing consults, states made their
own contributions to budgets of local health departments. States support of
CHDs surpassed federal and private donations, and was necessary for contin-
ued operation. In states such Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Colorado, where
the states provided no aid, only one CHD opened.22 By contrast, in states such
16For example, a private individual, Mary Breckenridge, strengthened Kentucky’s rural health
movement with a focus on children’s health. Michigan’s rural health program was almost
completely financed from private donors including the Kellogg Foundation and the Chil-
dren’s Fund of Michigan.
17Before 1927, Louisiana had ten health units; and by the end of 1927, 22 of its parishes were
operating full-time health departments.
18Duffy (1992) p. 223. Kentucky and Louisiana benefited extensively from this initiative, as
well as other neighboring states.
19 SeeFerrell et al. (1936) p. III
20Duffy (1992) states "‘The Rockefeller Foundation, based on its experience during the hook-
worm campaign developed a policy of stimulating county health units through temporary
grants. The funds were distributed through state health departments which were also re-
sponsible for organizing and supervising the county units. By the 1920s the Public Health
Service had a similar program"’ p. 234; Mountin (1934) states "These and other health
agencies worked through and with the state departments" p. 716
21 SeeFerrell et al. (1936) p. 21.
22Washington was the only other state that had limited state participation, however, the in-
volvement of the USPHS appears to make up for the difference.
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The History of County Health Organizations (Ferrell et al. (1936)) tracks
the rollout of CHDs from the beginning of the movement in 1908 until 1933.
The data includes records of the yearly staff members employed, the annual
budget by source, and the name of the health officer overseeing the depart-
ment. For this study, I digitized the data from the original document, with
examples of the source tables included in Figure 24. The History of County
Health Organizations was originally issued by the USPHS as a public health re-
port. The document was issued to describe the progress made in rural health
and makes the internal claim that is it the complete record of full-time county-
level health departments in the US. While I have not discovered any evidence
contrary to this, the data is still limited in that it does not include any infor-
mation on part-time CHDs or township services. Ideally, I would have infor-
mation covering town, county, full-time, and part-time services.
Figure 1 displays the growth of the movement from its inception in 1908
until the conclusion of the source document in 1933. This 1933 cutoff conve-
niently occurred just before the majority of spending related to the New Deal
was inaugurated. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the number of CHDs plot-
ted over time, with the red dashed line showing all CHDs and the blue solid
line showing those receiving funding from the state government. The number
of CHDs starts small in 1910 and grows to over 600 by 1931. Throughout this
growth, a number of CHDs did open and then close, especially in 1932 due
12
Table 1: Summary Statistics County, by Adoption
CHD No CHD Difference
Mean Mean b
Panel A Population
Rural 1910 2.616 1.868 0.748∗∗∗
Total 1910 4.032 2.711 1.321∗∗∗
Treated 1910 0.896 0.934 -0.038∗∗∗
Number Towns <10,000 5.269 4.654 0.615∗∗∗
Number Cities >10,000 0.258 0.177 0.081∗∗∗
Panel B Per Household
Property Value 2,505.730 3,047.400 -541.670∗∗∗
Local Debt 73.595 79.290 -5.695
Property Tax 42.267 61.293 -19.027∗∗∗
Panel C Share Taxes
County 0.513 0.514 -0.002
State 0.217 0.184 0.034∗∗∗
Municipal 0.270 0.302 -0.032∗∗∗
Panel D Demographic
Urban 0.195 0.154 0.041∗∗∗
Farm 0.505 0.515 -0.010
Black 0.221 0.092 0.130∗∗∗
Children Under 5 0.133 0.126 0.007∗∗∗
Females 0.484 0.473 0.012∗∗∗
Physicians 0.001 0.001 -0.000∗∗∗
HH Rent 0.510 0.422 0.088∗∗∗
Panel E Inequality
Occscore Gini 0.238 0.239 -0.001
Farm Gini 0.494 0.419 0.075∗∗∗
Adjusted Gini 0.784 0.752 0.033∗∗∗
Share Segregation 0.669 0.746 -0.077∗∗∗
Share Landless 0.574 0.581 -0.007
Panel F Share Farms
Farm Owners 0.601 0.682 -0.081∗∗∗
<3 Acres 0.005 0.006 -0.001
3-9 Acres 0.065 0.040 0.025∗∗∗
10-19 Acres 0.107 0.056 0.051∗∗∗
20-49 Acres 0.266 0.165 0.101∗∗∗
50-99 Acres 0.223 0.195 0.028∗∗∗
100-174 Acres 0.191 0.264 -0.073∗∗∗
175-259 Acres 0.064 0.095 -0.031∗∗∗
260-999 Acres 0.050 0.107 -0.057∗∗∗
500-499 Acres 0.017 0.044 -0.027∗∗∗
1000+ Acres 0.012 0.029 -0.017∗∗∗
N 725 2,110 2,835
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved
from the History of County Health Organizations in the United States pub-
lished in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic char-
acteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Cen-
sus data. County-level data on property taxes, property values, and public
debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and
Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
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to worsening economic conditions. This closure accounts for the slight dip
beginning in the 1930s. Overall, throughout the movement 725 counties had
services, while around 150 closed.
In the top panel the blue line displays the number of CHDs funded by
state governments. Most counties received state support, which affected how
widely the movement spread in a particular state. Initially, states were hesitant
to provide funds for the program and often required assistance from private
donors to help orchestrate the delivery of public health. The hesitance of state
boards appears to have been alleviated by the 1930s, when states heavily par-
ticipated in the movement. There were a select number of CHDs that did not
receive state funds and operated from internal or donor sources. These coun-
ties were often isolated within state, and without state support the movement
did not spread beyond these one or two counties.
Turing to the bottom panel of Figure 1, the graph shows the budget share
provided from internal funds versus external funds. At the beginning of the
movement in 1908, only internal county funds were available. Beginning in
1915, external funding from the state, USPHS, and private sources helped ini-
tiate program participation. These external contributions rose over time as
more outside organizations became interested in the movement. While the
county government remained the main provider of funds, the CHD was of-
ten dependent on the contributions of external donors. For each individual
county, the percent of funding from external sources was highly variable de-
pending on the location. For example, in Delaware, all three counties received
100 percent of funding from the state department of health, with the individ-
ual counties acting as health administration units. For counties receiving RSC
funding, 50 percent of the funding came from internal funds, 25 percent from
the RSC and 25 percent from the states. At the other extreme, some counties
14
provided all funding from internal county expenditures.
Figure 2: Distribution of CHDs
PANEL A: CHD PLACEMENT
To better understand the geographic distribution of CHDs, Figure 2 plots
the distribution of CHDs across the US by state funded CHDs in Panel A and
by percent of funding from external sources in Panel B. In Panel A, dark blue
areas represent CHDs that did not receive any state funding, while the pink
shows CHDs that received a portion of state sponsored aid. Overall, the map
reveals a cluster of departments in the South, sporadically in the West, and
throughout Michigan and Ohio in the Midwest. The middle of the nation, as
well as the Northeast, have limited investment from this movement. In Panel
B, the percent of funding from external sources does not display a uniform
pattern. For the distribution of each funding source throughout the United
States, see Appendix Figures 32-34
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PANEL B: FUNDING FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health
Bulletin 222.
Wealth, Debt, and Taxation
The 1910, 1920 and 1930 Census volumes include records of local govern-
ment activities in separate publications entitled, Wealth, Debt, and Taxation
(Bureau (1915), Bureau (1924), and Bureau (1935)). The data includes county-
level property taxes, the tax revenue, and the debt of the local government.
These three measures, wealth, debt, and taxation, give an an approximation of
relative county wealth and the government activity within each county. Sum-
mary statistics for the per capita county-level data are shown in Panel B of
Table 1 across the treated and untreated areas. At the state level, summary
statistics are shown in Table 2 in Panels B and C.
In Table 1, in CHD areas, property values and property taxes are lower per
capita. Without controlling for county characteristics or state-level fixed ef-
fects, CHD areas tend to have lower wealth and lower taxation levels. Public
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debt is not significantly different across CHD and non-CHD counties. Panel C
shows the relative share taxes from each level of government (state, county,municipal).
In CHD areas the state taxes are higher, but the municipal taxes are lower.
County level taxes are no different across CHD and non-CHD areas.
Table 2: Summary Statistics State, by State Adoption
CHD No CHD Difference
Mean Mean b
Panel A Board of Health
Quality 279.42 315.70 -36.28
Gov. Appoints 0.34 0.20 0.14
P.C. Prior Health Exp. 0.04 0.04 -0.00
Panel B PC Taxes
Property Value 630.36 815.41 -185.05
Total Taxes 13.38 16.41 -3.03
State Taxes 1.49 2.05 -0.56
County Taxes 3.49 3.31 0.19
Municipal Taxes 4.15 6.89 -2.74∗∗
Panel C Share Taxes
State 0.18 0.16 0.02
County 0.39 0.23 0.16∗
Municipal 0.43 0.61 -0.18∗
Panel D PC School
State 0.46 0.76 -0.30
County 0.71 0.81 -0.09
Municipal 3.00 2.59 0.40
Panel E Share School
State 0.16 0.24 -0.07
County 0.20 0.15 0.05
Municipal 0.64 0.51 0.13
N 38 10 48
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD opera-
tion are retrieved from the History of County Health Or-
ganizations in the United States published in U.S. Public
Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic char-
acteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census data. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are
available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public
Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. In-
formation on state health departments is published in
A Report on State Public Health Work: Based on a Survey
of State Boards of Health by Charles V. Chapin.
One limitation of this data is that assessment of property values varied
by locality and by state. Local officials were responsible for assessment, and
had complete power over the final estimated property value. While state gov-
17
ernments were permitted to levy a property tax, they had little control over
the assessment process. This conflict of interest between the state and local
officials led local assessors to under-value properties. To prevent these lower
property values from affecting local revenues the county officials could then
raise the tax rates accordingly.23 Thus, the property values frequently do not
represent the market values of local property.
Census Controls and Inequality Measures
Controls for county and state demographic characteristics are included
from census microdata over years 1910-1940 as well as the US Farm Land
Value data. The data originates from Haines (2004) and the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census Data (Minnesota Population Center and Ancestry.com
(2013)). When available, I use the calculated figures at the county level from
the complete count data. For figures such as farm values, or the distribution
of farm sizes, I rely exclusively on Haines (2004).
Summary statistics for the controls are shown in Panels A and D of Table 1.
For the majority of the analysis, I utilize controls for the share of nonwhites,
the log of population, the percent urban. I also test additional controls in-
cluding the number of towns and cities in each county, the proportion of the
physicians, the proportion of women, and the proportion of children in the
population. Treated areas appear to be more urban, have larger population,
and towns and cities. Around 20 percent of the population lived in urban ar-
eas, with around five towns within the county boundary. Treated areas are
also less white, have more women and children, and slightly fewer physicians.
The Haines (2004) includes data covering the distribution of farm sizes at
the county level. While this data does not perfectly capture farm ownership, it
23For more on this see related discussions in Wallis (2001) and Vollrath (2013)
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captures the relative distribution of farm sizes,which is displayed in Panel F of
Table 1. The shares are calculated as the ratio of the number of farms each size
relative to the total number of farms. Treated areas have a larger share of small
farms, and a smaller share of large and medium sized farms than untreated
areas. The cutoff is around 100 acres. Treated counties have larger shares of
farms under 100 acres, and untreated areas have more farms above 100 acres.
A portion of this may be due to the larger urban population in treated areas. I
also use the share of owners of farms to total farms to capture the relative con-
centration of land holdings. Treated areas have more concentrated holders of
land than untreated areas.
Based on the distribution of farm size, I calculate the Gini coefficient on
the distribution of wealth following Vollrath (2013). The farm Gini, displayed
in Panel E, is higher in treated areas than untreated areas. One issue with this
representation of inequality, is that it does not incorporate the landless indi-
viduals. To adjust for this, I test the relative distribution of property, measured
by the share of the landless in the county. Landless males are calculated as the
number of males over age 20 to the number of farms. This measure of wealth
concentration appears similar across treatment.
I also calculate the Gini coefficient on the relative distribution of occu-
pational based income scores. To accomplish, I use the reported occupation
scores in the 1910 full count census. I calculate the relative distribution of in-
come using this relative occupational standing. While taxation was based on
property values, income inequality still displays the relative standing of indi-
viduals in each county. The income Gini is lower in treated areas, signifying
that these areas may have higher levels of wealth inequality, but have lower
levels of income inequality.
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Mortality Measures
To measure health conditions, I digitized an unbalanced panel of rural
county-level mortality data from the US Vital Statistics (1890-1938). This data
provides the number of overall deaths, infant deaths, stillbirths, births, and
population for each county, excluding towns larger than 10,000. Two issues
with this data are present. First, the data is an unbalanced panel of states.
States were added to the death registration area asymmetrically throughout
the early twentieth century. Many of the southern states began reporting late
into the 1920s. A second issue with the data is the questionable accuracy
within the death registration area. While mortality statistics make the inter-
nal claim that states reported with a required level of accuracy, this accuracy
condition was less than 100 percent.
For pre-adoption years, I also have digitized county-level by-cause mor-
tality. This allows me to measure the relative health conditions in the years
prior to widespread CHD adoption. Unfortunately, county-level data listed by
cause is no longer available after 1915. Despite this fault of the data, I am still
able to test whether counties that adopted had relatively worse condition in
the time period leading up to treatment with a CHD.
Census of Religious Bodies
To guage the influence of Progressive reformers in individual commu-
nities, the estimation tests religious organizations aligned with Clean Living
movements of the period. The Clean Living movement was a affiliated with
progressive Social Gospel movement and wanted to reform the poor living
conditions of the period (Engs (2003)). Affiliated denominations sought to
reform society through the lens of Christian exchange and guidance, view-
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ing the State as the means to clean up society (Leonard (2011)). The move-
ment was focused in urban areas, but historical narratives suggests that as-
sociated denominations took an interest in the communities and churches
of rural America. Urban reformers believed that rural communities provided
a valuable human service that was no longer present after migration to the
cities. These urban progressives reached out to rural communities to foster
the Social Gospel movement in rural areas (Swanson (1977)).
Figure 3: Distribution of Political and Religious Alignment
PANEL A: SOCIAL GOSPEL
To identify groups associated with the Social Gospel movement I use de-
nominational data published in the Censuses of Religious Bodies. This data
source provides county-level religious organization membership for years 1906,
1916, 1926, and 1936 and is available in part 51-57 of ICPSR’s Historical, De-
mographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002 (Haines
(2004)). Using the denominations associated with the Social Gospel identifies
more progressive areas of the nation. The affiliated denominations are taken
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from Swanson (1977) and include the Presbyterian Church USA, the Mora-
vian Church, and the Methodist Episcopal church. An additional robustness
check adds denominations that may have been nominally associated with the
movement. Figure 3 shows the distribution of Social Gospel denominations
throughout the US.
PANEL B: DEMOCRATIC PARTY (1930)
SOURCES: Data sourced from Clubb et al. (1987) and Haines (2004).
Political Data
The CHD movement began as an outgrowth of Progressive reforms in
public health (Engs (2003)). Identifying whether CHD areas were more aligned
with Progressive thought, however, is not clearly divided by political party.
During the period, neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party was
strictly aligned with the Progressive movement. Two notable Progressive lean-
ing presidents included Woodrow Wilson, a democrat, and Teddy Roosevelt, a
Republican. The CHD movement itself was initiated during Teddy Roosevelt’s
progressive presidency (1901-1909) and continued to grow during the demo-
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cratic presidency of Wilson.
Democratic and republican votes were instead split by geographic lines,
with the South entrenched with Democrats and the North with Republicans.
This Southern Democratic majority is displayed in Figure 3 at the county level.
The Democratic vote is entrenched throughout the South, with the states be-
coming more Republican when moving northward. Since neither party iden-
tifies progressive thought, I instead use third party votes. Third party includes
Socialists, Progressives, and the Labor party, which tend to be left-leaning,
more progressive candidates. For the analysis, parties are grouped into Demo-
cratic, Republic, and third party. I use the political data from congressional
races published in Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presiden-
tial and Congressional Races, 1840-1972 (Clubb et al. (1987)).
4 | State-level CHD Adoption
The participation of state boards of health in the CHD program was a key
determinant of county-level adoption. States were the primary supporters
of the movement and provided the necessary financial support, consultation
services, and staffing assistance. Without state boards of health, few coun-
ties had the resources to initiate health departments. Based on the reliance
on state health departments, before considering county-level adoption, I first
attempt to unravel the factors that affected state adoption of the program. I
suggest two main explanations for state participation, prior health conditions
and the construction of local governments. Then, I test if the data confirms
either interpretation.
First, anecdotal claims suggest that adopting states had worse health con-
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Figure 4: State Health Board Spending and Rating
NOTES: The map displays the per capita state board of health expenditure in 1914. The
red bar shows the rating of the state board of health in 1914, with a higher number re-
flecting a better functioning board of health. New Mexico is missing from the data be-
cause of its lack of health-related activities in 1914.
SOURCE: Data sourced from Chapin (1916).
ditions that spurred the state boards to action. Further, states that already
had an active state board of health may have reacted to health conditions
more promptly and implemented CHDs. To capture the prior health condi-
tions, I test whether the pre-adoption mortality is related to state adoption of
the program. Then to measure whether a state had a better health depart-
ment before the rollout, I utilize the 1914 quality of the state boards of health
(Chapin (1916)). I anticipate that states with worse health conditions but bet-
ter boards of health will disproportionately adopt and fund health programs.
Figure 4 shows the expenditures and the rating for the state departments of
health in 1914. The expenditures are shown in ten thousand, where darker
blue represents more state funding for health. The red bars present the rat-
ing of each state department of health in 1914, with better scores representing
higher quality services throughout the state. The four states that stand out for
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both their quality and expenditures are Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and New York. All four are top performers, but only Ohio heavily participated
in the CHD movement. Within region, throughout the South and West, states
that were better rated such as California, Virginia and Kentucky participated
in the movement.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the rating and per capita expen-
ditures by CHD and non-CHD states. Health spending state boards of health
in 1914 appears no different across CHD and non-CHD areas. Prior health
expenditure by the board does not make states more likely to adopt the CHD
movement. Either CHDs were equally placed in states with active public health
and weak public health, or states that had been weaker became stronger over
the period. Considering whether the quality differs across CHD adoption,
state boards of health appear no different in their quality. Rating in 1914 also
does not seem correlated with state adoption of the program. From both the
rating and the total expenditure, it does not appear as though states with bet-
ter boards of health disproportionately adopted the movement. Lastly, I con-
sider whether the governor appointment of the chair of the board affected
adoption. It is possible election cycle political pressures might induce more
public goods spending in a state. Looking at the governor appointment in Ta-
ble 2, appointment does not seem to influence the adoption of the program
within the state.
Next, I consider a linear regression of CHD appropriation on health char-
acteristics in Table 3. In Panel A states that adopted are no different in the
prior rate of infectious illnesses, the per capita expenditures, or the rating of
the state board of health. One limitation of the analysis is the limited infec-
tious disease information available. Since not all states had entered the vital
statistics registration region, only 25 states are available. Still the results are
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suggestive of the fact that prior health conditions did not spur states to adopt
services disproportionately. States that had higher mortality, better health de-
partments, and a propensity towards health were no more likely to participate
in the movement.
A second hypothesis is that states with stronger county-level governments
were more likely to adopt the program. Figure 2 shows that states that adopted
the movement were principally in the West and South, with exceptions in se-
lect Midwestern states. While initially, the lopsided distribution throughout
the nation appears to be predicted by the poor health conditions in the adopt-
ing states, a more careful survey of the background literature suggests other-
wise. Adoption throughout the West and South was based on the structure of
local government. States with stronger county governments instead of town
or city governments were more apt to adopt CHDs. In New England and the
majority of the Midwestern states, the town or township is the main political
unit, and these towns are the principal providers of local public goods, which
included sanitary administration (Chapin (1900)).24
In the South and West, on the other hand, "the county board of health
has...been established to look after the sanitary interests of the people out-
side of the incorporated municipalities" (Chapin (1900)). This difference in
the organization of local government, appears to be the primary force affect-
ing the adoption of the county-level movement in health.25 In states that are
the exception to the rule, including Ohio and Michigan, legislation was passed
that required the organization of county-level services. This legislation was in-
tended to create more efficient organizations that could operate with enough
24The regional difference in the political divisions was not a new occurrence, and evolved,
beginning with the local government in the colonial era (Chapin (1900) pp. 6).
25These states include the New England states, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
26
Table 3: Taxes, Health Conditions, and State Boards Characteristics
PANEL A: STATE HEALTH CHARACTERISTICS
DEP. VAR.: CHD INFECTIOUS RATE PC EXPENDITURES RATING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Health 0.0023 0.0020 0.0359 0.7471 -0.0005 0.0005
(0.0028) (0.0052) (1.5856) (1.1576) (0.0006) (0.0004)
N 25 25 48 48 48 48
Controls X X X X X X
Region FE X X X
PANEL B: SHARE OF TOTAL TAX BURDEN
DEP. VAR.: CHD COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share Taxes 1.5114*** 0.1265 0.1261 0.4443 -1.3234** -0.3107
(0.2555) (0.1848) (0.8939) (0.6491) (0.2843) (0.2584)
N 48 48 48 48 48 48
Controls X X X X X X
Region FE X X X
PANEL C: PER CAPITA TAX BURDEN
DEP. VAR.: CHD COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC Taxes 0.0464 -0.0342 -0.0006 -0.0084 -0.1146** -0.0360
(0.0429) (0.0199) (0.0647) (0.0359) (0.0256) (0.0354)
N 48 48 48 48 48 48
Controls X X X X X X
Region FE X X X
NOTES: The above table shows the factors affecting state adoption. Controls include the
log of population, the share of the population that is white, the share of the population
that is urban. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level with significance
levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health
Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs
Restricted Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property
values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt,
and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
scale to be effective against illness.26
26"The Michigan township was made a health authority in 1846 when, as one investigator
put it, ‘diseases were thought to arise from smells and cemeteries, and when anyone able
to detect an odor or manage a cemetery could have qualified as a health officer." Such
tiny areas, many of them too poor to perform their other functions without state assis-
tance, are unable to afford the personnel or the equipment needed to carry out a health
program of any sort—and a health program is commonly regarded as of much less impor-
tant than, for example, education or roads. The health officers employed are more often
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While it is true that townships in the North set up town-level services,
these services were often ineffective due to the weak finances of the small pop-
ulations. Rather than being subpar to the town level, it was "generally agreed
that the county is the smallest feasible unit from the standpoint of efficiency
of service and administration. In most sections, the use of the county makes
it possible to abandon the large number of ineffective organizations found in
villages and townships" (Lancaster (1937)). To test whether the strength of lo-
cal government differs across treated and untreated states, I compare the tax-
ation power of state and local governments. Taxation is the clearest measure
of the influence of government and captures both the wealth and revenue at
each level.
Table 2 shows the mean value of the per capita taxes and property val-
ues across CHD and non-CHD states. In treated states, municipal taxes are
lower per capita. Even more convincing, the share of the tax burden from
municipal government is lower, while the county level is higher. This differ-
ence in the share of taxes reveals the relative difference in the power structure
across adopting and non-adopting states. County governments are relatively
stronger in areas that adopted, while municipal governments are stronger in
states that did not. The picture is even more clear in Figure 5 which shows
the share of taxes at the county government along with CHD access. The
northeast has few health departments and a very small share of finances at
the county-level of government. The West and South have most of their tax
dollars to the county government and also have many CHDs.
than not untrained, serve in their spare time, are paid only nominal salaries, and are quite
unconvinced of the value of the scientific health measures recommended by the state de-
partment which exercises nominal supervision over them. Of the 1,160 township health
officers in Michigan, 660 are not physicians, while in Indiana townships many of them are
paid as little as ten dollars a year. The post is a minor avocation of its holder, and the work
consists in most places of "an occasional quarantine, an abatement of a nuisance, and a
lighting of fumigators following quarantine" pp. 336 Lancaster (1937)
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Figure 5: Share of Taxes to County Governments and CHD Access
NOTES: The map displays the share of taxes to the county governments with plotted
points representing CHD counties. SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD
operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Organizations in the United
States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level data on property taxes,
property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth,
Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
To formally consider whether states that adopted had stronger county
governments, I consider the relationship between adoption and the taxation
burden with a linear regression in Table 3. Panel B shows the relative burden
between the municipal, county, and state governments and Panel C shows the
per capita burden for the county, state, and municipal governments. In Panel
B Column (1), without regional fixed effects, county governments that par-
ticipated in the movement accounted for a higher proportion of the total tax
revenue. In Column (4), without fixed effects, municipalities representation a
lower ratio of the total tax revenue. Similar to the summary statistics, states
that adopted this program had relatively strong county governments and rel-
atively weak municipal governments.
In addition to the share of the tax burden, the per capita amounts illu-
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minate the total strength of the government. In Panel C Column (5) before
accounting for regional characteristics, municipal governments had a lower
tax burden per capita. After adding regional fixed effects, the significance of
the coefficients disappears. This result is expected as the strength of the gov-
ernment did not vary within region, and when the regional group means are
removed, the effect is no longer detectable. Overall, this result confirms the
anecdotal claims that suggest that the broad adoption throughout the West
and the South was due to the nature of local government in the regions. Coun-
ties were the default level of local government in these regions, while in the
Midwest and Northeast, local government was stronger at the municipal level.
In states that participated in the program, governments were stronger at the
county level and weaker at the municipal level.
5 | County Adoption
I now turn to county-level adoption and consider the factors that affected
the adoption of county-level services within state. I argue that higher adop-
tion occurred in counties with a higher share of taxes at the county level, and
a higher per capita tax rate. Beyond these factors, I show that adoption was
unrelated to the majority of other demographic characteristics including the
prior health conditions in adopting areas. There is some evidence that CHDs
were adopted in more populous urban areas, but when controlling for the tax-
ation level, this relationship disappears.
Throughout this section, I test how adoption is related to various mea-
sures of taxation T , as well as other demographic factors. I estimate:
CHDjs = α+ βTjs + X ′jsγ+ ηs + js (1)
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where CHD is a measure of health department entry in county j. Tj is the
variable of interest in county j such as the share of taxation at the county level.
Xjs are the controls. Controls include the log of population, the share of the
population that is white, the share of the population that is urban. ηs are state
fixed effects. js is the regression error. To measure entry, I first define CHD as
a binary variable that captures whether the county ever received a CHD. Then,
I test the per capita budget and the fraction of funding from external funds.
Health Conditions
Table 4: CHD Activity and Mortality Rate
DEP. VAR.: CHD RATE 1914 BY CAUSE TIME VARYING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1910 1920 Infant Child Infect1 Infect2 Rate Infant
Mortality -0.0035 -0.0018 0.0030 -0.6844 -7.5552 -20.2931 0.0082 0.0007
(0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0051) (11.7248) (8.1717) (20.6400) (0.0065) (0.0039)
N 834 1,970 1,314 832 834 819 38,505 25,153
Controls X X X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X
County FE X X
Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 1 in Panel A and Equation 2 in Panel B. Panel A
displays the stagnant health conditions in the years before the CHD rollout. Columns (1)-(2) show the overall
mortality rate in 1910 and 1920. Column (3) shows the infant mortality rate in 1920. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. Columns (4) and (5) show the by-
cause mortality in 1914 and 1912. Panel B shows the time-varying county mortality rate with county fixed effects.
The estimation represents the mortality in the year before CHD adoption, with counties removed from the sample
once they adopt a health department. Columns (1)-(3) show the overall mortality rate. Columns (4)-(6) show the
infant mortality rate. Controls include the log of population, the share of the population that is white, the share
of the population that is urban. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level with significance levels at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic charac-
teristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data. Vital statistics are from the U.S.
Vital Statistics for the entire full county.
Intuition and anecdotal evidence dictates that worse health conditions
might have influenced the adoption of health services. Anecdotal claims em-
phasize that sanitation services were need based programs spurred by poor
health conditions or epidemics in the area. Based on these claims, higher ill-
ness areas should be more able to solicit funding for CHDs from both private
and public sources. Worse health conditions should also increase the willing-
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ness to pay for services and make CHD adoption more tractable. As with state
adoption, I hypothesize that there will be a link between public health initia-
tives and preexisting disease conditions in adopting counties. To test whether
this connection exists, I consider both the dynamic and stagnant health status
of CHD areas.
First, I consider whether worse pre-rollout health conditions pushed coun-
ties to adopt health services. To accomplish, I consider whether the overall,
infant, and by-cause mortality affected CHD adoption over the period 1910-
1933. For pre-rollout adoption, I test overall and infant mortality in 1910 and
1920, as well as the by-cause mortality rate, averaged over 1912 and 1914. Ta-
ble 4 presents the stagnant OLS results from Equation 1 for all six county mea-
sures with controls for the log of the population, the share urban, and the
share white. Columns (1)-(2) show overall mortality in 1920 and 1910. Col-
umn (3) shows infant mortality in 1920. Columns (4)-(6) show the infectious
disease mortality in the years leading up to the rollout, averaged over 1912 and
1914. Over all six columns, no convincing relationship between the CHD and
the health conditions of the county unfolds. One caveat to these results is that
a portion of the sample is lost due to incomplete mortality statistics. While
the sample loss is not ideal, the estimation still provides an instructive check
on whether there is any evidence that CHDs opened to treat poor health con-
ditions. Ideally, the data would be complete, but to my knowledge, no such
credible data exists.
To test whether epidemics in the year prior to CHD arrival pushed the
local authorities to institute health departments, I consider whether mortal-
ity in t − 1 influenced the provision of a CHD at time t. To characterize the
dynamic relationship with adoption, I use a panel of counties over 1910 to
1933. I only include the first year that the CHD opened, and exclude the years
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after adoption to avoid biasing the coefficients downwards due to successful
health services. The prior year’s mortality is tested over CHD operation in area
j at time t as:
CHDjt = α+ βMj,t−1 + X ′jtγ+ aj + jt (2)
where CHDj is a measure of CHD activity in area j. Mj,t−1 is the area-specific
mortality rate in the prior year. Xjt are time-varying area controls including
the log of the population, the share of the population that is white, and the
share of the population that is urban. aj is the county-specific fixed effect and
jt is the regression error.
Table 4 Columns (7) and (8) presents the results from a full panel estima-
tion (Equation 2) over both infant and overall mortality. Across both measures
of mortality, health conditions in the prior year do not predict CHD operation
at time t. This lack of relationship is surprising, given the anecdotal claims
suggesting that poor health conditions increased public health actions. Likely,
these anecdotal claims were of a small subset of the movement, or did not ac-
count for the time-invariant conditions in the county. County fixed effects
remove any positive relationship between the CHD and mortality rate.
Overall, through both the pre-treatment time period and the pre-rollout
period, I find no concrete relationship between prior health conditions and
CHD operation at the county level. Health conditions before to the program
show no ability to predict CHD placement.
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Relative Local Government Activity
As discussed in the state adoption, Section 4, states with stronger county
governments were more likely to adopt CHDs. Here I retest this assumption
at the county level and ask whether counties within state were more likely to
adopt CHDs if they had stronger county governments as compared with the
local municipal governments. I measure the relative strength of the county
government with the share of tax dollars levied at the county level. Using
the proportion, rather than the level reveals whether the county government
was relatively strong compared with the town or city government. Similarly,
testing the share of total taxes collected the municipal government reveals
whether the city and towns were relatively weak entities. I also include the
share of the state property tax revenues, which may indicate the relative strength
of the state government.
I test a linear specification of Equation 1, with controls for the log of per
capita property values, the log of the size of the population, the share of the
population in urban areas, and the share of the county population that was
white. Table 5 shows the results with and without state fixed effects. I include
both specifications because the strength of the government is relatively con-
stant within the state, and therefore, state fixed effects will remove the effect I
am attempting to detect.
Panel A shows the binary adoption decision. In Columns (1) and (5), with-
out state fixed effects, adopting counties levied a higher share of total taxes
at the county level while municipal forms of government played a weaker
role. This result is similar to the one discovered in Table 3. Generally, with-
out accounting for state or regional constants, counties with stronger county-
level governments adopted the program, while counties containing more au-
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Table 5: Share of Total Taxation by County, State and Municipal Authorities
PANEL A: TREATMENT
DEP. VAR.: TREATMENT COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Total Burden 0.130** -0.150*** 0.140 -0.329***-0.162** 0.222***
(0.059) (0.044) (0.197) (0.084) (0.069) (0.044)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Share 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.29
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X
PANEL B: PER CAPITA BUDGET
DEP. VAR.: PC_BUDGET COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Total Burden 0.012 -0.020* 0.009 -0.052***-0.016 0.036***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011)
N 724 724 724 724 724 724
Mean Share 0.51 0.51 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.27
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X
PANEL C: EXTERNAL FUNDING
DEP. VAR.: EXTERNAL COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Total Burden 0.122 0.017 0.255 -0.129 -0.193 0.016
(0.105) (0.036) (0.209) (0.083) (0.129) (0.034)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Share 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.29
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X
NOTES: Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 1. Controls include
the log of population, the share of the population that is white, the share of the population
that is urban, and the per capita property values. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property values, and
public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation
for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
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tonomous municipal governments had lower adoption of the program. Adding
state fixed effects flips the sign for municipal and county share of total taxes.
A lower share of county taxes leads to higher adoption and vise versa for mu-
nicipal governments. The result suggests again that when removing state in-
variant characteristics, more urban counties adopted the program, even when
controlling for the share of the population that was urban. This confirms
the prior suggestion that the relative strength of county government between
states influenced adoption of this program. Within state, however, areas with
stronger municipal governments or more urban areas were more likely to adopt
the program.
In Table 5 Panel B, I consider the intensive margin within the adopting
sample using the per capita budget. In Columns (1) and (2) the share of the
taxes raised by the county government shows a weak negative relationship
with the funding per capita. In Column (6), municipal taxes by contrast, are
similar to the Panel A, having a higher share of municipal taxes increases the
intensity of the program per capita. The involvement of cities and towns helps
to increase the services per capita and provided better funding overall, which
may in part be due to the two levels of government contributing to the health
department.
Across Panels A and B, areas that have a higher share of the total taxes go-
ing towards the state government are less likely to adopt CHDs and have lower
per capita funding. Because it is assumed that higher state support would lead
to better funding, this relationship is counterintuitive. Two separate possible
explanations for this result exist. First, when removing the state means, areas
that adopted disproportionately had undervalued their property, and corre-
spondingly raise their local taxes. Thus these wealthier counties had lower
state taxes, but relatively high local taxes and this suggests that the wealth-
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iest counties in states disproportionately adopted and funded this program.
A second explanation is that counties that adopted this program had lower
state tax burdens overall, and even when removing state means the relation-
ship still comes through. This is plausible given Southern states may have had
relatively decentralized governments when compared to the rest of the coun-
try.
Table 6: CHD Treatment and Per Household Public Finances
DEP. VAR.: PUBLIC FINANCE MEASURE LEVEL OF TAXATION
Treatment WEALTH DEBT TAXES COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita 0.007** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.134*** 1.455*** 2.464**
(0.003) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.476) (1.170)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Indep 0.67 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 1. Estimation in-
cludes all US counties. Controls include the log of population, the share of the population
that is white, the share of the population that is urban. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property values, and
public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation
for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
Absolute Government Activity
After considering the relative strength of local governments, I turn to the
per capita tax burden. Here I expect that county-level adoption will be con-
tingent on the local tax revenue because counties financed a portion of the
CHD internally. To test this, I re-estimate Equation 1 over the county-level
per capita property values, per capita tax revenue, and per capita public debt.
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Similar to previous iterations, I include controls for the log of population, the
share of the county that is urban, and the share of the population that is white.
Table 7: Per Capita Budget and Per Capita Public Finances
DEP. VAR.: PUBLIC FINANCE MEASURE LEVEL OF TAXATION
PC_Budget WEALTH DEBT TAXES COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita 0.011** 0.241 0.470 3.236*** 2.599 0.336
(0.005) (0.195) (0.326) (1.057) (1.915) (0.221)
N 724 724 724 724 724 724
Mean Indep 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 1. Estimation in-
cludes only the treatment sample. Controls include the log of population, the share of the
population that is white, the share of the population that is urban. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property values, and
public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation
for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
Table 6 shows the relationship between the county wealth, debt, and taxa-
tion over the binary adoption decision. The first three columns show the total
taxation, wealth, and debt per capita. The second three columns display the
per capita taxes at each level of government. Across all measures, adoption is
contingent on the wealth and ability to tax constituents. Counties that have
higher per capita wealth, higher property taxes, and more total debt per capita
are more likely to fund the CHD program. Next, in Columns (4)-(6) I break out
the county tax burden into the per capita county taxes, state taxes, and mu-
nicipal taxes. Across Columns (4) through (6) having higher levels of taxation
make program adoption more likely.
Table 7 repeats the same pattern of results with the per capita budget
within the treatment sample. In Columns (1)-(3), the per capita budget is
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only related to the property values of the county. Wealthier counties allocated
more to the budget within adoption. The relationship between the taxation
and public debt disappears for the per capita budget of CHDs. Turning to the
type of taxation, county, municipal and state in Columns (4)-(6), couties that
have higher county taxes per capita provide more funding for CHDs. Overall,
both adoption and funding are related to the relative ability of county govern-
ments to tax. Counties that adopted and funded this program had higher per
capita taxation as well as overall wealth.
Demographic Characteristics
Figure 6: Pre-Adoption Demographic Characteristics and CHD Entry
PANEL A: TREATMENT
(n = 2, 828)
Given the relationship between county taxation and adoption, it is plau-
sible that counties that adopt this program will be different than those that do
not adopt. To test whether census demographic characteristics predict adop-
tion, Figure 6 plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the
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pre-treatment county-specific characteristics from Equation 1. For the binary
adoption decision in Panel A, when controlling for county tax dollars, none
of the demographic characteristics significantly predict adoption. This is true
only once controls for the taxation level are added. For specifications without
the log of taxation, shown in Table A.32, adoption is more likely in counties
that have larger populations and are more urban. For plotted coefficients with
and without controls see Appendix Table A.33 and Table A.32.
PANEL B: PER CAPITA BUDGET
(n = 725)
The fact CHD placement is related to the population, and the share of ur-
ban residents appears puzzling at first. Since the CHD movement was praised
as being the first rural health movement in the United States, CHDs should
appear primarily in rural counties. CHDs, however, provided as a bridge be-
tween rural areas and the nearby towns and cities. This type of CHD place-
ment was especially the case in the South where cities lacked health depart-
ments until CHD entry. Spreading the county-level health service over the
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cities and the rural areas helped to alleviate the high fixed cost of the initial
investment, and to distribute the total cost over the entire population.27 The
organization of the county governments over the town and cities provided the
opportunity for municipalities to collaborate on public good provision, and in
doing so, allowed rural areas to be included in the program. For the areas that
did not adopt the program, and instead remained ‘unorganized’ in terms of
public health, the towns and municipalities did their best to employ part-time
health officers who collaborated to provide very limited public health func-
tions, including enforcing laws and quarantines (Association et al. (1933)).28
This part-time work was inefficient and allowed the health officers time to
do little preventative work. The organization of the county-level service, by
contrast, placed a full-time health officer over the entire county and brought
services to all residents, city, town, and country.
One surprising result from Figure 6 is the lack of relationship with the
share of physicians in the county. As suggested in the state adoption section,
CHD adoption is expected to be related to the presence of existing health au-
thorities. Doctors signal a propensity toward health and suggest that residents
may have been more likely to accept and adopt public health measures. Fur-
ther, since state boards of health were staffed and run by medical doctors,
ties between the local doctors and state boards of health could increase pro-
gram adoption. On the other hand, there is evidence that doctors could have
27Adoption for the full county was not always the case, especially for very large cities like
Louisville, Kentucky, which had a separate city health department, but for small cities,
usually around 30,000 to 50,000 or less, the county health officer would often oversee the
entire county.
28In a discussion of counties with organized health services as compared with unorganized
counties, Association et al. (1933) states "health service in the unorganized counties was
chiefly distinguished from that in the organized counties by the fact that it was admin-
istered not by one full-time health officer serving the entire county but by a number of
part-time health officers usually representing local units of government – township, bor-
ough, village, or city....Nor were the health officers always physicians." (pp. 43). Further,
these health officers did very little and "health officers in the unorganized counties were
in general responsible only for the enforcement of laws regarding the isolation of com-
municable diseases, for the abatement of nuisances, and for certain other minor health
functions" (pp. 44)
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been negatively related to CHD adoption. Animosity between the rural physi-
cians and public health proponents of the time was a reported problem in
remote areas. Rural doctors who were informed about the benefits of public
health, still complained that public health might reduce their customer base
by eliminating common health complaints.29 Other evidence suggested that
rural physicians went out of their way to ignore public health measures. In one
county, "the health officer complained that doctors avoided public health re-
sponsibilities and refused to enforce a law that was ‘for their benefit, & their
children, and & children’s’ children to a thousand generations’" (Link (1997)
p. 22). The lack of significant effect in Figure 6 is not suggestive of either op-
posing effects. The relative share of physicians in a county does not appear to
have significantly affected adoption of the program and could be due to the
contrasting relationships canceling each other out.
In Panel B, within CHD adoption, I test the intensity of treatment as mea-
sured by the per capita funding. The sample includes only treated counties.
The results show that more funding per capita is allocated in more urban
counties with a lower share of labor force participation, lower labor force par-
ticipation, but higher occupational scores. The results here suggest that fund-
ing for the CHD, in both rural and urban areas of the county, may have been
provided at a higher intensity over previously disadvantaged persons.
External Versus Internal Adoption
A key feature of the CHD movement is the presence of external funding
in addition to internal county participation. Here I try and reconstruct the
factors that affected external funding and compare external participation to
the factors that affected extensive margin adoption. I expect external funding
29See Link (1997).
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PANEL C: SHARE OF EXTERNAL FUNDS
(n = 2, 828)
NOTES: Panels A, B, and C show figures plotting the coefficients and 95% confi-
dence intervals from a linear regression estimating the likelihood of implementing
a CHD, funding a CHD, and receiving external funds. Controls include the log of
population, the share of the population that is white, the share of the population
that is urban, and the log of taxation. The estimations include controls for the log of
the population, the share of the population that is urban, white, black, under five,
medical doctors, women over 21, working, married, renting their dwelling, under
18, and literate. Occscore reflects the occupational score or the median income by
profession.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the
History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Pub-
lic Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
will be distinct from the features that affect local funding appropriation. To
measure external funds, I use the fraction of the total budget received from
external grants. Counties that did not adopt CHDs are included in the analysis
with a zero for the fraction of external grants.
In Table 6 Panel C, Table 5 Panel C, and Table A.31, no demographic or fi-
nancial feature appear to predict external funding for the CHD. External fund-
ing appears unrelated to the share of the population that was urban, the num-
ber of cities and towns, and the local finances. These external funding sources
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appear to be distributed based on a secondary rule and cannot be explained
in the same way as overall county adoption. This quasi-random funding helps
to distribute the CHD services to populations that otherwise would not have
received health services. The big picture result here suggests that on aggre-
gate, the outside private and public donors were so heterogeneous, that no
single factor can explain their presence in each county or state.
Figure 7: Pre-Adoption Demographic Characteristics and CHD Exit
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
(n = 2, 828)
CHD Failures
Whether CHDs integrated permanently into the localities varied by re-
gion. For some areas, budget constraints of the local governments made pro-
vision of health difficult. In other areas, the citizens or the officials were re-
portedly not prepared for well functioning public health measures. Ferrell
et al. (1936) list factors affecting closure as "mediocre personnel; the estab-
lishment of units before public opinion was prepared for them; inadequate
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leadership from State health departments, both administrative and financial
politics; and the starting of work in counties to weak to function effectively."
To test whether these factors hold up under empirical scrutiny, I consider the
defining characteristics of CHDs that opened and subsequently closed prior
to 1933.
PANEL B: CHD SAMPLE
(n = 725)
NOTES: Panels A, and B show figures plotting the 95% confidence intervals from a
linear regression estimating the likelihood of having a CHD close.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the
History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Pub-
lic Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
First, I consider the proposition that unsuccessful CHDs were located in
remote communities. These isolated communities may be less inclined to
adopt "bureaucratic authority" over health (Link (1997)) and this would sug-
gest that CHDs might close in less literate, less urban, and poorer areas. To
test whether these demographic factors affect closure, I reestimate the base-
line characteristics over CHDs that closed. Figure 7 compares the 1910 demo-
graphic characteristics of CHDs that remained open versus those that closed.
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Across the full sample in Panel A, CHDs appear no different, except for a slightly
smaller share of children under age 18. Counties that closed CHDs were no
less literate, no less urban, had a similar share of doctors, and were no differ-
ent in terms of race. While there were reports of constituents in remote areas
having conflicts with CHDs, on average, this does not appear to be the domi-
nant explanatory factor. There may have been some contention between the
"reformers and the reformed," but this was not a primary feature of the clo-
sure of CHDs.
Table 8: CHD Closure and Financial Characteristics
DEP. VAR.: PUBLIC FINANCE MEASURE LEVEL OF TAXATION
Close WEALTH DEBT TAXES COUNTY STATE MUNICIPAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita 0.001 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.176 -0.039
(0.001) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.131) (0.259)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Indep 0.67 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted
Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property values, and
public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation
for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
Second, I consider whether CHDs that closed were different than the treated
sample instead of the national sample of counties. Figure 7 Panel B shows
the results with the CHD sample. Unsuccessful CHD areas do appear to be
slightly smaller counties and have small urban centers. Counties that had to
close their CHDs appear to be more isolated and served fewer people overall.
This result provides evidence for the claim that CHD areas were more remote
along with residents being slightly less literate.
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Anecdotal evidence also suggests that unsuccessful CHDs located in fi-
nancially constrained areas.30 To test this, I consider the finances of the local
county government over the CHDs that closed versus those that stayed open
in Table 8. There appears to be no significant difference across financial fea-
tures between CHDs that stayed open versus those that closed. Overall, rel-
ative to successful CHDs, unsuccessful CHDs located in more remote areas.
The other financial conditions, such as income, wealth, and taxation appear
no different between CHD and non-CHD areas. There is also no evidence that
CHD closure happened as a result of a population that was less literate, less
wealthy, or had a lower propensity towards health.
6 | Inequality
Based on the results suggesting that CHDs operated in areas with higher
wealth and larger populations, I test whether CHDs were redistributive within
county. Related literature, Ramcharan (2010) and Vollrath (2013), has found
education spending to be higher in more homogeneous areas with low lev-
els of inequality. If CHDs provided a bridge between different types of pop-
ulations, CHDs may been the opposite from education spending in terms of
inequality. To test which type of counties CHD opened in, I measure inequal-
ity using land and income Gini Coefficients, the fraction of landless men, the
segregation within the county, and the distribution of farm sizes.
Land and Income Inequality
To measure inequality, I first use a Gini coefficient on land and income to
capture occupational and wealth inequality within a county. Land inequality
30These areas were not necessarily the drought affected communities, as federal funds went
to CHDs in drought affected areas in the 1930s. See Ferrell et al. (1936).
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is measured using the distribution of farm sizes as reported in the agricultural
census. I calculate the Gini coefficient on the distribution of farms based on
Ramcharan (2010) and Vollrath (2013). The distribution of land between res-
idents is especially salient for period in question as land was the default way
of storing wealth (Ramcharan (2010)). To complement this rough measure of
wealth inequality, I also make use of the fact that a large group of landless men
may be an even better signal of inequality within a county. Landless men cap-
ture whether CHDs operated in areas with a small fraction of landholders and
a large landless population of farm workers.
Since CHDs operated in urban and rural areas, however, land inequal-
ity is not the only helpful measure of inequality. It is difficult to measure the
wealth inequality for urban areas using land ownership as the sole measure
of inequality. To bridge this gap, I also measure between-profession income
inequality using the profession-based occupation scores. Income inequality
may be suggestive of the relative inequality between constituents, despite the
fact that local taxes relied on wealth and not income. To measure income
inequality, I make use of the reported occupational income from the 1910
Census. The occupational score is assigned to each working person, and I
utilize this median income by occupation to calculate the Gini coefficient for
income. Ideally, I would have the full income information for individuals, as
the occupation score removes all within-profession variability, however, this
measures is only available in the 1940 census.
With these measures in mind, to test the redistribution effect of CHDs, I
estimate:
CHDjs = α+ βGjs + γPjs + X ′jγ+ ηs + js (3)
where CHD is a measure of health department entry in county j. Gj is the
measure of inequality in county j. Pjs is the per capita property value. Xj
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are county-level controls, including the log of the population, the share of the
population that is white, and the share urban. ηs are state fixed effects. js is
the regression error.
Table 10 shows the results across the five measures of inequality, the Gini
coefficient for income inequality, the Gini coefficient for land inequality, the
adjusted Gini coefficient, the fraction of landless males, and the county seg-
regation measure. In Panel A, CHDs are placed in areas with higher occu-
pational inequality, a higher level of land inequality when adjusted by the
fraction of landowners, and a higher proportion landless males. CHD areas
have higher levels of inequality across all measures of inequality, except seg-
regation. Health departments mitigate inequalities within county, rather than
serving areas with homogeneous populations.
In even columns, the per capita budget, the results appear similar. CHDs
that allocate more funding per capita appear in areas that have more inequal-
ity. Even the land Gini remains strongly significant, suggesting that better
funded CHDs operated in areas with higher inequality. These results con-
trast with similar literature that considers the funding for schooling. Ramcha-
ran (2010) and Vollrath (2013) find that schools funds are negatively related
to inequality, while the results here suggest CHDs are, in fact, redistributive.
The contrasting findings are likely due to the differing governance of services.
Having CHDs at the county level was beneficial for redistribution because of
the nature of local government. This finding is more in line with the findings
for the South in Vollrath (2013), where Southern rural schools were unrelated
to inequality.
While a portion of this may be due to the urban-rural split of the counties,
the fact that CHDs operated at the county level and served both the rural and
urban areas is a unique feature of the movement. Many types of public goods
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served only the municipalities and having the CHD at the county level allowed
the health services to serve a more diverse heterogeneous population. The
results hold even though controls include the fraction of the population that
was urban.
Farm Distribution
Next, to consider a more detailed analysis of the distribution wealth, I
consider the relationship between the CHD and the share of farms at each
size. Understanding the exact distribution of land is instructive for drawing
conclusions about the type of county served by CHDs. To accomplish, I re-
placeG in Equation 4 with:
F =
# Farm Size i
# Farms
I then estimate a linear specification of Equation 4 each share of farm size i.
Figure 8 plots the coefficients from each separate estimation. Across all three
measures of CHD, treatment, per capita budget, and rural only counties, a
similar pattern emerges. At lower levels of acreage, less than three acres, CHDs
are no more likely to appear. Then for counties with more farms between three
and 49 acres, CHDs are more likely to operate. At 50 acres or more, the rela-
tionship reverses and is negative up until 500 acres. At 500 acres and above,
CHDs are more likely to likely to operate. This relationship between farm size
distribution and CHD funding again suggests a redistributive relationship be-
tween CHD activity and the constituents in the county. Counties that adopted
and funded the program have a high number of small plots and a relatively
large number of large plantations rather than evenly distributed plots of land.
In Panel B, the per capita budget, the relationship is even stronger for
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Figure 8: Farm Size and Adoption
PANEL A: TREATMENT
PANEL B: PER CAPITA BUDGET
smaller plots and declines quickly to become negative and significant for medium
sized plots. Counties with a large share of plantation-like farms do not appear
to allocate more funding per capita. The relationship has a less clear v-shape
than Panel A. In Panel C, rural-only counties. The relationship appears similar
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to Panel A, but the confidence intervals are wider due to the smaller sample
size. CHDs are adopted and funded in areas with small plot sizes and large
plantation-like farms but less so for medium-sized farms.
PANEL C: TREATMENT, RURAL COUNTIES
NOTES: Panels A, B, and C show the coefficients from a linear estimation testing
the likelihood of implementing and funding a CHD based on the share of farms of
each size. Each point represents a separate estimation. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the
History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Pub-
lic Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publica-
tions entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
Now, instead of considering each plot size separately, I test the relation-
ship over share of farms, holding the other farm size shares constant. I con-
sider the farm distribution for each size bucket 0 to 49, 50 to 499, and 500 plus
acres of farmland. This appears as:






js + γPjs + X
′
jγ+ ηs + js (4)
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where each Fijs is the share of farms in each size category, 0 to 49, 50 to 499,
and 500 plus.
Figure 9 shows the results across the distribution of land for each category
holding the other categories constant. In the full county sample, counties that
had more large farms were more likely to adopt and fund CHDs. Having more
small farms has a positive effect, but the result is not significant. CHD areas
appear to have more large farms than the rest of the US counties but are no
different over medium or small farms.
Figure 9: Farm Size Groupings and Adoption
NOTES: Graph shows the coefficients from a linear estimation testing the likeli-
hood of implementing and funding a CHD based on the share of farms of each size
holding the other farm sizes constant. Each model, all and rural, represents the co-
efficients from one regression model, where the share of total farms 0-49, 50-499,
and 500+ are included in the same estimation model. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the
History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Pub-
lic Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publica-
tions entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
As urban areas may be producing the majority of the inequality effect,
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I limit the sample to only rural counties. When considering rural counties,
a split occurs. CHD areas appear to have a high share of small farms and
large farms but not many medium-size farms. These results provide further
evidence that even in rural counties, CHDs entered into areas with relative
wealth inequalities. CHDs operated in areas with a large number of farms
over 500 acres and small-sized farms, but not many medium-sized farms. The
results over the farm sizes appear both in urban-rural counties and in rural-
only counties. CHDs perform a partially redistributive role from those with
extensive land wealth to those with meager collections of land wealth.
Segregation
Segregation is provides another measure of inequality that might be espe-
cially relevant in the context of the CHD due to the wide adoption throughout
the South. There is some evidence that CHD services were distributed to non-
whites, but in a segregated manner. The top diagram in Figure 29 shows an ex-
ample clinic in Tennessee. The services within this clinic were clearly split by
race (Atwater (1935)). The bottom diagram in Figure 29 displays the individ-
ual clinics distributed throughout the county, with services again segregated
in their operation. It may be that this segregation of services was exclusive to
one county, but there is very little discussion over whether segregation was a
common feature of the movement. Even in the text where the diagrams were
retrieved makes no mention of the segregation of services other than a brief
mentioning of racial differences in staff.31 Likely, segregation was taken as
given, and the fact that services were segregated was not a relevant discussion
in the historical context.
31"...provided for a public health personnel consisting of a trained health officer serving full
time, a full-time medical assistant, a director of nursing service and six staff nurses, one of
whom was colored" (pp 7 Atwater (1935)).
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To test whether CHD areas were more segregated counties, I calculate the
share of segregated individuals using the methodology described in Logan
and Parman (2017). Using the Full Count 1940 Census, I count the number
of individuals who share the same race as their neighbors. Then to calcu-
late a county-level measure of whether neighbors are racially similar, I take
the share of the total population having neighbors of the same race. A higher
share will indicate more segregation, and a lower share less segregation.
Table 10 Columns (9)-(10) show the results. Across all specifications, seg-
regation does not appear to be related to CHD adoption. In the full specifica-
tion with controls and state fixed effects, counties that adopted the movement
were no more segregated than those that did not. This relationship is surpris-
ing because based on findings in Logan and Parman (2017) Southern urban
areas were the most segregated areas in the US and these areas were also more
likely to adopt and fund CHDs. Across all specifications, CHDs do not appear
to be located in either more or less segregated areas.
Political Influence
Public health spending at the turn of the twentieth was politically affili-
ated and used by politicians as a way of garnering support for political parties.
For example in Florida, "the health system became a major source of politi-
cal patronage" (Link (1997) pp 286). The directors in Florida specifically used
health spending to increase support from progressive leaning constituents.
Due to this patronage, especially with the progressive wing, political patterns
of adopting counties may be suggestive of the type of constituent present in
adopting counties. Progressive influence in health might illuminate participa-
tion in the program. To test this, I consider whether CHDs were adopted in ar-
eas with higher third party vote shares. These third-party votes were tied with
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the Progressive influence of the day. Due to the background evidence suggest-
ing that the CHD movement was an outgrowth of the Progressive movement,
it is expected that third-party vote will be related to CHD operation.
On the other side, in states with greater inequality, wealthy individuals
were able to block the political participation of poor whites and non-whites
through literacy tests, and the other barriers to the political process (Ram-
charan (2010)). This was especially the case in areas with a great number of
landed elite. The Democratic party was closely aligned with landed elite and
provides a measure at the other end of the spectrum of the third party voting
pattern. In the South especially, the Democratic Party was closely tied with
large landholders, and a higher share of votes for the Democratic Party may
be suggestive of greater county land inequality.
To measure political alignment, I use four key measures. First, I consider
whether ‘close call’ elections affected the operation of a health department.
Following Ramcharan (2010), in elections where Republican and Democratic
votes were close calls, politicians were more likely to enact redistributive poli-
cies to reward constituents. In addition to close calls, I also test the relative
shares of each party vote, Republican, Democrat, and third party. If CHDs ap-
peared in areas with higher third party votes, it might suggest that these health
programs were targeting progressive constituents. If on the other hand, these
CHDs appear in more Democratic areas, it is assumed that CHDs operated in
counties with high levels of inequality and landed elite. I test both the stag-
nant voting patterns of the county as well as the time-varying adoption as the
deviation from the county time-invariant pattern.
Table 9 shows the county-level votes for federal congressional seats. In
Panel A, for the 1910 election, no clear relationship between the political vari-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































appear to predict participation in the movement. In both urban and rural
counties, the stagnant voting characteristics do not appear related to adop-
tion. This implies that counties that adopted this program were not particu-
larly aligned with the Democratic, Republican, or Progressive parties.
In Panel B, I reestimate adoption over the time-varying voting shares for
every election year between 1910 and 1932, from in Equation 2. The lagged
independent variable contains the voting share from the most recent election
(t − 1), and the treatment reflects the current year t. Due to the county fixed
effects, this voting measure captures the deviation from the time-invariant
political alignment of the county. In Columns (1)-(6) CHDs appear in years
following relatively higher vote share going to Democrats and a lower vote
share going to both Republicans and third-party candidates. The negative re-
lationship with third party vote is puzzling as counties that are voting more
progressive are less likely to adopt a CHD. This result appears contrary to the
anecdotal claims of the period. CHD appropriation is not related to more pro-
gressive voting patterns at the local level.
In Columns (1)-(3) having a higher share of county votes for the Demo-
cratic Party increases the likelihood of CHD participation. This is surpris-
ing because it indicates that CHDs are adopted in areas voting alongside the
landed elite. This suggests that either inequality is changing in adopting coun-
ties or that these counties were offering services to appease those left out of
the political process. The appearance of the CHD movement in areas with
higher Democratic votes confirms earlier estimates suggesting that CHDs op-
erated in areas with higher inequality. Here the result holds even in rural ar-
eas, which suggests that not all the redistributive power of CHDs appeared in
counties with both rural and urban areas.
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6.1 Religious Influence
Finding that CHD adoption is unrelated to Progressive politics is surpris-
ing for several reasons. First, the CHD movement was fundamentally a pro-
gressive health policy and would be expected to appear in more progressive
areas. Second, constituents who were more progressive may have been more
inclined towards public health measures of the day. This is especially true be-
cause, on the other side of the spectrum, many isolated rural individuals were
wary of state influence in their private lives.
To consider a different measure of the progressive influence, Panel C shows
the CHD adoption by the religious affiliation. Both those attending churches
affiliated with social gospel and the Catholic denominations are presented for
the state and county. Catholic is chosen as a check on the specification for so-
cial gospel affiliation, as related work, Moehling and Thomasson (2012) finds
that adoption of the Sheppard-Towner funding is tied to the fraction of the
Catholic population in a state. I also test two measures of social gospel influ-
ence, because there are varying accounts of affiliated denominations.
In Table 9 Panel C, over the two measures of Social Gospel affiliation,
CHD appropriation does not appear related to county-level progressive poli-
tics. When removing state-invariant characteristics, CHDs appear in less pro-
gressive counties. This result is interesting, as it reveals that while CHDs may
have appeared in more progressive states, the counties that adopted the move-
ment were relatively less progressive. This finding confirms the results from
Panel B, where third-party votes are negatively related to CHD adoption.
Overall, the results from both the political influences and the religious
influences suggest that CHDs areas were less progressive than non-adopting
areas. CHDs were placed in areas where the landed elite were winning at the
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polls and in areas with lower levels of progressive influence.
7 | Changes in County Characteristics
Counties adopting this program may not only have had different levels
of demographic and financial characteristics, but also may have experienced
changes over time. Here I check whether the story for the stagnant adoption
of CHDs holds over time, or if instead, counties that adopted experienced dif-
ferent trends in characteristics. For instance, the most direct case would be
a county raising its tax rate to pay for CHD operation. This would mean that
changes in taxation pushed CHDs to open rather than the stronger level of
government.
To test whether adopting counties had characteristics that changed over
time, I test whether adoption in county j is dependent on some characteristics
D:
CHDjst = α+ βDjstx+ X ′jstγ+ ηj + φst + jst (5)
where CHDjst is an indicator that equals one if a county adopts in that time
period t = 1910, 1920, 1930. Djst is the demographic or financial character-
istics of interest. ηj captures time-invariant county fixed effects. φst cap-
tures state-by-year fixed effects, such as higher state participation in the over-
all CHD program. jst is the regression error. Xjt are time-varying county
controls, including the log of the population and the share of the population
that is urban. This estimation tests whether county adoption is predicted by
changes in the demographic characteristics of interest,Djst.
Table 11 Panel A shows the financial characteristics of the county, includ-
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ing the per capita property values, taxes, and total debt. In the full specifica-
tion, counties that adopt this program appear no different than counties that
do not. The are no changes to tax revenue, property values, or total debt per
capita that explain CHD adoption. In Panels B and C the results are similar
over the demographic characteristics. While the levels may explain appropri-
ation, changes to each category do not appear to explain the adoption of a
CHD. Counties that decide to fund this program are different in their levels
rather than the changes. Counties that adopted CHDs are different in their
relative characteristics but do not appear to have explainable shifts over the
adoption period.
8 | Conclusion
The CHD movement of the early twentieth was one of the first public
health programs to serve rural areas. To understand what factors enabled
counties to adopt this program, I consider the characteristics of participating
states and counties.
At the state level, I find that state governments who participated had his-
torically administered funding for public goods at the county level. These
states had stronger county governments, with a higher share of the overall tax
burden. The differing structure of local government accounts for the differ-
ences in adoption of the movement. This explains why states such as New
England and the central Midwest were low adopters of the program despite
being more powerful governments with a general propensity to provide pub-
lic goods. Due to the structural differences in local governance, the township-
organized states opted out of the county-level service. I test this fact empiri-
cally at the state level, using the taxation power of local government and dis-
cover that in adopting states, the share of the total tax burden is higher at the
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county level and lower at the municipal level. This result holds at the county
level, before removing regional fixed effects, specific counties that adopted
had a higher share of county-level taxes and a lower share at the municipal
level. The lower ability of municipal governments to tax constituents in adopt-
ing states suggests a stronger county level of government.
After removing state-invariant characteristics, I find that adopting coun-
ties had higher property values and taxes, as well as more cities and towns
within the boundary of the county. Further, for adopting counties, more per
capita funding was allocated in areas with more cities and towns. The lower
fixed cost of investment spread over the larger populations likely supported
adoption of the health programs.
Contrary to expectation, county adoption is not predicted by the level
of literacy in the county, a propensity toward health, or pretreatment health
conditions. Results with pre-treatment health conditions are surprising as I
initially assumed that pre-treatment health conditions would influence the
adoption of the CHD. Counties who are more in need of the sanitation and
health services should be more willing to pay for them. Results in this pa-
per, however, suggest that mortality was similar between adopting and non-
adopting counties. Further, for the available data, counties that adopted this
program appear no more likely to have epidemic conditions, measured by
spikes in mortality in the year before adoption. Instead, the county’s ability
to provide public goods as well as the size of the population predicts adop-
tion. CHDs are allocated based on ability rather than need.
Factors that affect internal versus external funding of CHDs are distinct.
External financing from private and public organizations is uncorrelated with
almost all of the factors considered. The factors discussed in this paper are
those related to internal provisions of funds. Surprisingly, external funding
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does not entirely counterbalance wealth effect of locally appropriated fund-
ing. External public and private funds are no more likely to be distributed to
areas with lower income or health. Adoption appears to be entirely related to
the county’s wealth, but the fraction of funding received from external sources
appears to be quasi-random.
The results from this paper show that public health appropriation is not
necessarily related to the need for public health services. Based on the between-
county inequality, I consider the redistribution effects of public health within
county. From the findings in related work,32 CHDs are expected to appear in
wealthier areas with lower levels of inequality. Contrary to this expectation,
CHDs are placed in areas with higher levels of land and income inequality.
CHDs act as a redistributive program and serve to bridge the gap in health ser-
vices between lower and higher access individuals. Areas that provided public
health services show greater wealth and income disparities. These areas, how-
ever, appear no more segregated or racial split within each state.
Overall these results suggest that for public goods to be distributed uni-
formly, public and private aid that arises from outside the locality must be
present. If local tax revenue is the only source of funding available, adoption
will occur in areas where local governments can supply revenue through taxa-
tion of local constituents. Despite this between-county inequality, CHDs were
redistributive within-county and served areas with more income and land in-
equality. The conclusions from this paper help to identify how public health
is disseminated and reveal that public goods are not necessarily distributed
based on original intent, in this case, to improve poor health quality.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Time Varying Characteristics
PANEL A: FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
DEP. VAR.: CHD PROPERTY VALUES PROPERTY TAXES TOTAL DEBT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Household -0.0007* 0.0002 0.0124 0.0425 0.0005 -0.0048
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0196) (0.0271) (0.0073) (0.0080)
N 8,483 8,483 8,483 8,483 8,483 8,483
County FE X X X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X
PANEL B: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
DEP. VAR.: CHD Cities # Towns White Black Under 5 Under 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls 0.0169 0.0017 0.1732 -0.2351 0.4189 0.1127
(0.0227) (0.0031) (0.1503) (0.2221) (0.3429) (0.1330)
N 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486
County FE X X X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
PANEL C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
DEP. VAR.: CHD Physician Females Married Rent Occscore Illiterate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls -1.7758 0.0664 -0.0276 -0.1472* -0.0009 -0.0360
(5.2795) (0.3471) (0.0883) (0.0816) (0.0028) (0.1241)
N 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,480
County FE X X X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
NOTES: Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 5. Controls in-
clude the log of population, the share of the population that is white, the share of the
population that is urban. . Panels B and C exclude the share of the population that is
white from the controls. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health
Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs
Restricted Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, prop-
erty values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public




EXPLAINING DECLINES IN US RURAL MORTALITY,
1910-1933: THE ROLE OF COUNTY HEALTH
DEPARTMENTS
1 | Introduction
Before the turn of the twentieth century, urban centers faced a dispropor-
tionate disease burden that drew the focus of public health attention. These
city-specific health problems neglected the significant rural portion of the
United States, which made up 60% of the national population in 1900. Ru-
ral areas lagged in access to sanitation and public health services, despite the
convergence in urban-rural mortality.1 Relative our modern perspective, both
US rural and urban infant mortality rivaled countries with the worst infant
mortality by today’s standards (See Figure 10). In 1915, rural infant mortal-
ity was 94 deaths per 1,000 births and in urban areas, it was 103 deaths per
1,000 births, both of these measures compete with 2016 infant mortality in
Afghanistan and Somalia. Rural areas were also reported to exceed urban ar-
eas in preventable illness exposure. One widespread study found that in rural
areas "measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, influenza, lobar pneumonia and
diarrhea and enteritis account for a greater proportion of deaths than in the
cities" (Lancaster (1937)).
1Ferrell et al. (1936)
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Figure 10: Infant Deaths Per 1,000 Births, 1915, 1933, and 2016
SOURCES: U.S. Vital Statistics 1933 and 1915. CIA Infant Mortality Estimates 2016.
By 1908 the shortage of rural public health and the high mortality con-
ditions in rural areas drew national attention from the United States Public
Health Service (USPHS) and health-interested private organizations. These
organizations targeted the rural mortality problem by instituting local public
health departments that were operated by the existing county government.
This revolutionary approach initiated the first nationwide rural public health
program in US history. The rollout of health infrastructure improved sanita-
tion and provided access to child health services in under-served areas through-
out the US. The sanitation improvements included inspections, hygiene train-
ing, and installation of toilets, wells, and drainage. Health services appeared
in the form of exams, nutritional consults, immunizations, and midwife hy-
giene training. Local tax dollars provided the majority of funding for this pro-
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gram but supplemented support arrived from outside organizations including
the USPHS, state governments, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (RSC),
and the Sheppard-Towner Act.
This study questions whether the services offered by county health de-
partments (CHDs) impacted the local health conditions in targeted counties.
Reports surrounding the history of CHDs detail the mortality benefit of the
program, but the causal inference is limited. For instance, one report in Ten-
nessee details "for the 3-year period 1927-1929 the recorded death rate from
diphtheria was about 20 percent lower and that from typhoid fever about 40
percent lower in the aggregate population of the counties provided with whole-
time county health service than in that of counties not provided with such ser-
vice" (p. 2630 Lumsden (1920-30)). The historical studies compare counties
with and without health services, but do not take into account the selection
issue inherent the CHD program. These previous approaches have limited
causal interpretation, and a more robust empirical estimation is needed to
properly assess the program.
To measure the impact of CHDs, I use a novel dataset of CHD implemen-
tation from 1908 to 1933 combined with county-level mortality data, census
data, and county level taxation. I reconsider the effect of the national pro-
gram using an event-study design that exploits variation in when and where
CHDs were adopted. This event-study approach follows the mortality in each
year before and after CHD arrival, and compares the changes in mortality rel-
ative to the period before the CHD arrived as well as mortality conditions in
counties that never received the CHD. The event study approach also captures
whether counties experience an increase in mortality just before the CHD ar-
rived.
To address the selection issue, I first show that the county tax levels are
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the primary factor driving adoption. I then control for county tax dollars by
directly adding the log of taxation in the specification as well as including tax-
group-by-year fixed effects. These tax-by-year fixed effects capture the dif-
ferential changes in health in areas with higher levels of government activity.
Using the event study approach, I measure the effect of the CHD on both over-
all and infant mortality for the entire county as well as rural portions of the
county. I find that CHDs reduced the local infant mortality rate but had no
consistent impact on overall population mortality. Unlike the urban public
health investments, CHDs were only beneficial for infants and cannot explain
a meaningful portion of the mortality transition in rural areas.
The results based on the event-study design suggest that health invest-
ments reduced infant mortality by two deaths per 1,000 births. This decline
in infant mortality appears to persist for at least four periods after the initial
operation of a CHD. Based on the infant mortality decline, from 88 deaths
per 1,000 births to 62 deaths per 1,000 births by 1933, CHD access accounts
for eight percent of rural mortality decline over the span of the rollout.2 The
magnitude of this effect is similar, but slightly lower than the impact of the
Sheppard-Towner Act found in Moehling and Thomasson (2014).3 Comparing
the relative size of the effect to sewage and sanitation investment in urban ar-
eas, the effect appears small. Alsan and Goldin (2015) find that infrastructure
investments account for 44 percent of the period decline in infant mortality
between 1880 and 1915.
Next, I consider the heterogeneity of the effect by region and the size of
the county. First, I examine whether the effect is stronger in counties that in-
clude cities and towns in their boundary. I find that the decline in infant mor-
2In rural sections of counties, infant mortality, was 88 per 1,000 births in 1917 and declined
to 62 by 1934.
3Moehling and Thomasson (2014). for 9 to 21 percent of the decline in infant mortality over
the period.
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tality is more substantial in rural-only counties, where the mortality decline is
three to four deaths per 1,000 births. This result is quite interesting as it reveals
that CHDs improved mortality in their targeted population, and further sug-
gests that the associated declines in mortality are unlikely to spillovers from
urban mortality. The effect is also most considerable in counties with smaller
population sizes. Turning to differential the impact by region, I find the in-
fant mortality decline is most substantial in the Midwest, with an estimated
decline close to five deaths per 1,000 births. In the South the results are mixed
and confounded by the impact of the 1927 Mississippi floods. When Missis-
sippi is removed, the result is similar to the Midwest. There is little evidence
for an impact on infant mortality in the West.
This study adds to the literature by being one of the first to focus on a
rural-oriented public health program during the early twentieth century. The
primary prior work addressing rural morality is Higgs (1973), which consid-
ers the period leading up to the start of this study, 1890-1915, and concludes
that declines in mortality were precipitated by an improved standard of liv-
ing. Higgs (1973) notes that there were few public health programs during this
time which could explain the rural mortality reductions. This paper picks up
where Higgs (1973) left off, and follows the inception of the first documented
rural public health program. While this present study shows that the CHD
participation cannot explain the majority of the mortality transition, it does
document the effect of the first public health investment in rural areas during
the early twentieth century.
Though this study is one of the first to consider rural public health in the
early twentieth century, it follows an extensive literature covering state and
city-level efforts. The city-level literature has shown urban public health in-
vestments lead to significant declines in adult and infant mortality (Troesken
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(1999), Troesken (2001), Haines (2001), Cutler and Miller (2005), and Alsan
and Goldin (2015)). Prior work has also documented the benefit of more uni-
fied public health efforts across several states. Papers including Olmstead and
Rhode (2004), Bleakley (2010), and Moehling and Thomasson (2014) find re-
duced state-level mortality from broad public health efforts. Two closely re-
lated studies, Moehling and Thomasson (2014) and Bleakley (2007) have con-
sidered slightly different contexts of similar funding initiatives. Moehling and
Thomasson (2014) examines the Sheppard-Towner Act and finds decreased
state-level infant mortality in targeted areas. Bleakley (2007) considers the ef-
forts of the Rockefeller Sanitation Commissions participation (RSC) in hook-
worm eradication and finds improved long-run outcomes for children.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section II covers the his-
tory of the health investment. Section III describes the novel administrative,
mortality, and tax data employed. Section IV presents the event-study design
used as the primary empirical strategy. Section V displays the results from the
event study design. Section VI discusses the mechanisms for the effect, and
Section VII concludes.
2 | Background
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 60 percent of the US popula-
tion lived in rural areas with inadequate public health infrastructure. By 1908,
a national desire to spread sanitation, led by the USPHS, prompted the initia-
tion of CHDs.4 These health units targeted rural areas and smaller towns, but
for cost efficiency, they sometimes combined with city governments to over-
see the entire county.5 The overall goal of the movement was to spread “com-
4USPHS (n.d.) Public Health Bulletins 615, 699, 788, 887, 964, 1047, 1118, 1259, 1339, and
1421
5This combination was particularly true in the Southern United States.
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municable disease control measures, sanitation of private homes and public
places, malaria prevention, tuberculosis control, goiter prevention, infant and
maternity hygiene, venereal disease prevention, and school hygiene” (Lums-
den (1920-30), pp 2616). CHDs operated under the direction of a full-time
health officer along with assistance from nurses, inspectors, and clerks. CHDs
were primarily paid for by county tax dollars but frequently received up to 50
percent of their funding from other private or public funds. The four primary
sources of outside grants included: the RSC, the USPHS, state health funds,
and the Sheppard-Towner Act.6
History of Funding
The country’s first CHD was internally funded and opened outside Louisville
in Jefferson County, Kentucky. For increased adoption across the nation, out-
side consultation was necessary. In 1911, the USPHS piloted a rural health
department in Yakima County, Washington. This CHD worked to contain ty-
phoid fever—a water-borne and food-borne infection—that caused a three-
fold mortality rate in the U.S. relative to comparable nations.7 In Yakima County,
the USPHS helped to institute improvements in irrigation and water sanita-
tion in both the rural area and the small town of Yakima These efforts report-
edly produced a steep decline in typhoid-specific mortality. After successes
in the West, the movement extended to the impoverished South where the
USPHS spread water sanitation to control typhoid fever and related diseases
of filth, nutritional changes to reduce pellagra, and mosquito control to pre-
vent malaria. Through these measures, the USPHS decreased instances of all
three ailments, demonstrating that full-time local health units were effective
at conquering targeted illnesses.
6The Rockefeller Foundation funded activities through the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission
(RSC), Fosdick (1952) pp 38-41.
7Hygienic Laboratory Bulletin 35, 44, 52, and 72.
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Simultaneous to the USPHS, in 1910 the RSC created a five-year partner-
ship with state health departments to improve conditions in 11 states from
Virginia to Texas (see Bleakley (2007)). In 1915 the RSC efforts transitioned
into a partnership with county-level officials, contributing directly to the CHD
budget. Health department funded by the RSC were interested in benefiting
child health through a reduction in diseases of filth and improvements in ba-
sic care (Ferrell et al. (1936)).
The 1920s marked the appearance of grants explicitly designed to target
infant and maternal mortality. In 1921, the U.S. Department of Labor pro-
moted mother and child health through the Sheppard-Towner Act.8 CHDs
receiving this aid targeted their initiatives towards prenatal and infant exams,
training of midwives, and spreading mother-infant hygiene information. Out-
side of this Act, individual donors supported infant-child health in Kentucky,
Ohio, and Michigan. Kentucky’s Mary Breckenridge contributed to the bud-
get of counties targeting infant and young children’s health. The Children’s
Fund of Michigan heavily supported mother-infant health, and private con-
tributions surpassed state and national funds. Later in the 1920s, the Missis-
sippi flood of 1927 spurred the creation of health facilities in affected areas
and brought in additional funds from the Red Cross.
By 1931, approximately 600 counties had CHDs,9 with 88 percent receiv-
ing a portion of outside funding. Even though the bulk of annual funding
came from internal county funds, most counties required an external incen-
tive to begin improving the health of residents.10 Figure 11 plots the counties
that operated a CHD between 1908 and 1933, by the year the opened and Fig-
ure 32 plots the funding sources.
8MA, CT, and IL opted out of this program.
9Historical documents report fewer health departments because districts of health depart-
ments were enacted for a few county groups. District health departments served counties
in groups. To deal with this issue districts are split equally over counties.
10Duffy (1992), Ferrell et al. (1936).
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Figure 11: CHD Timing
NOTES: Figure displays the timing of CHD implementation.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222.
CHD Adoption
Figure 11 reveals that CHDs were notably absent in the Northeast. Ini-
tially, the lopsided distribution throughout the nation appears to be explained
by the health conditions in the adopting states. On a more careful survey
of the background literature, the adoption throughout the South and West is
based on the structure of local government. In New England and select Mid-
western states, the town or township acts as the main political unit. Thus, the
town was (and still is) the principal provider of local public goods, including
sanitary administration (Chapin (1900)).11
In the South and West, on the other hand, the county was the main provider
of public goods. Thus, in the South and West, "the county board of health has
11The regional differences in the political divisions was not a new occurrence, and evolved,
beginning with the local government in the colonial era (Chapin (1900) pp. 6).
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been established to look after the sanitary interests of the people outside of
the incorporated municipalities" (Chapin (1900)). This difference in the or-
ganization of local government, appears to be the primary force affecting the
adoption of the county-level movement in health.12 In states that are the ex-
ception to the rule, including Ohio and Michigan, legislation was passed that
required the organization of county-level services. This legislation was in-
tended to create more efficient organizations that could operate with enough
scale to be effective against illness.13
The relative importance of the county government as opposed to the state
or city-level governments is plotted in Figure 12 where the share of the total
property taxes at the county level is displayed.14 The map displays the strength
of the county government throughout the South and the West. In the North-
east and Midwest, the county plays a much smaller roll in total property taxes.
The CHD rollout occurred in these states that had stronger county govern-
ments. CHDs were established based on the existing strength of local gov-
ernments and based on the structure of related services, including elections,
assessment, and roads.15
12These states include the New England states, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
13"The Michigan township was made a health authority in 1846 when, as one investigator
put it, ‘diseases were thought to arise from smells and cemeteries, and when anyone able
to detect an odor or manage a cemetery could have qualified as a health officer." Such
tiny areas, many of them too poor to perform their other functions without state assis-
tance, are unable to afford the personnel or the equipment needed to carry out a health
program of any sort—and a health program is commonly regarded as of much less impor-
tance than, for example, education or roads. The health officers employed are more often
than not untrained, serve in their spare time, are paid only nominal salaries, and are quite
unconvinced of the value of the scientific health measures recommended by the state de-
partment which exercises a nominal supervision over them. Of the 1,160 township health
officers in Michigan, 660 are not physicians, while in Indiana townships many of them are
paid as little as ten dollars a year. The posts a minor avocation of its holder and the work
consists in most places of "an occasional quarantine, an abatement of a nuisance, and a
lighting of fumigators following quarantine" pp. 336 Lancaster (1937)
14Share of property taxes at the county level is expressed as CountyTaxes
TotalPropertyTaxes
, where total
property taxes are the sum of county, state, and municipal.
15See Lancaster (1937), Mountin (1934), Chapin (1916), and Duffy (1992).
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Figure 12: CHD Timing
NOTES: Figure displays the share taxes at the county level, i.e. CountyTaxes
TotalPropertyTaxes
, where total
property taxes are the sum of county, state, and municipal.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222.
Based on the importance of county government, it is suspected that county-
level adoption of a CHD will be predicted by the strength of the county gov-
ernment as measured by the level of county taxation. I test whether CHD
adoption is predicted by the level of taxation in Section 4. I also exclude the
Northeast from the analysis due to the possibility of town-level services con-
founding the results.
Activities
CHDs operations were led by a medical director, and specific tasks were
carried out by inspectors, nurses, and clerks. Nurses performed the majority
of medical services while inspectors to work to better sanitation measures,
and clerks provided administrative support. A visual representation of the
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CHD structure and primary activities is shown in Figure 27. To better under-
stand the quantity of services provided, a sample of the activities of 132 coun-
ties are provided in Lumsden (1920-30), with an example entry in Table 23.
This document is distinct from the main data used in the analysis section,
Ferrell et al. (1936), and is only used to get a snapshot of main health depart-
ment functions. The estimates of CHD activities are shown in Figure 31 and
Table 19, with all estimates averaged over the years 1925-1928.
At the beginning of the movement, CHDs focused their efforts on sanita-
tion work to reduce diarrheal diseases. Health departments improved access
to toilets, wells, and drainage in rural areas. Sewage and drainage improve-
ments moved waste away from water supplies and reduced the reoccurrence
of waterborne infections. Alongside this main goal, initiatives worked to in-
spect public areas, food, and milk to reduce typhoid fever and tuberculosis.
Supplementary efforts worked to publicize information on proper hygiene
and nutritional improvements. Figure 31 displays the percent of sanitation
services by principal activity. To aggregate the data, included activities are
those that require the presence of a trained staff member. This requirement
would include the installation of a toilet, or the number of lectures given, but
would exclude the number of bulletins handed out or the attendance at a lec-
ture.
Medical services were the second major effort of CHDs. Beginning in
the 1920s most departments employed a nurse to administer treatments, ex-
ams, and consultations. These initiatives were specifically concerned with the
health of infants and young children. Health officers and nurses worked to-
gether to provide advice, conduct exams, and to instruct midwives and schools
in proper sanitation. Medical efforts in addition to exams attempted to quell
the spread of infectious disease. Vaccinations were distributed for smallpox,
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Table 12: CHD Efforts in Financial and Medical Terms
PANEL A: MEDICAL EFFORTS OF CHDS, 1925-1928
Mean SD
Child Exams (Per Child) 0.90 0.84
Prenatal Exams (Per Infant) 0.26 0.40
Infant Exams (Per Infant) 1.12 1.65
Vaccines 0.08 0.09
TB Control 0.03 0.06
Quarantines 0.03 0.05
Defects Corrected 0.01 0.02
Venereal Disease Control 0.01 0.02
PANEL B: CHD CHARACTERISTICS
Total Percent of Total
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Staff
Total 5.75 18.57 100.00 0.00
Nurses 1.90 5.55 31.10 16.83
Inspectors 1.06 3.63 14.87 15.01
Budget (K)
Total 200.68 677.03 100.00 0.00
County 147.90 677.26 60.57 26.52
State 28.15 28.01 21.05 17.55
USPHS 8.99 18.35 6.75 12.83
RSC 5.64 12.29 4.41 8.19
Mother-Inf 2.94 11.05 2.69 11.84
Other 7.06 22.19 4.53 10.42
Observations 5431 5431
NOTES: Table includes per capita CHD efforts on medical ser-
vices as well as the CHD efforts in financial and staffing terms.
Budget dollars are presented as inflation adjusted to 2016.
Medical efforts are reported per capita for the rural population
of the county. Infant, school children, and prenatal include
efforts such as exams, consults, and home visits per the esti-
mated population. All other figures are per capita for the whole
county population.
SOURCE: Data are retrieved from the Cooperative Rural Health
Work of the Public Health Service, 1925-1928 and are available
in various years of U.S. Public Health Reports.
typhoid, and diphtheria.16 Quarantines were administered, both for adults
and for children. Students were excluded from public schools for communica-
ble diseases such as diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, and whooping cough.
Table 19 Panel A presents the medical efforts per capita by category.17 Two
16Diphtheria was technically an antitoxin, but in records is included as a vaccine.
17Note that some of the 132 counties are lost due to lack of data on births and population for
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For this study, I digitized the History of County Health Organizations (Fer-
rell et al. (1936)), which tracks the rollout of CHDs from 1908 until the end of
the study in 1933. The document was compiled by the USPHS as a central fi-
nancial record and includes detailed annual data covering the employed staff
and the budget by source. The document maintains that it is the complete
record of CHDs in the US. To confirm whether this claim is true, I have cross
checked with state-level public health records. The original text for two exam-
ple counties appears in Figure 24. The full dataset is new to the literature with
the exception of the CHD roll out in North Carolina, which has been studied
in Fox (2015).
To understand the timing of the rollout over US counties, Figure 11 plots
the grouped years from 1908 to 1933. Only treated counties are shaded on the
map, with red and orange shades representing earlier treatment, and blue and
green representing later-treated counties. The map reveals a cluster of depart-
ments in the South, sporadically in the West, and throughout Michigan and
Ohio in the Midwest. The middle of the nation, as well as the Northeast, have
limited investment from this movement. The map also reveals the regional
diversity in the timing and placements of CHDs. While in some states CHDs
were implemented within a five year span, including Michigan, New Mexico,
and Arizona, many states such as Washington and North Carolina staggered
the period in question.
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adoption over 15-20 years. For a map of the rollout by three year gaps see
Figure B.I.
Figure 13: County Health Department Characteristics, 1910-1933
Figure 20 shows the distribution of health units by funding type across the
US. Outlined and shaded areas represent counties that adopted a CHD, with
the darker colors highlighting more funding from the specific funding cate-
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NOTES: The first graph displays the average external versus internal
funds. The second graph shows the average amount contributed from
the external sources, excluding internal funding from the county. Bud-
get figures are in 2016 dollars. The third graph shows the average num-
ber of staff employed.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved
from the History of County Health Organizations in the United States
published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222.
gory. Blank sections display never-treated counties. In the top two maps, child
health funding from the RSC and mother-infant sources lightly overlap, but
the RSC surfaces mainly in the South and Southwest. The mother-infant funds
appear peppered throughout Michigan and Ohio, as well as the Southeast and
Northwest. The bottom two maps display the distribution of USPHS and state
funds. Almost all health departments received some amount of money from
the state government, and a substantial number received funding from the
USPHS.
Optimally, the program intended for local CHDs to provide a budget of
$10,000 to serve a county with 25,000 individuals. Inflation adjusted this trans-
lates into $140,000, an amount that ensured employment of one medical di-
rector, one nurse, and one inspector. Table 19 Panel B shows summary statis-
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tics for the budget and staff over the years 1910 to 1933. The first set of columns
provides the inflation-adjusted total amounts and the second shows the per-
cent of the total. From the top three rows, the average CHD met expectation,
having roughly two nurses and one inspector with a budget of $208,000.
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Mortality Data and Controls
PANEL A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MORTALITY STATISTICS
CHD NO CHD DIFFERENCE
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Est.
Entire County
All Deaths 765.25 2,024.36 348.13 1,161.73 417.12∗∗∗
Population (K) 64.31 164.77 28.38 88.29 35.93∗∗∗
Infant Deaths 91.04 198.28 39.19 113.28 51.86∗∗∗
Births 1,289.04 3,004.30 609.51 1,753.06 679.53∗∗∗
Rural
Deaths 361.85 377.32 206.99 182.02 154.86∗∗∗
Population (K) 31.85 31.73 18.98 13.68 12.87∗∗∗
Deaths of Children <1 48.60 48.17 25.87 26.40 22.72∗∗∗
Total Births 691.06 597.59 386.62 306.52 304.44∗∗∗
Total Stillbirths 28.75 28.82 13.42 13.19 15.33∗∗∗
White
Deaths 203.24 221.69 121.58 108.79 81.66∗∗∗
Population (K) 21.83 22.22 13.00 10.91 8.83∗∗∗
Infant Deaths 25.64 28.71 14.63 19.42 11.01∗∗∗
Births 453.85 395.50 294.81 262.69 159.04∗∗∗
Nonwhite
Deaths 177.36 200.99 93.90 91.56 83.46∗∗∗
Population (K) 12.61 12.94 7.07 6.39 5.54∗∗∗
Infant Deaths 24.34 32.61 12.15 17.60 12.18∗∗∗
Births 301.94 348.36 163.62 169.32 138.32∗∗∗
N 7,057 67,529 74,586
CHDs not only varied in their budget and staff, but in the type of funding
provided for operation. These funding sources help to illuminate and identify
the health goals of particular CHDs. Organizations that targeted child health,
the RSC and mother-infant funds, are of primary interest. Table 19 reveals that
the child-interested funds only made up a small portion of the total budget,
however, their presence in a particular CHD indicates a focus on improving
child health. On average, mother-infant funds provide three percent of the
83
budget,1819 and the RSC contributed four percent of the average budget.
Figure 14 presents a time-varying display of both the budget and staff. In
the top graph, at the start of the movement, CHDs were funded from inter-
nal county funds with no existing outside aid. Beginning in 1915 the external
funds increased into the 1920s, with the specific breakdown of funding types
shown in the second graph. Of the external funds, states budgets are typical
the largest contributors, with other types of aid evenly split.
PANEL B: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CONTROLS
CHD NO CHD DIFFERENCE
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Est.
Population (K) 64.31 164.77 28.38 88.29 35.93∗∗∗
% Nonwhite 22.07 21.14 13.64 19.59 8.43∗∗∗
Acres/100 3.18 6.16 11.04 43.98 -7.86∗∗∗
% Urban 27.25 24.81 16.60 21.38 10.66∗∗∗
P.C. Property Value 716.75 517.42 722.76 672.99 -6.01
P.C. Property Tax 16.81 12.26 17.32 15.27 -0.51∗∗
Physicians/10,000 8.51 4.32 9.62 5.91 -1.10∗∗∗
% Households Own 45.49 13.87 51.73 13.09 -6.25∗∗∗
% Households on Farm 43.18 22.78 49.20 19.93 -6.02∗∗∗
N 7,057 67,529 74,586
Notes: The top panel shows the summary statistics for the mortality data, and the bottom
panel shows the summary statistics for included controls.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics
are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level data on prop-
erty taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled
Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demo-
graphic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census
data.
The staff employed in the health department gives another picture of how
the CHD operated internally. The number of staff in the bottom of Figure 14
reveals that initial CHDs employed a health director and an inspector. By
1915, the number of nurses employed starts to rise and continues to grow into
18The mother-infant category includes the Sheppard-Towner Fund, the Children’s Fund in
Michigan, and individual donors in Ohio and Kentucky.
19Some Michigan counties received 100 percent of the budget coming from the Children’s
Fund of Michigan.
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the 1920s, while the number of medical officers and inspectors remains con-
sistent throughout the movement. Because inspectors were primarily charged
with sanitation, and nurses with examinations, this pattern indicates that health
departments in early years focused on sanitation efforts. Likely, the increased
employment of nurses came from outside desire to provide medical services.
By the beginning of the 1920s, nurses are supplied at a higher level than the
other two staffing types.
Mortality Data
To measure health effects, I digitized an unbalanced panel of rural county-
level mortality from the US Vital Statistics (1890-1938). The original data table
appears in Figure 25 and 26. This data provides the number of overall deaths,
infant deaths, stillbirths, births, and population for each county, excluding
towns larger than 10,000. Because there is evidence that CHDs also targeted
some cities in the full county, I additional test the full-county mortality data
from U.S. County-Level Natality and Mortality Data, 1915-2007 (Bailey et al.
(2017b)). This data covers the entire county and includes towns and cities.
There are three main disadvantages with the mortality data. First, the
data is an unbalanced panel of states. States were added to the death regis-
tration area asymmetrically throughout the early twentieth century. Many of
the southern states began reporting late into the 1920s. To address the un-
balanced panel, Section 5 provides a subset of the main analysis with a bal-
anced panel. Specific gaps in the data are shown in Table B.35. A second issue
with the data is the questionable accuracy within the death registration area.
While mortality statistics make the internal claim that states reported with a
required level of accuracy, this accuracy condition was less than 100 percent.
Third, by-cause data is only available for rural areas before 1915. For the pe-
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riod of interest only overall and infant mortality data is available.
Figure 14: Mortality Trend, 1910-1936
NOTE: Shows years excluding 1918, to show overall downward trend in mortality. SOURCE:
Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county.
Table 12 Panel A provides summary statistics for the mortality data. The
top five rows, deaths, population, stillbirths, infant deaths, deaths, and births
are directly from the mortality statistics.20 Figure 14 provides a time-varying
display of the mortality data for both the full county and rural areas. Through-
out the period, there is a decline in mortality, which follows the national trend.
In 1910 for rural areas, the crude death rate in the rural US was 132.7 per
10,000. By 1934, it had declined to 98.8. Infant mortality dropped by a sim-
ilar amount starting at 88 per 1,000 births in 1917 and falling to 62 in 1934.
20Population estimation is necessary for some counties reporting modest populations, and
are based on census data for years 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940.
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U.S. Census Data
Controls for county characteristics are added from census microdata over
years 1910-1940 as well as the US Farm Land Value data. These data sources
are made available through the ICPSR via Haines (2004) and the IPUMs Re-
stricted Complete Count Census Data (Minnesota Population Center and An-
cestry.com (2013)). Linear averages fill the gaps between the census years. Ta-
ble 12 Panel B presents the summary statistics for the controls used through-
out the analysis split by the adoption of a health department. Controls in-
clude the log of the population, the share of the population that is urban, the
share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes,
the per capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population den-
sity, and the share of the population that is white. CHD areas have higher pop-
ulations with higher fraction of nonwhite individuals and less land per person.
CHD areas also have lower taxes and property values per capita.
Harmonization of County Boundaries
County boundaries need to be harmonized to combine the four data sources.
Harmonization moves boundaries back to the first year in the sample, 1910.
This process is completed using the procedure in Rappaport (2007).21 This ad-
justment slightly changes the structure of the data, but it ensures correct iden-
tification of treated areas. A second alignment splits health department efforts
into the respective counties. For a few health departments, efforts served mul-
tiple counties. These efforts are divided into the individual counties and with
funding and staff split evenly.22 The final data source includes all harmonized
US counties from treated states outside of the Northeast.
21I thank the authors kindly for sharing their unification files.
22Ideally, these would be split by population weight, however, to add the population data,
counties borders must be unified, which requires individual CHDs to be tracked.
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4 | Empirical Strategy
Factors Affecting Investment
As discussed in the background section, Section 2, CHD arrival is mainly
determined by the taxation level in the county. Counties that had higher state
capacity at the county level, as measured by taxation power, were more likely
to provide health departments. Following the approach in Bailey and Goodman-
Bacon (2015), I first show which factors are related to adoption and timing,
and then proceed into the event-study specification. This section confirms
that taxation is the predominant factor in adoption, rather than other county
characteristics.
To measure whether health department arrival is correlated with pre-investment
county characteristics, I estimate:
CHDjs = α+ β1(Djs) + β2 ln(tax)js + ηs + js (6)
where CHDjs is binary measure of health department entry into county j be-
tween the years 1908 and 1933. Djs is the 1910 county characteristic of inter-
est. ln(tax)js captures the log of the county-level taxes in 1910. ηs are state
fixed effects. js is the regression error. To measure entry, I first define CHD as
a binary variable that captures the adoption of a CHD in county j. Then, using
the timing of adoption, I consider whether county characteristics affected the
timing of the health department through arrival year.
To implement the above equation I test each 1910 county characteristic
in a separate estimation and control only for the county-level log of taxes and
the state fixed effects. This allows me to individually test which factors predict
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health department entry. The county characteristics that I test include: the
log of the population, the share urban, the share white, the share under five
and under one, the number of medical doctors per capita, the share of female
household heads, the share of household heads in the labor force, the share
of household heads who own homes, the log of property values, the log of the
area of the county, and the mortality rates in 1910, 1911, and 1912.
Figure 15: Pre-Adoption Demographic Characteristics and CHD Entry
PANEL A: TREATMENT
Figure 15 plots the 16 separate estimations of Equation 29 with the 1910
demographic characteristics and the log of the 1910 county taxation.23 The
binary adoption decision is displays in Panel A. County adoption is only pre-
dicted by the log of taxation. Interestingly, county adoption can not be pre-
dicted by the urban-rural split, the racial composition or medical doctors within
the county. There is a slight exception with the log of the area of the county,
which weakly appears to predict treatment, but more importantly for my em-
23Note that coefficients have been rescaled by factors of 10 so that the estimates can be plot-
ted on the same axis for ease of visualization of statistical significance. For the true coeffi-
cients with the correct interpretation of magnitudes see Table B.36.
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PANEL B: TIMING OF TREATMENT
NOTES: The first graph displays the relationship between CHD placement and 1910
population controls. Panel B shows the relationship between 1910 population con-
trols and the timing of the CHD. Each point represents the estimated coefficient on
the 1910 population control, with the estimation including controls for the state
fixed effects and the 1910 taxation level. Lines represent the 95 percent confidence
intervals on the point estimates.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the
History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Pub-
lic Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for rural
counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county.
County-level data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available
in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912,
1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the
IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
pirical strategy, the size of the county does not appear to influence the timing.
In Panel B, the timing of the adoption, the relationship with county size
disappears. Earlier CHD implementation is only explained by the level of
county-level taxation. Why does this relationship between adoption and tax-
ation exist? More disposable public funding allowed counties to open and
operate CHDs. This result aligns with the expansion of CHDs, as initially,
they were financed internally and, only beginning in 1915, were external funds
available to help operate CHDs.
90
To correct for the county-level taxation affecting treatment adoption, I
perform two corrections. First, I directly control for the log of county taxes
and the per capita property values in the specification. Second, I include tax-
group-by-year fixed effects in the regressions.24 The taxation groups capture
county characteristics that vary by the level of taxation. I choose tax-group-
by-birth-year fixed effects, in addition to the direct inclusion of the tax rev-
enue in the regressions, because the differing level of taxations may allow
counties to provide other types of public goods that may vary with the level
of taxation in each year.
In addition to controls for the tax and property values, I adjust the specifi-
cation to account for other factors that may affect mortality conditions in each
county. First, I include controls for the size of county including the the log of
the targeted rural population population, the log of the size of the county, and
the population density. The population density is particularly important as
more dense counties may face a differing disease burden. I also control for
the composition of the population in the county by controlling for the frac-
tion in towns and cities, the share of the population on farms, and the fraction
of white residents. These two controls adjust for the differing population dis-
tributions of counties which may have varying infrastructure investments and
mortality levels. Lastly, I control for the fact public health successes may be af-
fected by outside private health options. To account for private health options
I include the number of physicians per 10,000 persons.25
24Tax groups are dummy variables interacted with the birth year. Each dummy variable rep-
resents the percentile ranking of the per household tax revenue relative to other counties.
The groups include percentiles from 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-100.
25The number of doctors in each county is not available in the 1910 Census, the number of
physicians originates from the reported occupation in the Full Count Census.
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Event-Study Specification
After establishing that CHD entry is uncorrelated the determinants of county-
level mortality, I exploit variation in the timing and the location of CHD to
capture the effect of health department entry on mortality. More specifically,
I track mortality before and after CHD entry using a flexible event study.26
This specification accounts for the pattern of mortality surrounding CHD en-
try and allows estimates to reflect mortality changes in each year before and
after entry. Most importantly, tracking mortality in the period leading up to
CHD entry allows the specification to test for spikes in mortality prior to en-
try. The event study compares county-level mortality before and after CHD
entry against an omitted period, which includes the year before CHD arrival
as well as conditions in never-treated counties.
To test how CHD access affects the evolution of county-level mortality, I
estimate the following equation:
Mjst = aj + ηst + pihjt +
12∑
m=−3
βmCHDjm + X ′jtγ+ jst (7)
whereMjst is the mortality rate in county j and time t = 1910, ..., 1936. County
fixed effects, aj, control for factors would affect selection into treatment by ab-
sorbing time-invariant characteristics of counties. ηst captures state-by-year
fixed effects, such as state-level adoption of Sheppard-Towner funding, higher
state participation in the CHD program, or epidemic conditions within the
state. pihjt are the tax-group-by-year fixed effects, which control for the rel-
ative magnitude of taxation prior to CHD adoption.27 jst is the regression
26I follow a similar specification to Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015), which was used in
a related context to study the rollout of Community Health Centers. See also Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993.
27Each group dummy variable represents the percentile ranking of the per person taxation
92
error. Xjt are county-level controls. Controls include the log of the popu-
lation, the share of the population that is urban, the share of the population
living on farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per capita property
value, the physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the
population that is white.
CHD activity is captured by the event-study indicator variable, CHDjm.
CHDjm represents the entry of a health department into county j at period
m = 0. m represents the time period relative to entry at time period 0, and
ranges from three years prior to CHD entry to 12 years after CHD entry.28 The
year before CHD implementation, m = −1, is the excluded indicator variable
and provides a baseline for mortality before and after implementation. The
excluded period includes both treated counties in the year before CHD op-
eration as well as mortality conditions in never-treated counties. The event-
study specification checks the assumption that the pre-treatment changes in
mortality conditions are uncorrelated with CHD timing and placement for
treated counties in the periods just before treatment, m = −3 and m = −2.
The main effect is captured based on the post-treatment dummy variables,
m = 1, 2, ...12, which is relative to the pre-treatment period,m = −1.
I limit the time period of the event study to three years before treatment
until 12 years after treatment. Observations outside of this window are cap-
tured by the first and final dummy variable. The reason I make this limita-
tion is that the panel of counties is incomplete and for most counties I do
not have mortality many years before or after CHD implementation. Ideally,
I would have a full panel of each county for a decade before and after treat-
ment, but unfortunately this data does not exist for the period in question. I
relative to other counties. The groups include percentiles from 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80,
80-100. These dummy variables are then interacted with year dummy variables
28More formally,m indicates each observation’s timing relative to opening a CHD in county j
in period zero. m is the difference between time t and the year the CHD opened, T , where
m = t− T .
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also choose to end the mortality panel in 1936 due to the entry of sulfa drugs in
1937. These newly available drugs may lead to sharp reductions of mortality
in the post-treatment period.
5 | Event-Study Results
Figure 16 plots the event-study dummy variables based on estimation of
Equation 7. Panel A shows overall mortality in green and Panel B shows the
infant mortality in blue. Each plotted line represents a weighted least squares
estimation of the county-level mortality rate, with the overall rate weighted
by the population, and the infant mortality weighted by the number of births.
The plotted points connected by the solid line represent the estimated co-
efficients on the county-level mortality. The darker color denotes the entire
county’s mortality, and the lighter line indicates the rural portion of the county.
The dotted lines outline the 95 percent confidence interval around each point
estimate for the full county mortality. For a plot of the confidence intervals on
rural mortality, see Figure B.II.
Focusing on overall mortality in Panel A, mortality displays a slight de-
cline following CHD entry. Beginning one period after the CHD opens, the
point estimates suggest that county-level mortality declines by about two deaths
per 10,000 persons. The statistical strength of the point estimates is limited as
upper confidence interval hovers around zero for the entire post-period. Both
rural mortality and full mortality decline after the CHD opens, however, the
confidence intervals are narrower on the entire county mortality.29
One of the primary benefits of using an event-study framework is that it
allows the estimates to directly check whether a rise in mortality led to the in-
29See Figure B.II for the rural confidence intervals.
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Figure 16: Baseline Effect of CHD on County Mortality
PANEL A: MORTALITY
stitution of a CHD. Most importantly, with a traditional difference-in-difference
estimation, the post-CHD coefficients may be inflated if there was a spike in
mortality just before the CHD entered. This spike would be quite plausible if
epidemic conditions led to the institution of a health department. Using an
event-study specification directly checks whether there was a rise or decline
in mortality just before the CHD arrived. Considering the period leading up
to CHD entry, overall mortality does not appear to be higher or lower in the
pre-period by an amount that is statistically different from zero. In the year
the CHD arrives, period zero, the point estimate does reflects a slight rise in
mortality, however, this spike is not statistically different from zero. Based on
the event-study design, it does not appear as though there was a statistically
significant increase in mortality that preceded the CHD.
In Panel B, infant mortality shows a definite drop in the year after CHD
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PANEL B: INFANT MORTALITY
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of
Equation 7. Each plotted point represents the time before and after CHD implementation, excluding the period
just before treatment m = −1. The dependent variable in Panel A is overall mortality and in Panel B is infant
mortality. Infant mortality is weighted by the number of births. Overall mortality is weighted by the population.
Dark lines represents the entire county, light lines represent the rural areas of the county, dashed lines display
the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are reported for the full county estimates. Crude and adult mortality
are per 10,000 individuals. Infant and child mortality are per 1,000 births. The plotted coefficients include all
treatment states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban
group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the log of the population, the share of the
population that is urban, the share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per
capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that is
white. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital
Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level
data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Pub-
lic Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
arrival. One period after CHD opens, infant mortality declines by two deaths
per 1,000 births. In the second year after CHD arrival infant mortality declines
by about three deaths per 1,000 births. The lower infant mortality rate persists
from periods three through six. Then in periods seven and eight, the CHD
effect diminishes, and while infant mortality is still lower than pre-treatment,
the confidence interval includes zero. In years nine onward, the impact is
once again negative and significant.
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The effect on infant mortality appears relatively stark when comparing
the decline to pre-treatment levels of infant mortality. The drop in mortality is
more robust than with overall mortality, and there appears to be no evidence
for a rise in mortality just before the CHD opened. The pre-CHD mortality
levels are not statistically different from zero, and while there is a slight rise
in mortality in period zero, it is not statistically significant. This result sug-
gests that the lower infant mortality post-CHD is not a consequence of higher
mortality in the year just before the CHD appeared. As with the overall mor-
tality rate, infant mortality is highest in the year of CHD arrival, period zero,
however, the effect is not statistically different from zero. It is possible that
CHDs opened as a response to high mortality conditions, yet the spike is not
conclusive.
The fact that the mortality for both infants and overall mortality is esti-
mated to be highest the year after the CHD opened does suggest that for some
reason CHD arrival was correlated with worsened the measured health con-
ditions in the county. If by-cause mortality data were available for this period,
the mortality spike might be more perceptible in a disaggregated mortality
measure. However, I have not found this data to be available at the county
level after 1915. This result does, however, contradict my prior that CHDs
may have faced elevated mortality in the year before the health department
arrived. Instead, it appears that CHDs arrived during the year of high illness
conditions, though the rise is not statistically different from zero.
As an alternative explanation, it is possible that the mortality spike was
a result of measurement rather than an epidemic. While there were specific
cases where CHDs arrived due to an outbreak, particularly Yakima County, or
in extreme weather events like the Mississippi floods of 1927. In the narra-
tive of the movement, these cases appear to be the exception rather than the
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rule. Instead, it is possible that the arrival of the CHD caused counties to keep
better vital statistics than in the pre-period. Vital statistic collection was a pri-
mary duty of the health department and likely improved in the year of CHD
arrival. If this measurement issue were the case, it would place a downward
bias on coefficients and diminish any mortality decline present. The better
reporting of deaths in the vital statistics would increase the number of deaths
reported, and the mortality decline following the placement of a CHD would
be underestimated. Overall, it is difficult to disentangle whether the higher
point estimate in period zero represents a true mortality spike or a measure-
ment issue. Since the point estimate is not statistically different from zero in
the aggregate, it should not a principal cause of concern.
Figure 17: Baseline Effect of CHD on Stillbirths and the Birth Rate
PANEL A: BIRTHS
As CHDs reduced infant mortality in treated counties, the availability of
health services could also impact the birth rate. To test whether this is the
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PANEL B: STILLBIRTHS
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of
Equation 7. Each plotted point represents the time before and after CHD implementation, excluding the period
just before treatment m = −1. The dependent variable in Panel A is birth rate and in Panel B is stillbirths.
Each is weighted by the number of births. Dark lines represents the entire county, light lines represent the
rural areas of the county, dashed lines display the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are reported for the full
county estimates. Stillbirths are per 1,000 births. Births are per 1,000 persons. The plotted coefficients include all
treatment states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban
group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the log of the population, the share of the
population that is urban, the share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per
capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that is
white. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital
Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level
data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Pub-
lic Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
case, Panel A of Figure 17 plots the point estimates for the event study on the
birth rate with the coefficients weighted by the county population. For both
the full county and the rural portion of the county the birth rate appears to
slightly increase for two to three periods after the health department arrives.
This result is slightly unexpected as falls in infant mortality are usually met
with declines in the birth rate. The rise in birth rate returns to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero after two to three periods post-CHD. The birth
rate is also not statistically different from zero just before health department
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entry.
Why the birth rate increased rather than decreased in an interesting ques-
tion, and I have two current explanations for the effect. First, it could be
that women choose to have more children after it is presumed to be safer
and healthier to have a child, both for the child and the mother. Based on
state-level estimates of maternal mortality, women do appear to have a slight
improvement in outcomes after CHD entry and we know that infant mortal-
ity declines in the post-period. This explanation is fairly weak, however, as
it would likely take time for women realize the benefit of the CHD, especially
with the relative size of the effect being fairly small. Women would have to
anticipate the arrival of health services, and adjust their fertility accordingly.
As an alternative explanation, better measurement of vital statistics may lead
to a spike in birth rate. This effect is similar to the issue noted previously
about the improved recording of mortality statistics, and likewise, births may
be collected more rigorously post-health department. While the mortality ef-
fect would place a downward bias on estimates, the better recording of births
would inflate the birth rate upwards and produce estimates that would be oth-
erwise indistinguishable from zero.
Lastly, the mortality data details the number of stillbirths in the county
for the rural portion of the county. I consider an event study of the CHD and
the effect on stillbirths in Panel B of Figure 17. While the point estimates are
negative, the results are not statistically different from zero and hover around
zero for the entire post period. These results are not unexpected as stillbirths
were difficult to measure during the early twentieth century and there are sev-
eral issues with reported stillbirths. First, I have not found a precise national
definition as to the number of weeks of gestation that qualify as a stillbirth.
Second, the reported gestation was not accurately measurable as proper preg-
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nancy dating techniques were not available. Third, and most important, still-
births were often underreported and remained unregistered, particularly be-
cause many births were not under the care of a physician or midwife during
pregnancy. These issues make the results with stillbirths difficult to interpret.
Event Study Limitations
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the above results. While CHDs
do appear to reduce infant mortality, several issues underlie the estimation.
First, states entered the death registration area in a staggered fashion over the
first three decades of the twentieth century. This staggered entry creates an
unbalanced panel of mortality data and could bias estimates. What direction
will the unbalanced panel place on the bias? The direction depends on two
factors. First, the conditions of the states that entered the death registration
area in the middle of the sample. Second, the expected effect of the CHD in
areas that were not registered when the health department arrived. To allevi-
ate a portion of issue with the unbalanced panel, I check the estimates with
a balanced panel of counties in Section 5. Despite this check, it remains a
limitation of the period that mortality statistics are not fully available for the
sample.
As stated above, a second issue with the analysis is the measurement er-
ror in the mortality statistics. Reporting during the period was prone to error,
and individual deaths frequently went underreported. This underreporting,
however, likely causes coefficients to be downward bias and would under-
state the effect. Why would we expect a downward bias? States may have
under-reported deaths before the CHD arrival, but CHDs were charged with
providing accurate vital statistics within the county. Thus, when the CHD ar-
rived reporting should have gotten better in each county. This means that
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after the CHD arrived the mortality rate would unambiguously increase. Even
if CHDs were completely ineffective at improving health conditions the num-
ber of deaths in a county with a CHD should increase. The measurement er-
ror would also provide an alternative explanation as to why mortality may in-
crease in period zero of the event study, aside from epidemic conditions in
the county. Thus, the duty of the health department to provide accurate vital
statistics may unintentionally weaken the observable effect of the CHD.
Another issue with the above estimates is the possibility of nearby cities
investing in infrastructure to treat sewage and water at a similar time to the
health department arrival. Further, the decline in urban mortality during the
period may have had a spillover effect to rural areas. To begin addressing this
problem, I check whether the mortality decline occurred mainly in rural or ur-
ban counties in Section 5. If rural areas are the primary beneficiaries of CHDs,
there is less concern over either of the two issues mentioned. If the mortality
declines appear mainly in urban counties, more checks will be needed.30
Checks on the Event-Study Specification
Table 14 performs a number of checks on the event-study specification. I
focus on the infant mortality results in the text. I include the overall mortality
results in the Appendix Table B.37, however, overall county mortality shows an
inconsistent effect. For all robustness checks, I also use grouped event-study
indicators instead of the full set of event-study indicators. The groupings that
I choose are periods up to -2, the period before treatment (period -1), then ex-
clude period 0, then group periods one and two after treatment, three and four
periods after treatment, and then periods five and onward. For the robustness
checks, I exclude time zero, which includes untreated counties. This adjust-
30Potential checks includ separate estimates for cities and rural areas, as well as control for
water and sewage investment in select states.
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ment of the excluded period checks whether there was a rise in mortality just
before CHD entry (period -1), and ensures I am not obscuring epidemic con-
ditions by excluding period -1 in my baseline estimates.
Table 14: Checks on the Event-Study Specification with Infant Mortality Rate
PANEL A: NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS
SPECIFICATION: NEARBY RATE NEARBY ONLY CHD NEARBY
Mortality: Rural Full Rural Full Rural Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years up to -2 -0.56 -0.30 -0.82 -0.60 -1.67* -1.44*
(0.89) (0.84) (0.90) (0.87) (0.95) (0.87)
Year -1 -0.23 -0.46 0.05 -0.37 -0.04 -1.02
(0.95) (0.80) (0.93) (0.81) (1.09) (0.94)
Years 1 and 2 -1.64** -2.36*** -1.74** -2.25*** 0.29 -0.47
(0.77) (0.69) (0.77) (0.72) (0.91) (0.77)
Years 3 and 4 -1.81** -2.24*** -1.81** -2.39*** -0.91 -1.79**
(0.82) (0.76) (0.82) (0.78) (0.93) (0.91)
Years 5 and after -1.19 -1.58* -1.19 -1.48* -0.12 -1.21
(0.88) (0.83) (0.88) (0.82) (0.97) (0.93)
N 35,239 35,559 23,721 23,878 36,272 36,585
N CHD x Year 6,186 6,193 6,186 6,193 16,252 20,145
Mean Dep 68 70 68 70 64 63
Baseline FE X X X X X X
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved
from the History of County Health Organizations in the United States
published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from
the U.S. Vital Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the
U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census
publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation for years 1912,
1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calcu-
lated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
For the robustness checks, I cover six main adjustments to my original
specification. First, I add additional controls for mortality in the neighboring
county. Then, I restrict the control group to only counties bordering a CHD.
Next, I do a pseudo-placebo test where I see whether having a CHDs affect
mortality in neighboring counties. Fourth , I check a balanced panel of coun-
ties. Fifth, I examine a matched sample with propensity weights. Finally, I
include county time trends to account for the preexisting mortality transition
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of the period.
In Columns (1) and (2), I repeat the baseline estimate with the grouped in-
dicators and period zero excluded instead of the period just before treatment.
I also include controls for mortality in a neighboring county. I randomly se-
lect one neighboring country whose mortality I directly add as a control in the
specification. The results appear similar. Mortality declines in periods one
through four by roughly two deaths per 1,000 births with the effect becoming
weaker as time moves forward. Changing the excluded period from m = −1
to m = 0 has little impact on the results. The only noticeable change is that
all coefficients are negative relative to the excluded period. The negative co-
efficient in the period before the CHD opened suggests that the measurement
issue noted above could be causing the spike in mortality in year zero. Since
there is no rise in deaths just before CHD entry, it weakens evidence suggest-
ing a mortality spike due to an epidemic. It could, however, still be the case
that counties acted quickly enough to open a CHD during an epidemic year,
and the outbreak was contained entirely to year zero. Since the coefficients
leading up to time zero are not statistically different from zero, this suggests
that the increase in mortality is not pronounced enough to show up in the
overall effect.
Next, in Columns (3) and (4), I check whether including only counties
neighboring CHDs as controls in the specification affects the results. This lim-
itation on the control group helps to lessen concern over the control group
bring substantially different from the treatment group. I exclude all counties
that are not either treated with a CHD or bordering a CHD county. The re-
sults appear similar to the first two columns for infant mortality.31 Afterwards,
I check whether CHD entry affects mortality in these neighboring counties.
31In the results with overall mortality, Appendix Table B.37, when the sample is limited to
neighboring counties the effect actually becomes more robust and the effect increases for
the full county.
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PANEL B: SAMPLE ADJUSTMENTS
SPECIFICATION: NEARBY RATE NEARBY ONLY CHD NEARBY
Mortality: Rural Full Rural Full Rural Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years up to -2 -0.56 -0.30 -0.82 -0.60 -1.67* -1.44*
(0.89) (0.84) (0.90) (0.87) (0.95) (0.87)
Year -1 -0.23 -0.46 0.05 -0.37 -0.04 -1.02
(0.95) (0.80) (0.93) (0.81) (1.09) (0.94)
Years 1 and 2 -1.64** -2.36*** -1.74** -2.25*** 0.29 -0.47
(0.77) (0.69) (0.77) (0.72) (0.91) (0.77)
Years 3 and 4 -1.81** -2.24*** -1.81** -2.39*** -0.91 -1.79**
(0.82) (0.76) (0.82) (0.78) (0.93) (0.91)
Years 5 and after -1.19 -1.58* -1.19 -1.48* -0.12 -1.21
(0.88) (0.83) (0.88) (0.82) (0.97) (0.93)
N 35,239 35,559 23,721 23,878 36,272 36,585
N CHD x Year 6,186 6,193 6,186 6,193 16,252 20,145
Mean Dep 68 70 68 70 64 63
Baseline FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables,
βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of Equation 7. The first
row represents the coefficient two periods before treatment, the second
row represents the coefficient one period before treatment. The third
row is one and two periods after treatment, and so on. Zero is the ex-
cluded period. The dependent variable is infant mortality with the esti-
mates weighted by the number of births. Infant is per 1,000 births. The
plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of the Northeast.
Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban
group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the
log of the population, the share of the population that is urban, the share
of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes,
the per capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population
density, and the share of the population that is white. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10,
5, and 1 percent.
Columns (5) and (6), report the infant mortality estimates for counties neigh-
boring CHD counties. This test acts as a placebo test on the results, as CHD
access should have little effect on neighborhood county mortality. While there
could be a small spillover effect, the effect should be quite muted compared
to the original specification. The results appear as expected. CHD access has
little notable effect on the infant mortality in bordering counties.
In Columns (7) and (8), I restrict the sample to the balanced panel of
counties. This limitation cuts the sample size in half, and limits the treated
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group by half as well. For the rural-only infant mortality in Column (7), coeffi-
cients indicate only weak decline in the post period. Full mortality by contrast,
has a comparable impact to the baseline. The reason for the weakened effect
could be the smaller sample or the selected states that were in the sample. If
worse-off areas reacted more positively to CHD access, but were not included
in the balanced panel, the results should show a weakened effect.
In Columns (9) and (10) I created a matched sample of counties and use
propensity weights to balance the characteristics of treated and untreated coun-
ties. The results, here again, appear to be the similar to the baseline. Last, in
Columns (11) and (12), I add a county time trend to the specification. This
time trend accounts for the fact that mortality was on a downward trend in
both urban and rural areas during the health department rollout. With time
trends the estimated effect of the CHD is relative to both time zero, and well
as the deviation from the mortality trend in the county. The results includ-
ing the county time trend in the post-CHD period maintain their strength and
significance. The effect, however, is quicker to disappear after the arrival of
a CHD. CHDs appear to reduce mortality by two deaths just after the health
department arrived, but the time trend eventually absorbs the effect after five
periods.
Urban-Rural Counties versus Rural-Only Counties
Due to the effect on both rural infant mortality and the full county’s infant
mortality, a plausible alternative explanation for the decline in mortality is the
urban mortality transition. This alternative explanation is especially concern-
ing if urban areas invested in unrelated water and sewage treatment during
the CHD rollout. To help test this concern, I split my sample into three parts.
First, rural counties made up of counties without towns as of the 1910 cen-
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sus. The second sample includes counties that have both rural areas as well
as small towns as of the 1910 Census. My final, tiny sample, contains coun-
ties with the most prominent cities, including cities with more than 25,000
people. I then reestimate my event-study specification with grouped dummy
variables on each of these three samples, with the results in Table 15 over in-
fant mortality with overall mortality in Appendix Table B.38.
Here an interesting pattern emerges, the sample of rural-only counties
shows the strongest results. For infants, the reduction is between three and
four deaths per 1,000 births. Furthermore, the coefficients indicate the effect
is stronger than in the full specification. For rural areas, CHDs reduce infant
mortality between two and four deaths per 1,000 births for periods one to four.
In these results there also appears to be no evidence of higher infant morality
two years before implementation, which helps eliminate concern over a spike
in mortality leading to biased coefficients.
In Columns (3)-(6), the effect disappears with urban counties For both
counties composed of larger towns and counties made up of cities, infant
mortality does not respond to the arrival of a health department. All of the
benefit from CHDs appears to be realized by the rural-only group. This result
with the split sample help to ease concerns that the gains in rural mortality are
due to a program that emphasized cities or urban investment. It also helps to
mitigate the concern that all the gains in rural mortality are due to unrelated
urban reductions in mortality. The CHD program appears to be more benefi-
cial in rural counties. For infants, the results are more robust than for overall
mortality which is shown in Table B.38.
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Table 15: Separate Estimation for County Type and Infant Mortality
SAMPLE: RURAL-ONLY RURAL-TOWNS URBAN-RURAL
Mortality: Rural Full Rural Full Rural Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years up to -2 -0.74 -0.95 -0.15 -0.12 1.90 -0.23
(1.38) (1.36) (1.32) (1.35) (3.09) (1.54)
Year -1 -0.84 -0.97 0.31 0.33 4.15 -0.23
(1.50) (1.52) (1.33) (1.32) (3.25) (1.45)
Years 1 and 2 -3.28*** -3.30*** -0.90 -0.63 0.53 -1.93
(1.19) (1.22) (1.12) (1.03) (3.66) (1.81)
Years 3 and 4 -2.80** -2.67** -0.81 -0.69 -2.04 -2.71
(1.18) (1.17) (1.15) (1.16) (3.79) (1.92)
Years 5 and after -2.77** -2.90** -0.17 0.84 -2.60 -3.01
(1.30) (1.30) (1.24) (1.24) (3.35) (1.83)
N 19,415 19,506 14,960 15,158 1,799 1,821
N CHD x Year 2,345 2,346 3,160 3,166 681 681
Mean Dep 65 66 70 72 67 72
Baseline FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables,
βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of Equation 7. The first
row represents the coefficient two periods before treatment, the sec-
ond row represents the coefficient one period before treatment. The
third row is one and two periods after treatment, and so on. Zero is
the excluded period. The dependent variable is infant mortality with
the estimates weighted by the number of births. Infant is per 1,000
births. The plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of
the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state
by year, urban group by year, and priod health spending by year. Con-
trols include the log of the population, the share of the population that
is urban, the share of the population living on farms, the log of the
county property taxes, the per capita property value, the physicians
per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that
is white. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
Heterogeneity in the Event-Study Results
To test whether the effect varied based on the type of county, I employ
the estimation over a number of different samples. First, because CHD efforts
were heterogeneous, and it is highly plausible the effect may have varied by
region, I separately test the impact of the CHD by region. Next, to see which
types of counties benefited the most, I check whether the results vary by the
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county-level composition of race, property values, and access to physicians.
Then, I test whether different funding types affected the mortality declines.
Last, I split the sample and test the effect of the CHD in counties of varying
population size.
To begin, I test the infant mortality results separately over each region.
Figure 18 shows central event-study coefficients plotted for infant mortality
over the three included regions, the Midwest, the South, and the West. Panel
A, which shows the Midwest, displays the most substantial mortality drop. For
periods one through six the reduction in infant mortality is between three and
five deaths per 1,000 births. This decline is much stronger than the baseline
drop of two deaths per 1,000 births. The coefficients also remain negative
and significant through period eight, where the confidence interval briefly
includes zero. For both rural and full mortality there appears to be little ev-
idence of an increase in mortality before implementation of the CHD. Overall,
the Midwest shows a much more consistent and robust drop to the arrival of
a CHD.
In Panel B, infant mortality in the West fails to show a clear decline af-
ter entry. The coefficients bounce around zero with the confidence intervals
including both positive and negative values. Finally, in the South, plotted in
Figure 19 Panel A, there is little effect on infant mortality. The confidence in-
tervals include zero throughout the estimation and there also appears to be a
spike in mortality during period 0 and -1, which suggests that health depart-
ments in the South may have opened due to epidemic conditions. My initial
suspicion is that this spike is due to the 1927 Mississippi floods that forced
CHDs to open as a response to unsanitary conditions. This was especially
the case in Mississippi where the state and USPHS responded to the floods by
implementing CHDs throughout the state. To test whether this pretreatment
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Figure 18: Baseline Effect of CHD on Infant Mortality, Midwest and West
PANEL A: MIDWEST
spike is due to the 1927 floods, I test the South excluding Mississippi in Panel
B. Here there is a stark decline after the CHD arrives, by two deaths in period
one and then three deaths in period two. The CHD causes infant mortality
to decline in the South with the exclusion of Mississippi. There is also little
evidence of a spike in mortality without Mississippi in the data. It appears as
though all of the evidence for a spike in mortality is due to the 1927 floods.
Next, in Table 16 I test whether different types of counties were uniquely
affected by access to a CHD. First, in Columns (1) and (2) I examine whether
counties that had a higher proportion of whites versus nonwhites benefited
differently from access. I check this sample rather than nonwhite infant mor-
tality because nonwhite infant mortality is not well reported for all counties
and is more likely to have excluded periods. Using the drastically reduced
sample of counties where white and nonwhite mortality are reported sepa-
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PANEL B: WEST
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are event-study dummy variables,βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of Equa-
tion 7. Each plotted point represents the time before and after CHD implementation, excluding the period just before
treatmentm = −1. The dependent variable all panels is infant mortality. Panel A shows the Midwest and Panel B
shows the West. Infant mortality is weighted by the number of births. Dark lines represents the entire county, light
lines represent the rural areas of the county, dashed lines display the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are re-
ported for the full county estimates. Crude and adult mortality are per 10,000 individuals. Infant and child mortality
are per 1,000 births. The plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are
included for the county level, the state by year, urban group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls
include the log of the population, the share of the population that is urban, the share of the population living on
farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population
density, and the share of the population that is white. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Organiza-
tions in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics
for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt,
and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the
IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
rately fails to show an effect. The small sample and poor reporting makes it
difficult to reliably estimate by-race mortality in an event-study specification.
Instead, splitting the by areas with high levels of nonwhite suggests whether
counties benefit differently based on their racial composition. The results re-
veal that counties that were more than 50% nonwhite show no evidence of
declines in mortality. The effects is completely contained to the sample with
more whites than nonwhites. While the reasoning for the effect may be that
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Figure 19: Baseline Effect of CHD on Infant Mortality, South
PANEL A: SOUTH
CHDs did not offer health services to nonwhites, I have found no evidence
of this, and instead, I have uncovered two diagrams of health services which
shows that CHDs provided services in a segregated manner. Figure 29 shows
the health department itself, and the offered clinics were both segregated in
Rutherford County Tennessee.
Next, I consider high and low property value counties and split the sam-
ple by whether the county is above or below the mean property value in 1910.
The results in Columns (3) and (4) show that infant mortality declines by a
similar amount in both types of counties. There does not appear to be a het-
erogeneous effect by the pre-treatment wealth of counties. Then, I consider
whether pre-treatment access to physicians in 1910 affects the outcomes. Hav-
ing differing private options may change the effect of the CHD. In both areas
above and below the mean number of physicians infant mortality declines by
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PANEL B: SOUTH, NO FLOODS
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are event-study dummy variables,βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of Equa-
tion 7. Each plotted point represents the time before and after CHD implementation, excluding the period just before
treatmentm = −1. The dependent variable all panels is infant mortality. Panel A shows the South and Panel B shows
the South excluding Mississippi, the primary state that initiated CHDs as a repose to the 1927 floods. Infant mortality
is weighted by the number of births. Dark lines represents the entire county, light lines represent the rural areas of
the county, dashed lines display the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are reported for the full county estimates.
Crude and adult mortality are per 10,000 individuals. Infant and child mortality are per 1,000 births. The plotted
coefficients include all treatment states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the
state by year, urban group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the log of the population, the
share of the population that is urban, the share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes,
the per capita property value, the physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that
is white. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Organiza-
tions in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics
for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level data on
property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt,
and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the
IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
a similar amount, but the effect persists longer for areas with a high number
of physicians. Private pre-treatment access to health services actually appear
to create a complementary effect to the public health departments.
Next, I consider the effect of separate funding initiatives, including mother-
infant, RSC, USPHS, and state contributions. The estimates are reported in
Columns (7)-(10), with each column only including never-treated counties
and counties that received each type of funding. Counties that did not receive
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Table 16: Heterogeneity of the Effect with Infant Mortality
SPLIT SAMPLE: WHITE PROPERTY PHYSICIANS FUNDING
<50% >50% Low High Low High M-I RSC USPHS State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Years up to -2 2.36 -1.10 0.20 -1.83 -1.91 -0.24 0.88 -0.84 -0.24 -1.02
(3.21) (0.84) (1.15) (1.17) (1.32) (1.04) (1.67) (1.36) (1.24) (0.93)
Year -1 3.75 -0.76 0.42 -1.18 -1.22 0.01 0.03 -0.35 0.71 -0.17
(2.99) (0.79) (1.03) (1.28) (1.33) (0.96) (1.91) (1.41) (1.23) (0.92)
Years 1 and 2 -1.57 -2.27*** -1.65* -2.55** -2.06* -2.03** -2.65* -1.87 -1.17 -1.77**
(2.44) (0.73) (0.87) (1.15) (1.10) (0.87) (1.55) (1.16) (1.05) (0.79)
Years 3 and 4 0.62 -1.77** -1.10 -2.73* -0.64 -2.45** -0.50 -1.16 -1.77 -1.26
(2.71) (0.87) (1.03) (1.53) (1.22) (1.13) (1.54) (1.40) (1.17) (0.93)
Years 5 and after 0.42 0.12 1.03 -3.80** 1.01 -1.43 -0.38 -0.04 -0.60 -0.09
(3.46) (1.03) (1.29) (1.72) (1.53) (1.29) (1.85) (1.66) (1.43) (1.12)
N 3,330 33,185 24,699 11,787 21,358 15,225 13,831 24,934 24,763 29,531
N CHD x Year 1,102 5,091 4,698 1,495 3,608 2,585 2,073 3,160 4,107 5,720
Mean Dep 76 68 71 66 71 68 72 69 70 70
Baseline FE X X X X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares es-
timation of Equation 7. The first row represents the coefficient two periods before treatment, the second row
represents the coefficient one period before treatment. The third row is one and two periods after treatment, and
so on. Zero is the excluded period. The dependent variable is infant mortality with the estimates weighted by
the number of births. Infant is per 1,000 births. The plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of
the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban group by year, and priod
health spending by year. Controls include the log of the population, the share of the population that is urban, the
share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per capita property value, the
physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that is white. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital
Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level
data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Pub-
lic Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
the stated funding are excluded. For the by-funding estimates, CHDs only
show a benefit for mother-infant funds and state funds. The RSC and USPHS
show little benefit. Whether the results here are driven by regional effects or
from the funding type is difficult to disentangle. RSC funds were mainly al-
located in the South, while mother-infant funds appeared more readily in the
Midwest. Since the South showed little benefit from the movement while the
Midwest was heavily impacted, the estimated effect could be from the funding
type or the region the funding was located.
Finally, in Table 17 I split the sample by population size and level of taxa-
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Table 17: Separate Estimation for Population Size of Counties
PERCENTILE 1910: >50 >20 >10 10-90 <90 <80 <50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years 1 and 2 -1.98** -1.98*** -2.10*** -1.85* -2.02** -2.46** -3.83**
(0.78) (0.73) (0.72) (0.97) (0.96) (1.12) (1.80)
Years 3 and 4 -1.28 -1.54* -1.59* -1.10 -1.22 -1.79 -3.83*
(0.94) (0.86) (0.85) (1.09) (1.09) (1.24) (2.07)
N 19,317 30,213 33,888 29,572 32,269 28,325 17,235
N CHD x Year 5,033 5,868 6,065 4,321 4,449 3,102 1,160
Mean Dep 71 70 70 69 68 66 63
Baseline FE X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares es-
timation of Equation 7. The first row represents the coefficient two periods before treatment, the second row
represents the coefficient one period before treatment. The third row is one and two periods after treatment, and
so on. Zero is the excluded period. The dependent variable is infant mortality with the estimates weighted by
the number of births. Infant is per 1,000 births. The plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of
the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban group by year, and priod
health spending by year. Controls include the log of the population, the share of the population that is urban, the
share of the population living on farms, the log of the county property taxes, the per capita property value, the
physicians per 10,000, the population density, and the share of the population that is white. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital
Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level
data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Pub-
lic Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated
from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.
tion in 1910. For the different samples, I test the full specification with grouped
event study indicators, but I only report periods one through four in Table 17
to simplify the results. For completeness, I include the full results in Table B.40.
Table 17 shows the population size broken into percentile samples. The
percentiles include the top 50, 20, 10 percent, the bottom 90, 80, and 50 per-
cent, as well as the middle 10 to 90 percent. The sample splits are based
one 1910 full county population. The weakest effect is in Column (4), the
middle 10-90 percent, where the coefficient dips below two deaths per 1,000
births. The most substantial effect occurs in the sample of smaller counties in
Columns (6) and (7). For the bottom 50 percent of the distribution in terms of
population size, the effect is a reduction of four deaths per 1,000 births, almost
115
double the baseline reduction. Eliminating either the top half of the bottom
half of the distribution does not seem to reduce the effect. CHDs appear to be
effective in different population size counties, and the results are not driven
by the most populous counties.
6 | Mechanism for the Effect
CHDs appear to produce a robust and significant decline in infant mor-
tality by about two deaths per 1,000 births. For the overall population there
appears to be some effect, but the results are prone to change depending on
the specification. Likely any reductions seen in overall mortality are due to
reductions in infant or possibly child mortality. In this section I test several
difference-in-difference specifications on a very small subset of states where
by-cause mortality and morbidity are available. This allows me to gain insight
into how CHD are reducing mortality in the population.
Based on the heterogeinity of the effect, the results indicate that the most
successful CHDs fit into one of the following categories, in a rural areas, in
the Midwest, or below 90 percentile in population. To unravel the mecha-
nism for the effect, I test correlations of CHD entry with varying measures of
health using a simple difference-in-difference framework.32 I do not attempt
to establish causality as the availability of data is quite limited. To estimate
the difference in mortality during in CHD counties after arrival of a health de-
partment, I test the following equation:
mjt = α+ β(CHDj × Postt) + λPostt + aj + jt (8)
32The data used in this section on based the archival work of Carl Kitchens, and generously
shared for the purposes of this paper. To attain morbidity records, I digitized the state
public health reports collected for Kitchens (2013).
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where is the mjt county-level mortality (or morbidity) in year t. CHDj indi-
cates treatment with a CHD and Postt indicates the post period. aj is a county
fixed effect. jt is the regression error. For the available data, the equation
captures the change in mortality for CHD counties after the CHD arrives.
Morbidity
For a select number of states, Alabama and Michigan, the number of re-
ported illnesses by cause are available. I use this data to test which diseases
CHDs were most effective at reducing.
To measure the impact of the CHD on disease occurrence rather than
mortality, I test Equation 8 over the the number of reported illnesses from
state-level health reports from Alabama and Michigan. For these two states,
I create two groups of illnesses, those which a CHD could administer preven-
tative or curative measures, mostly in the form of vaccination, and diseases
which were not preventable. CHDs could mainly target typhoid, diphtheria,
and smallpox through vaccination and some prevention. After 1923 all three
illnesses had vaccinations available. Diphtheria also had an antitoxin that was
available earlier in the period. I expect that CHDs will reduce illnesses that
they could work to prevent, but as a placebo test, should have no effect on
illnesses that they could not prevent.
Table 18 Panel A shows the results. For illnesses which CHD could vacci-
nate against, the heath department reduced instance of illnesses by 10 cases
in Alabama and four in Michigan. By contrast, CHD are ineffective against
non-vaccine illnesses as well as TB. The decline in preventable illnesses re-
veals that CHDs were preventing the diseases which they could administer
treatment or prevention against. The most plausible explanation for this ef-
fect may be a vaccination story, where CHD prevention through vaccination
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Table 18: Mechanisms for the Mortality Effect
PANEL A: MORBIDITY
AL
Disease Type: Vaccine No Vaccine TB Typhoid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CHD x Post -9.00*** 21.97 -0.46 -5.04***
(2.34) (23.72) (1.54) (1.77)
Post -3.20* -51.55** -0.88 -4.85***
(1.79) (21.53) (1.27) (1.28)
Observations 134 134 134 134
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are
retrieved from the History of County Health Organizations in the
United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital
Statistics are from state health reports.
had the largest effect on illness-specific deaths but it is difficult to disentangle
the exact preventative measure for the CHD.
To check whether CHDs operated purely through water purification, I
also report typhoid separately for both states. In Michigan, the CHD has no
significant effect on typhoid mortality. For Alabama, there is a reduction in
typhoid, but is only half of the effect on vaccine preventable illnesses. The ef-
fect of CHDs does not appear to be fully explained by possible improvements
in water and drainage. Finally, to check whether CHDs have an effect on TB,
I check the effect on TB for Alabama. I see no perceptible change in TB after
the arrival of the CHD.
Overall, CHDs counties show reductions in illnesses that are preventable
by the CHD. These illnesses include diphtheria, smallpox, and typhoid. A por-
tion of effectiveness could be explained by better vaccination from the health
department, but the declines in typhoid alone suggest that CHD counties may
have also improved water and drainage. The mechanism could have been




Disease Type: Vaccine No Vaccine Typhoid
(1) (2) (3)
CHD x Post -4.27* 6.66 -1.00
(2.51) (17.46) (0.77)
Post -3.40*** 8.69 0.21
(0.69) (13.35) (0.39)
Observations 166 166 166
PANEL C: MATERNAL MORTALITY
NC
(1)












NOTES: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specifica-
tion (8), a differences-in-differences estimation on maternal
mortality and morbidity. The death rate is per 1,000 births.
The morbidity rate is per 10,000 deaths. Vaccine illnesses in-
clude typhoid, diphtheria, and smallpox. The non-vaccine
illnesses include whooping cough, measles, and pneumonia
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
Maternal Mortality
Due to the declines in infant mortality, there might also be an effect on
maternal mortality that is not perceptible in overall mortality. To measure the
impact of the CHD on maternal mortality, select states provide data during the
period considered, with only two periods and two states are available, North
Carolina and Michigan.
Table 18 Panel B presents the results for Michigan and North Carolina.
The results show that CHD exposure produces reductions in maternal mor-
tality in the post period. This diminished maternal mortality is similar to the
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improvement in infant mortality, and suggests that CHDs effective at improv-
ing the health of pregnancy and birth. While the effect is statistically weak in
Michigan, this result does suggest that CHDs may have been effective at im-
proving health surrounding pregnancy and birth for both mothers and chil-
dren.
7 | Conclusion
This study finds that CHD access had little effect on overall population
health after accounting for preexisting downward trend in mortality. Instead,
CHDs were most effective at improving infant mortality in targeted areas. Treated
counties experienced a reduction in infant deaths by two per 1,000 births.
These results are contained to the period between 1917 and 1934, with the
majority of the benefit occurring two years after adoption of a CHD. The ef-
fect is most substantial in rural-only counties, as well as in the Midwestern
region of the United States. In these areas, infant mortality declined by three
to five deaths per 1,000 births.
Over the rollout, CHD access can account for eight percent of the decline
in infant mortality which decreased from 88 deaths to 62 deaths per 1,000
births.33 In the Midwest and in rural-only areas whether the effect is strongest,
the reduction accounts for between 13 and 20 percent of the period decline
in infant mortality. Comparing the magnitude of the effect to similar stud-
ies on infant mortality reveals that CHDs were similar to education programs
but less effective than sewage and sanitation programs. Through educational
efforts Moehling and Thomasson (2014) attribute Sheppard-Towner funding
with 9 to 21 percent of the infant mortality decline over 1922 to 1929. The
33In rural sections of counties, infant mortality, was 88 per 1,000 births in 1917 and declined
to 62 by 1934.
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estimated effect of CHDs is much lower than the sewage and sanitation in-
vestment in Massachusetts, which Alsan and Goldin (2015) associate with 44
percent of the decline over 1880 to 1915.
Though the program had little effect on the overall mortality of counties,
a major limitation of this study is that finer estimates of by-cause mortality
are unavailable in rural areas during the period. Having typhoid-specific or
diphtheria-specific estimates would help to better understand the effective-
ness of CHDs. For the by-cause morbidity data that is available, in Michigan
and Alabama, CHDs are associated with declines in diphtheria, typhoid, and
smallpox. These three illnesses are the illnesses which preventive efforts in-
cluding vaccination, sanitation, and antitoxin regimes could be performed.
For illnesses that could not be targeted by the CHD program such as pneumo-
nia, measles, and whooping cough, CHDs were correspondingly ineffective.
These correlations give a better understand of the illnesses which CHDs were
most effective against during the rollout and reveal that efforts improve ill-
nesses through vaccination and prevention.
Overall, this study tracks first and largest rural health programs in US his-
tory. The rollout of county health departments was expansive and included
roughly 725 counties throughout 38 states. Despite the size and scope of the
CHD program, there has been little effort to study the effect of the CHD pro-
gram in a causal manner. This study is the first to attempt to disentangle the
effect that CHD access had on rural mortality and is one of the first papers to
tackle rural health in the early twentieth century. With the exception of Higgs
(1973), the majority of papers focus on urban health and the corresponding
health investments (Troesken (1999), Troesken (2001), Haines (2001), Cutler
and Miller (2005), and Alsan and Goldin (2015)). The findings from the present
study contribute to our historical understanding of twentieth century public
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health systems enacted throughout the US. Similar to the current develop-
ment literature, Clasen et al. (2007) and Wolf et al. (2014), public health in-
vestments in rural areas behave differently than their urban counterparts and
prove to be less effective overall in the low density setting. Estimates establish
a clear benefit associated with basic health and sanitation services overseen




THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
MEASURES TARGETING CHILDREN
1 | Introduction
Today in the United States nearly one out of every ten dollars in the econ-
omy is spent as public expenditures on health.1 In 1900, public expendi-
ture on health was a fraction of today’s spending, and made up only one out
of every 200 dollars.2 In fact, the US government spent more on farm ani-
mals, plants, and birds than on the health of its citizens.3 As a field, we know
that targeted public health spending is effective at improving short-run out-
comes. When deducing whether this public expenditure on health is worth-
while,however, we care not only about the short-run effects but also about
the long-run welfare gains. Does public expenditure on health produce long-
run welfare gains that affect individuals throughout their lives? The causal
inference of answering this question in aggregate is difficult to attain, and fur-
ther, requires more than 100 years of data to see the full lifespan of individu-
als. Thus, to elicit the causal effect of public expenditure on long-run welfare
gains, I turn to a particular rollout of public health and follow individuals who
18.3% of GDP is spent as public expenditure on health (World Bank [2014])
2In 1900 0.55% of US GDP (Fishback [2010])
3“The federal government, which spent millions of dollars on diseases of farm animals,
birds, and plants in the nineteenth century, spent almost nothing on the health of its citi-
zens" (Duffy 1993)
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were exposed from childhood through adulthood.
In this paper, I follow the rollout of county health departments (CHD)
over 1908 to 1933 and ask whether the program produced lasting welfare ben-
efits for individuals exposed to the program. This program was the first ma-
jor expansion of health infrastructure to rural areas and one of the largest
wholesale expansions in US history. Prior to the CHD rollout, public health
was notably sparse outside of major US cities. Rural health was of such low
importance that the "health of swine was often considered more important
than that of a poor farmer and his family" (Engs (2003)). With the advent of
the CHD nurses and medical doctors offered child health services, including
exams, nutritional consultations, immunizations, and midwife training. The
large scope and the historical lens of the study allows me to study the effect
of children receiving health services throughout the full lifespan of individ-
uals. I select boys who were likely exposed to this program and follow them
from childhood into adulthood using a century long longitudinal dataset that
I constructed by linking together four separate datasets CHD administrative
records, 1920 and 1940 census data, World War II enlistment records, and
social security death records. This allows me identify childhood exposure,
observe the childhood household characteristics, then follow children’s early
adult earnings, adult health, and their death year.
To determine the effect of improved childhood health on later-life earn-
ings, I exploit variation in CHD location, the staggered timing of the inter-
vention, and the age of treatment.4 Children residing in a CHD county while
under the age of five form the treatment group. This assignment creates three
control groups for the health effects. First, within the same county, children
treated under age five are compared against older cohorts. Second, across
treated and never-treated counties, children are compared over each year of
4Using variation in the age of exposure builds upon related work of Duflo (2001).
124
birth. Third, the staggered adoption of CHDs over 1908 to 1933 enables chil-
dren to be compared across birth year for early and later-treated counties.5
This comparison of early and later-treated children mitigates concern over
both selection into treatment as well as changes in cohort-specific wage pat-
terns. Finally, to capture the presence of children in CHD counties, the treat-
ment assignment is based on the child’s location during the 1920 and 1930
census. This childhood exposure is then linked to later-life outcomes using
the 1940 census.
I find that children exposed to a CHD before the age of five had three to
four percent higher annual adult earnings. Testing additional measures of in-
come, including the hourly wage, occupational score, and intergenerational
occupational mobility, reveals comparable earnings improvements. Next, I
relax the assumption on the treatment cohort by employing an indicator for
exposure during each year of childhood, from pre-birth to age 10. Here, I find
that the earnings improvement is highest for children who received health
services in infancy and decreases in magnitude over each year of childhood.
For children exposed in utero and infancy, the increase in income is between
six and eight percent. Grounding the relative size of the effect in returns to
schooling reveals that health improvements in infancy are comparable to an
additional year of schooling. For treatment before age five, CHD exposure is
equivalent to one-half of a year of schooling.6
To understand how CHDs produced income gains, it is necessary to ap-
preciate the state of rural health in the early twentieth century. While bu-
colic sentiment suggests that rural schoolchildren were disease-free, when
compared with their urban counterparts, studies during the beginning of the
5For the income results, an arbitrary cutoff for young exposure occurs in 1925 based on the
availability of the 1920 census. This 1920 census is the main data source used to identify
the location of children during the rollout.
6Clay et al. (2016) find the period return to schooling to be 0.064 to 0.079.
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twentieth century reveal a different story. Davenport and Love (1920) exam-
ine defects in men drafted into the US military and find that, though cities
surpassed rural areas in the rate of defects, the overall health condition was
"counterbalanced by the greater amount in rural districts of mental deficiency,
deformed and defective extremities, blindness in one eye, arthritis and anky-
losis and gonococcus infection." Davenport and Love (1920) further note that
the majority of deformities found in rural areas originate in infancy, which
lends credibility to findings that suggest higher prenatal effects of CHDs. A
similar large-scale study of one-half of a million schoolchildren reports that
"children attending rural schools are, on the average, less healthy and are
handicapped by more physical defects than the children of the cities, includ-
ing all the children of the slums" (Wood (1921)). In both studies, the implica-
tion is similar; rural children were poised to benefit from access to the health
services provided by the CHDs.
To investigate the underlying mechanisms behind the income improve-
ments, I evaluate the respective roles of adult schooling and health. In re-
lated literature,7 morbidity declines lead to higher educational attainment for
schoolchildren. Results here paint a different picture; exposed children show
no difference in their total years of schooling. Instead, treated children appear
to be more likely to maintain the correct grade level for their age. This reduced
grade regression shows that children are more productive while in school, de-
spite not increasing their total investment in education. The rise in school
performance hints at earnings increases emerging directly from higher health
human capital.8
7See the empirical strategy in Bleakley (2007).
8Grade regression may suffer from measurement issues due to ungraded Southern schools.
Such schools did not assign students to class levels, and this issue persisted into the 1940
census for the South. Enumerators in 1940 were instructed to make their best guess grade
level, based on the child’s reported age. For further explanation on the issue, see Margo
(1986b), Margo (1986a), and Collins and Margo (2006).
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To consider the direct effect on adult health, I take advantage of the cogni-
tive scores, body mass index (BMI), and height reported in World War II army
enlistment records (WWII) as well as lifespan, published in the Social Security
Death Master File (SSDM). Reduced disease exposure in childhood may have
one of two effects on adult health. First, the reduction in illness severity and
frequency may reduce disability in surviving adults. Second, through reduced
mortality selection, less healthy and resilient adults may survive. To test which
effect dominates, I link health measures from the SSDM and WWII data to the
1930 census. Based on this sample, I find evidence of both decreased mor-
tality selection and lower disability. Men exposed to a CHD in childhood have
higher BMI, better cognition, and an increased likelihood of living past age 80.
These men, however, also have a lower probability of reaching age 60 and are
slightly shorter. These contrasting effects suggest that, while the healthiest in-
dividuals are getting healthier, mortality selection may allow the least healthy
individuals to survive past childhood.
This study complements a broad literature linking childhood health im-
provements to lifelong economic outcomes (Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004),
Almond (2006), Bleakley (2007), Case et al. (2008), Case and Paxson (2009),
Currie (2009), Bozzoli et al. (2009), Maluccio et al. (2009), Currie and Almond
(2011), and Beach et al. (2016)). These studies have demonstrated that child-
hood health has a lifelong influence on adult productivity and well-being. The
present study also adds to the extensive literature measuring the effective-
ness of public health interventions (Troesken (1999), Troesken (2001), Haines
(2001), Cutler and Miller (2005), and Alsan and Goldin (2015)). A primary fo-
cus of this literature has been the short-run mortality reductions associated
with city provision of water and sewage services. This study combines the two
strands of literature by examining whether better public health access has life-
long benefits for exposed children. To accomplish this, I use record-linking
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methodologies developed by Ferrie (1996) with modifications based on rec-
ommendations by Bailey et al. (2017a). The large-scale record linkage pro-
duces longitudinal data that follows individuals over time and through migra-
tion. Using this novel approach, related work has documented the long-term
consequences of public policy (Aizer et al. (2016) and Beach et al. (2016)) at
the individual level, rather than the area-specific level.
While a limited number of studies have followed the recipients’ of pub-
lic health services into adulthood (Bleakley (2007), Bleakley (2010), and Beach
et al. (2016)), few have focused on rural areas. Results from urban areas can-
not be universally applied to the rural geographic context as short-run stud-
ies have demonstrated that public health interventions operate differently in
the low-density setting (Duflo et al. (2015)). Quantifying the lifelong benefits
associated with improvements in sanitation and health services is relevant to-
day when rural population health is suffering. Currently, in the US, rural areas
have higher infant and maternal mortality than urban areas. Rural areas also
suffer from poor access to health services (HHS (2012)), with the worst access
to care occurring during gestation and childbirth. States such as Florida, Al-
abama, Nevada, and South Dakota only have obstetrical services in one-third
of rural counties.9 The later-life costs of the limited access are impossible to
measure without the passage of time, as researchers cannot observe the life-
time earnings of affected children. The present study offers a historical lens
into the lifelong efficacy of public health interventions in rural areas that can
be at least partially extended into the modern times.
This study proceeds as follows. First, I describe the institutional setting
and the rollout of the CHD movement in Section 2. Then in Section 3, I mo-
tivate my analysis with a model of adult health under an exogenous decline
in childhood illness. In Sections 4 and 5, I detail my empirical strategy, the
9 See Maron (2017) and Hung et al. (2017).
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data used, and my preferred linking methodology. Next, in Section 6 I present
my main findings, with adult income as the primary measure of adult pro-
ductivity. In Section 7, I consider the underlying mechanisms for the income
improvements and provide evidence that improved adult health is the main
channel for the effect. Then in Section 8, I perform robustness checks and in
Section 9 conclude.
2 | Background
At the turn of the twentieth century, 60 percent of the US population lived
in rural areas without access to public health services.10 The interstate spread
of disease,11 as well as the clear gap in health services between urban and rural
areas,12 motivated the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) to develop
a strategy to provide public health to the entire nation.13 This desire combined
with initial surveys in "18 fairly representative counties in 16 states" (Ferrell
et al. (1936) p. 4) established the CHD movement in the US. While the CHD
movement was the byproduct of a national effort, CHDs were locally admin-
istered units that served the countryside as well as towns with less than 10,000
individuals.
The rollout of the CHD movement began in 1908 and occurred over three
waves. In the initial years 1908-1914, local governments were responsible for
10 City health departments had evolved so that, by 1873, 134 cities in the United States had
boards of health, and though many did not initially have full-time health officers, by 1900
the majority did (Altenderfer (1946)).
11Disease was affecting commerce and "frequent instances were observed in which cases
of diseases developing in the city had been caused by infection brought in through the
medium of persons and of water, milk, oysters, or some other food supply from a nearly or
distant rural community" (Ferrell et al. (1936) p. 2).
12Comparable programs in cities existed prior to the CHD movement. Ferrell et al. (1936)
notes that, at the timing of the first CHD, "cities and towns had developed health services,
but for the rural areas very little had been done" (p. III).
13"The Public Health Service as the Federal agency especially concerned and specifically au-
thorized to cooperate with State and local health departments to prevent the spread of
human infections between the States" (Ferrell et al. (1936) p. 1).
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CHD funding but received consultation services from organizations such as
the USPHS and the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (RSC). Then in 1915,
state governments, the USPHS, and the RSC began to offer grants to increase
program adoption. During the 1920s, additional support was provided from
public and private funding sources. One notable development was the Sheppard-
Towner Act of 1921, which delivered aid for initiatives targeting mother and
infant health. The inflow of funding for children helped CHDs to increase
provision of prenatal and newborn exams, improve the training of midwives,
and spread mother-infant hygiene information.




Sanitary Infractions 0.006 0.015
Installation of Privies, Sewers, Wells 0.018 0.023
Exams
Child Exams (Per Child) 0.904 0.844
Infant Exams (Per Infant) 1.120 1.648
Prenatal Exams (Per Infant) 0.264 0.400
Medical
Vaccines 0.083 0.095
TB Control 0.027 0.061
Quarantines 0.031 0.046
Defects Corrected 0.015 0.021
Venereal Disease Control 0.011 0.021
Nutritional Instructions 0.005 0.018
NOTES: Table includes per capita CHD efforts on sanitary services, med-
ical services, and exams of children. Efforts are reported per capita for
the rural population of the county. For exams, the per capita estimates
are per targeted population, e.g. infants.
SOURCE: Data are retrieved from the Cooperative Rural Health Work of
the Public Health Service, 1925-1928 and are available in various years
of U.S. Public Health Reports.
By 1933 CHDs were distributed throughout 38 states. Figure 20 displays a
map of the counties affected by the movement. Panel A presents the spread of
CHDs throughout the US, with dark blue areas representing the adoption of a
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CHD between 1908 and 1933. Panel B shows the percentage of funds from ex-
ternal sources, which include the RSC, USPHS, state funds, and other private
donors. External funds vary between counties and states, with some receiving
no external aid, and others receiving all of their funding from external sources.
A notable attribute of the map is the absence of services in New England and
several Midwestern states. The structure of local government accounts for the
state-level differences in adoption of the movement. In New England and the
central Midwest, the township, instead of the county, acts as the main polit-
ical unit and provides most of the public goods, including sanitary admin-
istration (Chapin (1900)).14 In the South and West, on the other hand, "the
county board of health has ... been established to look after the sanitary inter-
ests of the people outside of the incorporated municipalities" (Chapin (1900)).
Due to the structural differences in local governance, the township-organized
states opted out of the county-level service.15 To account for the state-level
difference in structure, only the 38 treatment states are included in the anal-
ysis. A more extensive discussion of differences in state-level adoption is in-
cluded in Chapter 1 Section 4.
For states that did adopt the movement, the presence of a CHD is defined
as having a full-time health officer dedicated to the operation of public health
services at the county level. Before the movement, while a few counties did
have part-time boards of health, these health boards were staffed by physi-
cians whose time was dedicated to private practice. The existing boards were
weak, ineffective, and improperly funded (Chapin (1900)). By contrast, for-
mal CHDs were full-time units that operated under the direction of a full-time
health officer along with assistance from nurses, inspectors, and clerks. These
14The regional differences in the political divisions was not a new occurrence and evolved
over time, beginning with the local government in the colonial era (Chapin (1900) p. 6).
15These states include the New England states, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Ohio and Michigan later passed laws
that required the organization of county-level services to ensure rural areas received ser-
vices. See the Hughes Act in Ohio.
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CHDs provided annual salaries for the employees and ensured the health of-
ficers and nurses were focused on providing public health services, instead of
working in private practice Figure 27 provides a diagram of the structure of
CHDs as well as the specific activities completed by each staff member.
To better understand the exact activities performed by CHDs, Lumsden
(1920-30) provides a cross section of services for a select 132 counties.16 An
example entry of the original table is provided in Table 23, with the summary
statistics in Table 19. These aggregate statistics for sanitation and medical
efforts are reported per thousand persons and averaged over the years 1925
through 1928. To combine activities, I only include those that would require
the presence of a trained staff member. This requirement would incorporate
the installation of a toilet or the number of exams given, as both activities
would require an health official to be present. It would exclude efforts quanti-
fying the participation of citizens, such as the number of bulletins handed out
or the number of persons at a lecture.
Sanitation services are shown at the top of Table 19. In the first row, in-
spections of public areas, food sources, and milk sources compose the largest
per capita effort. Inspectors worked to improve the safety of local gathering
places such as churches and schools as well as the quality of locally produced
food and milk. In particular, inspectors identified food and drink contami-
nated with tuberculosis and typhoid fever. When transgressions were found,
the inspectors responded with sanitary infractions reported in the second row.
The third row reports the main sanitation infrastructure investment of CHDs,
the installations of toilets, wells, and sewage. These efforts removed waste
from water sources to maintain safe drinking water for residents. Aside from
these on-the-ground measures, health officers gave lectures on proper hy-
16This document offers a snapshot into precise CHD activities for select health departments
funded by the USPHS and is an additional source of information from the main data
source utilized in the analysis section (Ferrell et al. (1936)).
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giene, still a novel concept at the time.
In the second two sections of Table 19, CHD health services are separated
into exams and medical efforts per 1,000, with example pictures of services
in Figure 28. Exams were mainly targeted toward children and performed to
identify health concerns, administer medication and vaccines, and provide
general advice to parents. The examinations focused on children and preg-
nant women, with many of these efforts provided for free. Exams were con-
ducted by the health officers and nurses in both clinics and at home. Based on
the numbers provided, CHDs examination efforts were enough to cover 40-70
percent of the population. In 1930, the per capita estimate translated into a
raw figure of "fifty-five thousand three hundred and five infants and children
of preschool age examined and over 59,636 home visits by health nurses or
health officers" (Lumsden (1920-30) p. 2632).
To complement the examinations, CHD public health nurses and medi-
cal officers provided nutritional advice; communicable disease control; vac-
cinations for typhoid, smallpox, and diphtheria; as well as instruction to local
midwives and schools. These medical efforts are shown in the bottom panel
of Table 19. Midwife training is excluded from the table, though it is still an
important medical effort to note. In 1930 alone, CHDs provided "instruction
of 12,880 midwives in cleanly and careful methods" (Lumsden (1920-30) p.
2632). In rural areas, as access to doctors was limited, midwives were fre-
quently the default care provider, especially in poorer locales.
2.1 Health Effects of CHDs
Based on the historical literature’s anecdotal claims of CHDs successes, I
evaluate the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of CHDs. There are three
primary channels that I consider: mortality, morbidity, and fertility. The over-
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all impacts of the CHD on each channel are as follows:
[1] Reduced mortality for children under five (by three per 1,000 births)
[2] Decreased maternal mortality (two per 1,000 births)
[3] Declines in morbidity (between five and ten cases per 10,000)
[4] No effect on birth rate
I discuss the details of each empirical strategy in Appendix Section C and
Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
3 | Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework builds upon the work of Zivin and Neidell (2013),
which takes the structure of Grossman (1972) and modifies the traditional rep-
resentation of health as an investment good to a sequential investment set-
ting. I recast this framework to an environment where parental investments
in childhood directly impact adult health. Adult health is based on three fac-
tors: the disease environment in early childhood, the parental care in early
childhood, and the subsequent educational choices. This section outlines the
portion of the model necessary for intuition, with the full maximization rele-
gated to Appendix Section C.
3.1 Health Production Function
The production of adult health for each child is a function of the parental
choice of childhood education e and care c as well as the exogenous illness
prevalence φ:
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h = h(e, c, φ) (9)
where the health production function is increasing in e and c, and decreasing
in φ.
Since CHD benefits are contained to early childhood, child health is es-
tablished before making educational investments. I reexpress this dynamic
process as a (static) reduced-form representation by re-writing adult health
as a function of both the childhood health and the disease level (Zivin and
Neidell (2013)). Within adult health, childhood health, x, is formed based on
the parental care and the exogenous disease levels, rewritten as x(c, φ). Then,
the educational investment relies on the final childhood health, expressed as
e(x).17 Based on these adjustments, the adult health appears as a consump-
tion of complements:
h = h(e(x), x(c, φ)) (10)
The primary focus of the production function is to clarify how exogenous shocks
to illness levels, φ, will impact childhood health, x, and thereby adult health,
h.
Consider an exogenous reduction in disease levels, φ. In this setting,
there are two types of children, those who would have survived without the re-
duction in illness and those who would not have survived without the shock.18
First, children who would have survived before the decline in illness unam-
biguously experience lower scarring in childhood. These children will have
17Childhood health is increasing in parental care c and decreasing in illness episodes φ.
18This captures both scarring and selection or survival bias discussed in the literature, as in
Bozzoli et al. (2009).
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greater childhood health human capital, x, and higher adult health, h. Sec-
ond, children who would have died before the decline in illness are now able
to survive. These children survive, despite lower levels of care, c, and child-
hood health, x. Due to the reduced mortality selection, the lower childhood
health, x, may result in lower levels of adult health, h. As the adult health of
these children would have been absent from the population before the decline
in illness, their survival may reduce average adult health.
To formally examine the relationship between the disease environment
and adult health, the effect of the disease environment can be expressed as



























where the relationship between adult health and illness levels, dh
dφ
, is com-
posed of the relationship between adult health and child health, dh
dx
, and the
relationship between childhood health and the illness levels, dx
dφ
.









. The first portion, ∂x
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, represents the scarring ef-
fect of the disease environment on childhood health (the biological compo-




, describes the parental role in maintaining
child health. If scarring is large, or parental care is ineffective, then reducing
φ will be unambiguously beneficial. In cases where care remediates the neg-
ative health effects of illness, reducing φ may only benefit children with low
parental care and mortality selection may reduce overall health.
Now considering the relationship between adult and child health, dh
dx
, the











, describes the degree to which education can compensate for
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the negative effects of scarring in childhood. The second portion describes the
relationship between childhood and adult health, ∂h
∂x
. Here again, if education
can compensate for negative health effects, then the role of reducing illness
may be small. If, on the other hand, childhood health directly influences adult
health through ∂h
∂x
, then individuals will benefit from the health investment
through reduced scarring.
3.2 Model Implications
Within the conceptual framework, the effect of a reduction in illness lev-
els, φ, on later-life income is ambiguous. The result depends on the relative
response of each factor in Equation 11 as well as the health effects in Sec-
tion 2.1. First, poor childhood health may hinder the acquisition of human
capital through e(x) and would reduce either quantity or the quality of educa-
tion. Second, scarring in childhood may directly impact adult health through
childhood health x. Third, the relationship between parental care, childhood
health, and education is dependent on preferences and prices. Parents may
focus their investment on childhood health and fail to readjust education if






Assume the disease exposure, φ, declines. The basic implications are as
follows:
Implication 1 Reversal of Mortality Selection: Relatively large mortal-
ity reductions may allow children with lower levels of parental care (c)
to survive. This reduction in mortality selection may decrease the popu-
lation’s average adult health (h).
Implication 2 Scarringof Individual: Holding parental inputs constant:
• Individuals not affected by mortality selection will unambiguously
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have lower levels of scarring ( ∂x
∂φ
) and thus improved child health
(x).
• This reduction in scarring will hold for all individuals, regardless





Implication 3 Parental Care: In cases where parental care unambigu-
ously increases (e.g., decrease in maternal mortality), child health will






Implication 4 Education: At lower disease levels, the corresponding ef-
fect on educational attainment depends on the degree to which the re-






Implication 5 Substitutability: Parents will trade off early life care and
the educational investment based on the ratio of the marginal cost to the
marginal benefit to adult health (Equation 24).
For the empirical estimation, Implication 1 may reduce adult health and thereby
income. Implications 2 and 3 will improve adult productivity and boost in-
come. Implications 4 and 5 imply that parents will adjust their investment
based on the price of each input and the responsiveness of education to child-
hood health.
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Figure 20: Distribution of CHDs throughout the United States
PANEL A: ALL CHDS
4 | Data
4.1 Health Investment Data
The History of County Health Organizations (Ferrell et al. (1936)) tracks
the rollout of CHDs from the beginning of the movement in 1908 until 1933.
The data includes records of the yearly staff members employed, the annual
budget by source, and the name of the health officer in charge of the depart-
ment. For this study, I digitized the data from the original document, with
examples of the source tables included in Figure 24. The History of County
Health Organizations was originally issued by the USPHS as a Public Health
Report, with the purpose of describing the progress made in rural health. The
report makes the internal claim that is it the complete record of full-time county-
level health departments in the US.
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PANEL B: EXTERNAL FUNDS
Table 20 summarizes the key features of the CHD data, including the bud-
get and staff over the years of operation. Based on USPHS recommendations
the ideal CHD was provided an annual budget of $140,000 per 25,000 per-
sons.19 This budget was considered sufficient to provide one full-time medical
director, one nurse, one inspector, and a clerk. Based on the top four rows, the
average CHD met this expectation, having roughly two nurses and one inspec-
tor with a budget of $208,000. Each of the three types of employees carried out
specific tasks related to the function of the CHD. The nurse provided med-
ical services, the inspector worked to implement sanitation initiatives, and
the director helped with medical services and oversaw the department. Fig-
ure 27 shows the functioning structure of the CHD with the specific activities
assigned to each employee.
Frequently, the formation of a CHD required financial support from a
private or public organization. The most influential external player was the
state government itself. In a 1933 survey of CHDs, Freeman and Bishop (1933)
19Inflation adjusted to 2016; in 1930 the ideal budget was $10,000.
140
PANEL C: EARLY VERSUS LATE ADOPTERS
NOTES: Figures display the distribution of CHDs throughout the United States. Panel A
shows all CHDs. Panel B shows the percentage of funding from external contributors.
White areas represent counties that never adopted the CHD program.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222.
suggest that states were responsible for CHD placement, the budget require-
ments, consultation services, and the appointment of staff members. Addi-
tional support was provided by private donors as well as the USPHS. To better
understand the amount of funding and the relative significance of each sup-
porting organization, Table 20 separates the budget by the origin of financ-
ing. While external sources provided only half of the total funding for a CHD,
their presence helps to illuminate consultation services provided to the de-
partment and partially illuminates the favored health initiatives of each par-
ticular CHD.20 Of primary interest are the child health organizations, which
include funding from mother-infant funds and the RSC.21 Based on Table 20,
20Frequently, these organizations required CHDs to put forward half of the budget internally,
as was the case with the RSC.
21The mother-infant category includes the Sheppard-Towner Fund, the Children’s Fund in
Michigan, and individual donors in Ohio and Kentucky. Some Michigan counties received
100% of the budget from the Children’s Fund of Michigan.
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on average, mother-infant funds provided 3% of the budget, and the RSC con-
tributed 4% of the budget.
A limitation of the History of County Health Organizations is that, beyond
the subset provided by Lumsden (1920-30), there is little information describ-
ing the reach of the movement. I have no way of identifying the number of
children served or the preferred initiatives of each department. The ideal data
would include information on the diseases targeted and the uptake by individ-
uals in the county. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, this data does not exist.
Instead, I take advantage of the per capita spending and per capita staff to get
a sense of the differing levels of intensity in each county.
Table 20: Summary Statistics for CHD Administrative Data, 1908 to 1933
Total Percent of Total
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Staff
Total 6 19 1 541 100 0 100 100
Nurses 2 6 0 191 31 17 0 87
Inspectors 1 4 0 86 15 15 0 89
Budget
Total 0 1 0 21 100 0 100 100
County 0 1 0 21 59 27 0 100
State 32 63 0 1,832 20,727 17,374 0 100,000
USPHS 9 18 0 255 6,554 12,660 0 89,182
RSC 6 12 0 249 4,242 7,994 0 58,824
Mother-Inf 3 11 0 106 2,620 11,739 0 100,000
Other 9 42 0 1,330 3,758 8,088 0 47,826
Observations 5507 5507
NOTES: Figures report the summary of the budget amounts and staff for all CHDs over all
years. Budget dollars are presented in thousands and are inflation adjusted to 2016.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of




Male children residing in CHD counties are identified using the Decen-
nial censuses of the United States for the years 1920 and 1930. The IPUMs
Restricted Complete Count Data (Minnesota Population Center and Ances-
try.com (2013)) provides the given name, surname, birth year, birth state, and
race for all individuals in the US during census years. These characteristics of
individuals are then used to link individuals to the 1940 census, which reports
adult income and education. This linked sample captures treated individuals
even when they migrate out of their birth county. Without the linked sample,
only county-level effects could be estimated. Since migration out of the treat-
ment county may be nonrandom and stratified by income, it is an important
feature to capture.
Linking base census years (1920, 1930) to the 1940 census, creates two
linked samples, 1920-40 and 1930-40. Both samples include all men living
outside of cities in the 38 treatment states during base years, 1920 and 1930.
The 1920-40 sample includes men ages 19 to 39 in 1940, and the 1930-40 sam-
ple includes individuals ages 10 to 18. Table 21 provides summary statistics
for the two samples by exposure to a CHD. Panel A shows the 1920-40 sample
and Panel B the 1930-40 sample. Across CHD exposure, treated individuals
tend to have lower levels of education, income, and are less likely to be white.
In the 1930-40 sample, men in CHD counties appear more likely to be behind
in school and participating in the labor force.
The bottom of Panel A reports the three measures of income used through-
out the analysis. I rely primarily on the 1940 labor market income, which is
shown in hundreds at the bottom of Panel A. Across the treatment assign-
ment, CHD individuals earn less, on average, $690 per year, while non-CHD
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individuals earn $727 per year. To test marginal labor productivity, estimates
consider the hourly wage. Across both CHD and non-CHD counties, the wage
is around 50 cents per hour. Finally, the occupational score provides a sec-
ondary measure of labor market success. This variable, occscore, identifies the
occupational standing by the median income for each occupation (in hun-
dreds, 1950 dollars). The occupational score is utilized to test both the son-
father occupational mobility and income trends by cohort.
Table 21: Summary Statistics by CHD Exposure
PANEL A: 1920-40 MEN 19 TO 39
No CHD CHD Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
1940 Age 29.36 5.88 29.20 5.88 0.16∗∗∗
White 0.93 0.25 0.84 0.36 0.09∗∗∗
Black 0.07 0.25 0.16 0.36 -0.09∗∗∗
Grad 8th 0.80 0.40 0.67 0.47 0.12∗∗∗
Grad HS 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.06∗∗∗
Grad College 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.01∗∗∗
Years Education 9.60 3.21 8.85 3.59 0.75∗∗∗
Hours Worked 37.07 22.71 35.76 21.90 1.31∗∗∗
Hourly Wage 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.02∗∗∗
Income (Hundreds) 7.27 7.93 6.90 7.69 0.37∗∗∗
Occupation Score 20.70 11.37 20.13 11.24 0.57∗∗∗
N 2,025,796 1,095,836 3,121,632
PANEL B: 1930-40 MEN 10 TO 18
No CHD CHD Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
1940 Age 14.11 2.53 14.10 2.52 0.01∗
White 0.93 0.26 0.84 0.37 0.09∗∗∗
Black 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.36 -0.09∗∗∗
Attending School 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.04∗∗∗
Years Behind 1.09 1.48 1.45 1.74 -0.36∗∗∗
In Labor Force 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 -0.01∗∗∗
N 605,079 369,393 974,472
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4.3 World War II Enlistment Records
Records of U.S. Army World War II (WWII) enlistees provide health mea-
sures, which allow me to estimate the persistence of better child health into
adulthood. These data are available from the National Archives and Records
Administration and include enlisted men born between 1910 and 1928. The
records detail the weight, height, and Army General Classification Test (AGCT)
scores for enlistees.22 All three of these measures provide insight into adult
health and mental fitness, which is expected to improve with CHD exposure.
A notable drawback of this data is that men who were rejected for low height or
weight are excluded from the sample.23 This truncation of the data will likely
place a downward bias on estimates, as individuals with lower levels of height
and weight are excluded.
Similar to the 1940 census, the WWII records are linked to the 1930 census
data to identify treatment with a CHD.24 Table 21 Panel C reports the summary
statistics for the 1930-WWII linked sample, separated by exposure. Here CHD
individuals again appear to be worse off, having lower cognitive scores and
lower BMIs. They are also less likely to be white, which is similar to the census
sample.
22AGCT is reported for 1943 from March through June. During this period, enlistment of-
ficers reported cognitive scores in the weight column of the records. This anomaly was
discovered by Ferrie et al. (2009). The AGCT is meant to capture "general learning ability"
and not "innate ability." AGCT is strongly correlated with IQ and predicted post-service
occupations. See Bingham (1946).
23See Grumstrup-Scott et al. (1992).
241930 is used instead of 1920 as cognitive scores are measured in 1943, making individuals
in the 1920 sample at least 23 and would leave out a large portion of army recruits who are
ages 18-22.
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PANEL C: 1930-WWII MEN 18 TO 35
No CHD CHD Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Age 22.56 3.44 22.47 3.43 0.09∗∗∗
Height (inch) 68.59 2.56 68.57 2.55 0.02∗∗
Weight (lbs) 149.66 20.86 148.29 20.48 1.37∗∗∗
BMI 22.35 2.79 22.16 2.72 0.19∗∗∗
AGCT 96.64 23.22 89.51 24.26 7.13∗∗∗
White 0.92 0.27 0.84 0.37 0.08∗∗∗
Black 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37 -0.08∗∗∗
Not White/Black 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00∗
N 493,354 336,827 830,181
4.4 Social Security Death Master File
For measures of longevity, the lifespan of individuals can be calculated
based on the birth and death date reported in the Social Security Death Master
File. This file contains information on name, date of birth and death, and their
social security number. The full file contains 88 million Americans with death
dates beginning in 1965 and ending in 2011. One limitation of the data is that
individuals who die before 1970 are inconsistently reported in the data (Aizer
et al. (2016)).
Table 21 Panel D reports the summary statistics for men in the SSDM who
are successfully linked to 1930 census data. I link individuals from the SSDM
data to the 1930 census using year of birth, full name, and state of birth. State
of birth is a rough estimate of true birth state and is based on the social secu-
rity numbers of individuals. The summary statistics report the main outcomes
used the analysis; the individual lifespan and the respective probability of liv-
ing to 60, 70, and 80 to test the lifetime benefit of CHDs. Similar to the WWII
records and census data, individuals in CHD counties have shorter lifespans
and lower probabilities of living to older ages.
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PANEL D: 1930-SSDM MEN
No CHD CHD Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Lifespan 75.867 11.468 75.023 11.659 0.84∗∗∗
>80 0.413 0.492 0.386 0.487 0.03∗∗∗
>70 0.727 0.446 0.702 0.457 0.02∗∗∗
>60 0.911 0.284 0.898 0.303 0.01∗∗∗
N 1,552,330 903,635 2,455,965
NOTES: The above table displays the mean and standard deviation for CHD and non-CHD
areas. Individual-level data covers three longitudinal samples of Census and WWII data:
1920 linked to 1940, 1930 linked to 1940, and 1930 linked to WWII records. Significance
levels are reported at the 5, 1, and 0.1 percent levels.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History
of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bul-
letin 222. Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete
Count U.S. Census. U.S. Army World War II enlistee records are obtained from the Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration. Longevity measures taken from Social Secu-
rity Death Master File.
4.5 Record Linking Process
Following a procedure that builds on the existing literature,25 men are
linked from base years (1920, 1930) to outcomes years (1940, WWII) using
permanent characteristics. Permanent characteristics include last name, first
name, sex, race, birth year, and state of birth. The main analysis excludes
women, due to changing surnames.
To link individuals, my preferred methodology diverges from the litera-
ture standard. I rely on recent critiques by Bailey et al. (2017a) and eschew the
use of phonetic name equivalents.26 The literature standard makes use of the
Soundex or NYSIIS algorithms to replace reported names with the phonetic
spelling. Bailey et al. (2017a), however, finds that this technique increases in-
correct matches without strongly improving correct links. Therefore, I link last
25See Ferrie (1996) and Ferrie and Rolf (2011).
26Bailey et al. (2017a) make three concluding recommendations, the first of which cautions
"we strongly recommend against using NYSIIS and Soundex to improve match rates" (p
34).
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names as reported, and the given names based on proper equivalents. The
proper equivalents are chosen for common nicknames using related work by
Olivetti and Paserman (2015). I also split the given name into first and middle
name and rely mainly on the first name to link individuals. A further discus-
sion of the chosen methodology, as compared with alternative and traditional
methods, is discussed in Section C.
To link across census years, the base sample (1920, 1930) begins with men
in rural areas of the 38 CHD states. From the base sample, men are linked
with their counterparts in outcome years (1940, WWII, SSDM) using their re-
ported birth state, first name, last name, and race. The resulting sample of
linked pairs contains duplicate records, where the same person is linked to
more than one counterpart in the outcome year. To remedy this, the quality
of linkage is assessed using birth year and reported middle name. First, using
the reported birth year, the smallest birth year difference is chosen. Remain-
ing duplicates whose birth years differ by more than three years are removed
from the sample. Second, using the middle name, ties in duplicates records
are chosen based on whether the middle name matches across. Finally, the
last step removes all remaining duplicate records. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the quality of this sample, see Section C.
5 | Empirical Strategy
5.1 Factors Affecting Investment
The main empirical strategy employs variation in CHD timing, CHD loca-
tion, and the age of exposure to capture the persistence of health benefits into
adulthood. Following related work,27 before proceeding to the main empir-
27See the empirical setup in Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015).
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ical approach, I establish that CHD arrival is uncorrelated with county-level
characteristics.
First, based on the assumption that CHDs were implemented to remedy
poor health conditions, it is suspected that area-specific health conditions will
influence the CHD location and timing. To evaluate this claim, I test whether
the pre-treatment mortality rate predicts where and when counties adopted.
For county j in state s this appears as:
CHDjs = α+ β(Mjs) + ηs + js (12)
where CHD is a measure of health department entry in county j. Mjs is the
mortality rate in county j. ηs are state fixed effects. js is the regression er-
ror. To measure entry, I first define CHD as a binary variable that captures
the presence of a CHD in county j. Then, using the year of adoption, the es-
timation considers whether counties with worse health conditions adopted
earlier.
Figure 21 plots β, the coefficient on the annual county-level mortality
rate from Equation 29. Each point represents a weighted least squares regres-
sion over the years 1910 to 1914. This estimation is tested in the years before
widespread CHD adoption, to ensure that health services do not impact mor-
tality. Over each year, the county-level mortality rate fails to predict both when
and where CHDs were established. The confidence interval on the coefficients
extends to include zero for each year. Contrary to expectation, CHD adoption
is not predicted by the pre-treatment county-level health conditions.
Second, Equation 29 is estimated over the 1910 demographic character-
istics, with a single control included, the log of the 1910 population. For the
binary adoption decision in Table 29 Panel A, treated counties are more ur-
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ban, have more unmarried individuals, and a higher share of renters. Interest-
ingly, county adoption is unrelated to the racial composition or medical doc-
tors within the county. To control for the factors affecting the selection into
treatment, I compare individuals in early and later-treated counties as well as
those in never-treated counties. Panel B shows that the timing of adoption is
unrelated to the county-level population characteristics. I also include county
fixed effects to remove time-invariant county characteristics. To control for
the population size, which is related to timing and treatment, I include state-
by-place-size fixed effects in the regression.28 This interaction term controls
for characteristics of the population size that may vary by state. To address
other factors that affect treatment, I include individual-level controls for ur-
ban status in the 1940 and whether the childhood home was owned or rented.
As counties financed a portion of the CHD internally, it is suspected that
county-level adoption may depend on the local tax revenue. To test this, I
re-estimate Equation 29 over the county-level per household property values,
per household tax revenue, and per household public debt. Table 29 Columns
(11)-(13) show the relationship between the county wealth, debt, and taxation
over the binary adoption, the timing of treatment, and the share of funding
from external sources. In Panel A, the county-level debt, taxes, and property
values affect selection into treatment. The relationship between CHDs and
county-level wealth and taxes is intuitive as taxable values of land should af-
fect appropriation of public goods. Public debt is a little more subtle in its
interpretation. (Wallis (2001)) suggests that public debt provides a rough mea-
sure of government activity. This would imply that CHD county governments
were more active, and more to likely to subsequently provide CHDs.
Considering instead, the timing of adoption, in Panel B, counties that
28IPUMS defines the place size as under 1,000 or unincorporated, 1,000-2,499, 2,500-3,999,
4,000-4,999, and 5,000-9,999.
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adopted earlier were no different in terms of public debt, and instead, had
higher tax levels and property values per household. More disposable pub-
lic funding allowed counties to implement CHDs earlier. This result aligns
with the expansion of CHDs, as initially, they were financed internally and,
only beginning in 1915, were external funds available to help operate CHDs.
The appearance of external funding helped to randomize the distribution of
the movement, which is shown Panel C. Outside support is unrelated to all
features of the adopting counties, including the taxation power of the local
government. To control for the differences in tax revenue for early and later-
adopting counties, I perform two corrections. First, I include tax-group-by-
birth-year fixed effects in the regressions.29 The taxation groups capture county
characteristics that vary by the level of taxation per household. I choose tax-
group-by-birth-year fixed effects, instead of direct inclusion of the tax rev-
enue, because the use of county fixed effects prevents the inclusion of time-
invariant county characteristics. As a secondary check, I augment the treat-
ment indicator by the share of external funding provided to the county. This
check provides a quasi-random measure of CHD presence, as outside aid does
not appear to be related to any of the county characteristics in Table 29 Panel
C.
5.2 Main Empirical Strategy
After establishing that the placement and timing of CHDs are uncorre-
lated with the majority of county characteristics, the goal of the empirical
strategy is to estimate the effect of decreased illness exposure on adult out-
comes. To accomplish this, my identification strategy relies on three sources
of variation, where the CHD was implemented, when the CHD opened, and
29Tax groups are dummy variables interacted with the birth year. Each dummy variable rep-
resents the percentile ranking of the per household tax revenue relative to other counties.
The groups include percentiles from 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-100.
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the age of the children upon entry.
For each child, exposure is based on their presence in a CHD county after
the CHD opened. Since adoption was staggered between counties, some as
early as 1908 and others as late as 1933, the earliest birth year of exposed chil-
dren is 1904, and the latest is in the 1930s. The benefit of this staggered rollout
is that children in the earliest adopting counties can be compared against two
groups: first, children in never-treated counties and second, children in later-
treated counties. The validity of this staggered treatment is bolstered by the
fact that CHD timing does not appear related to county demographic charac-
teristics in Table 29.
A third source of variation arises from the age distribution of CHD health
effects. As CHDs were most effective at preventing mortality for children un-
der five and much less effective for older children and adults, the benefit of
the CHD can be compared between young and old cohorts. Following related
work,30 children who are treated before age five are compared to those who
received the CHD at age five or later. This comparison allows county fixed ef-
fects to be included in the regression model. Without the cohort comparison,
there would be no within-county treatment variation, and cohort-invariant
county effects could not be removed.
Based on the three sources of variation, the later-life benefit of the CHD
for individual i, in county j, born in year k is expressed as:31
30See empirical strategy of Duflo (2001).
31Equation 13 is a modified approach to a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) esti-
mator. In the given context, the DDD design is preferred to related estimation techniques,
such as an event study or instrumental variables approach. To implement an event study,
a panel of individuals is necessary, which is unavailable in the Full Count Census. The
instrumental variable approach would require the presence of a factor that is unrelated
to individual income but is related to the CHD timing and disproportionately beneficial to
young individuals (an instrument forCHDjt×Ti). After exploring avenues including polit-
ical factors (e.g., Fishback et al. (2006), Fishback et al. (2001)), unrelated public goods (e.g.
Carnegie libraries and public parks), and historical documentation for a bundled program
(e.g. Duffy (1992) and Ferrell et al. (1936), no other social or political programs have been
found to be related to timing of CHDs. Instead, the timing of CHD implementation ap-
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yijkts = α+ β(CHDjt × Ti) + X ′iγ+ aj + ηk +ψjk + δs + ijkts (13)
where yijkts are the later-life outcomes, including income, education, health,
and longevity. CHDjt denotes the presence of the program in county j in time
t as a binary variable that equals one if a county ever adopts and zero other-
wise. Ti is an indicator that equals one if individual i is treated before age five,
in other words if t − k < 5.32 Xi are individual controls. Controls include the
homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of
siblings, and indicators for race. aj are exposure county fixed effects. ηk are e
birth year fixed effects. ψjk are the tax-group-by-birth-year fixed effects.33 δs
are state fixed effects interacted with the size of the place. ijkts represents the
regression error, with all standard errors clustered at the county level through-
out the analysis. It should be noted that the fixed effect for the timing of im-
plementation, φt, is absorbed by the county fixed effect because timing does
not vary within county.
The advantage of the specification in Equation 13 is the three control
groups created for CHDjt × Ti. The first group encompasses individuals in
the same birth year who are located in never-treated counties, whereCHDjt is
zero. The second control group includes individuals within the treated coun-
ties but in older cohorts, where Ti is zero. The within-county variation enables
the inclusion of county fixed effects, aj, which accounts for cohort-invariant
pears to be related to state participation in the program as well as the availability of funds
for CHDs, which are explored further in Section 5.4.
32The choice of age five as the baseline specification can be tightened or relaxed. As the
mortality results show that all health effects are realized by age 14, specifying the “young”
at 15 would be the upper bound on the definition.
33Tax groups are dummy variables interacted with the birth year. Each dummy variable rep-
resents the percentile ranking of the per household tax revenue relative to other counties.
The groups include percentiles from 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-100.
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unobservable conditions in treated counties. A third control group exists for
counties treated earlier, i.e., before 1925 for the income specification. Chil-
dren under five in early-treated counties are compared with children in treated
counties (CHDjt is one) who are not exposed under age five (Ti is zero) be-
cause they resided in counties that adopted later. As the timing of treatment
is unrelated county demographic characteristics, as shown in Table 29, these
individuals provide an added control for the individuals in early-treated coun-
ties. In particular, later-treated individuals help account for unobservable
characteristics that may affect selection into treatment that are not removed
by county fixed effects.
Overall, the validity of estimates in Equation 13 rests on two assumptions.
The main assumption is that there are no unobservable county-time effects
related to instituting a CHD. If the timing of adoption is tied to other public
services that affect income, such as educational reforms, the coefficients will
be upward biased. For this to be the case, the unobservable program would
have to disproportionately benefit those treated under five and be almost per-
fectly correlated with the timing of the CHD. In effect, the secondary program
would have to be bundled with the CHD program while also disproportion-
ately benefiting those under five. In the background historical literature, there
is no mention of bundling services with the CHD rollout.34 Additionally, due to
the variation in the adoption decision between states and the various funding
sources that spurred the movement, uniform county-time effects are consid-
ered unlikely.
A secondary assumption of the specification is that younger cohorts expe-
rienced greater health benefits from CHDs than older cohorts. The mortality
effects from Section 2.1 form the basis of this assumption. If this assumption
fails, the coefficients will be biased toward zero, and thus this assumption is
34See Duffy (1992) and Ferrell et al. (1936).
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less important for the validity of estimates. The magnitude of the downward
bias depends on the relative health benefits of younger and older cohorts.35
5.3 Age of Exposure
To relax the assumption on the definition of young and to test whether
the precise age of CHD access impacts long run outcomes, I reconsider the




βm(CHDjt × dim) + X ′iγ+ aj + ηk +ψjk + δs + ijkts (14)
where yijk are the later life outcomes. CHDjt denotes the presence of the pro-
gram in county j at time t. dim are indicators for arrival of a CHD at age m, in
other words, the difference between the arrival year and the birth year of each
child, t−k = m. Xi are individual controls. aj are birth county fixed effects. ηk
are age fixed effects. ψjk are the tax-group-by-birth-year fixed effects. δs are
state fixed effects interacted with the size of the place. Controls include the
homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of
siblings, and indicators for race.
This estimation uses the binary implementation of CHD to measure how
health effects transition through childhood. Due to the decline in the mor-
tality response after age five, it is expected that there will be a similar decline
over childhood exposure for later-life outcomes. All health effects are thought
35A rough estimate of the bias could be computed from intuition based on the mortality es-
timates. In the mortality results, individuals from five to 14 had one death reduced per
1,000 births, while those under five had three deaths reduced per 1,000 births. Therefore,
the income benefits for the young cohorts should be three times as large as for the older
cohorts.
155
to be realized by age 10, which is why the sum from zero to age ten is chosen.
5.4 Intensive Margin
Reports in historical documents suggest that the likelihood of adopting a
CHD was primarily based on the availability of external grants (Duffy (1992)
p. 222-235). These external grants came from both private and public fund-
ing sources, including the states, the RSC, and the USPHS. Over these exter-
nal funds, the adoption decision was a threefold process between the exter-
nal funding source, the state boards of health, and the county itself.36 I use
this external funding variation to reduce concern over endogenous adoption
in Equation 13. I interact the fraction of the budget received from external






× (CHDjt × Ti)
This additional source of variation places a higher weight on areas with more
external funding relative to internal funds.
To illustrate how this would affect the treatment assignment, consider
three 1930 cases: Barnstable County in Massachusetts, Roscommon County
in Michigan, and Prince Georges County in Maryland. The strongest inter-
nal adopter of this group is Barnstable County. Barnstable had a 1930 bud-
get of $14,000 with $1,500 coming from the USPHS. For this county, the Mas-
sachusetts state board of health provided no support for the program.38 In-
36 Many of external grants required the participation of the state boards of health in promot-
ing CHDs. While there were cases of private donors, such as the Milbank Foundation,
contributing directly to counties, the majority required state boards of health to delegate
funds (Duffy (1992) p. 222).
37I use the maximum year of external funding, as it is most representative of the investment
decision being a combined decision by the external funding source, the state government,
and the county government.
38The Massachusetts board had only limited authorit,y and health prevention was left largely
156
stead, the USPHS contributed directly to the budget of the county, with the
majority of funds coming from the county itself. Thus, the adoption deci-
sion for Barnstable was almost entirely internal and individuals treated under
age five would be given a treatment a weight of 0.11. On the other extreme,
Roscommon County in Michigan had a budget of $21,810, which came en-
tirely from private donations.39 For Roscommon, since no funding was pro-
vided internally, there is little cost to providing the CHD, and the adoption
is based on the exogenous availability of funds from the Kellogg Foundation.
Based on this, Roscommon would be given a weight of 1.0. Finally, Prince
Georges County in Maryland had a budget of $10,509, with 4,500 coming from
the county and $6,009 coming from the state. This county would require both
the adoption decision to take place at the county and the state level and would
receive a treatment weight of 0.57. Thus, the county with the least internal
cost to participating would be weighted the highest, and the most endoge-
nous county would be given the lowest treatment weight.
In addition to the availability of funding, there is some discussion of ill-
ness related adoption decisions in the historical literature.40 While I have not
found any evidence for this41 over time or in the stagnant adoption case, this
variation can be used similarly to variation in funding. Differing disease inci-
dence throughout the US can be utilized to assess how treatable a particular
area was. Individuals facing high preexisting preventable deaths stand to im-
prove lifetime outcomes by more with the introduction of a CHD than individ-
uals in the regions afflicted with higher levels of chronic conditions. Following
the literature,42 the percentage of infectious disease deaths near the birth year
to its 355 township units. Moreover, a long tradition of local self-government meant that
there was little uniformity among the many township health agencies (Duffy (1992) p.
226).
39"...the strength of the voluntary organizations was so great the some states tended to leave
the battle to the private sector" (Duffy (1992) p. 223).
40 See Duffy (1992) p. 223.
41See Figure 21.
42See the empirical strategy of Bleakley (2007).
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× (CHDjt × Ti) (15)
more concisely, Iks×(CHDjt×Ti), where Iks denotes the state fraction of deaths
due to communicable disease in the two years before birth. While the state
level is not ideal, due to county-level data limitations, implementing the state-
level measure allows for the inclusion of the full sample. The full effect of
the intervention is the disease-specific mortality augmented by the exposure
indicator for those in treated counties who receive a CHD while young.
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Figure 21: CHD Operation and Pre-Adoption County-level Mortality Rate
PANEL A: BINARY ADOPTION
PANEL B: FIRST YEAR OF CHD
NOTES: Panel A displays the coefficients from a linear regression estimating the likelihood of imple-
menting a CHD based on the mortality rate. Panel B plots the coefficients from linear regressions esti-
mating the year the county received the CHD. Estimates are weighted by the county population. Error
bars on point estimates show the 95 percent confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County
Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level
demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data.




Table 22 shows the estimated effect of CHD exposure on the three mea-
sures of adult earnings. The results from Equation 13 are consistent across
coefficients; early-life CHD exposure improves adult earnings.
The central measure of adult earnings, the log of income, is shown in
Columns (1)-(4). In the full specification with county fixed effects, Column
(3), children exposed to the CHD while under the age of five earn three per-
cent more than control groups. The improvement in annual earnings suggests
that children are healthier following treatment with a CHD and these fitter in-
dividuals earn more in adulthood. CHDs are reducing illness scarring in the
population (Implication 2), and this decreased disability dominates any mor-
tality selection present (Implication 1).
While annual wages show the direct relationship between health and pro-
ductivity, better childhood health is expected to improve the marginal pro-
ductivity of each worker. Better productivity on the margin will increase earn-
ings for each hour worked as opposed to more time spent in the labor force.
To test productivity, Columns (5)-(8) show the hourly wage. In the full spec-
ification, Column (7), estimates indicate that CHD exposure leads to a three
percent boost in hourly earnings. The similarity in magnitude to the baseline
effect suggests that income improvements result from higher marginal pro-
ductivity of individuals rather than a trade-off between leisure and time spent
in the labor force.
To ground the magnitude of income improvement in related public in-
vestments, CHD exposure can be compared with the returns to schooling.
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For the early twentieth century, Clay et al. (2016) finds that the 1940 return
to schooling ranges from 0.064 to 0.079 for 1885-1912 birth cohorts. Thus, the
productivity benefit to CHD treatment is comparable to one-half of a year of
education. This comparison with returns to schooling reveals that the effect
of the CHD is sizable When considering the relative intensity of each type of
investment, the benefit of the CHD is even more pronounced. Schooling re-
quires the presence of a teacher interacting with each student daily. Health
departments, on the other hand, invested broadly, and possibly once annu-
ally in each child. Thus, each CHD generated reasonably high income returns
when compared to educational investments.
One initial concern that may arise over the income estimates is unobserv-
able differences in life-cycle earnings patterns between cohorts and across
counties. Such unobservable differences would make the control groups a
poor comparison for the CHD individuals and could impact the validity of the
results. To test whether these unobservable differences are generating the full
effect, I utilize the log of the occupational score. The log of occupational score
measures the median wage by occupation and removes cohort-specific earn-
ings patterns. Instead, occupation score tests whether individuals are moving
between professions with CHD exposure.
Columns (9)-(12) display the results with the occupational score.43 The
full specification with county fixed effects, Column (11), is half of the base-
line effect. CHD exposure results in a 1.7 percent increase in the occupational
score when compared with control groups. Testing the median income by
profession removes within-occupation income variation, and the decline in
effect is expected. The drop occurs because the log of occupational score only
43The sample here is purposefully limited to individuals who report income in the census.
While this may exclude some groups, including farmers, the restriction ensures the sample
is the proper check on the cohort-specific wage patterns. Without this exclusion, the effect







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































captures between-profession differences. The smaller estimate suggests that
within-occupation variability in income is accounting for half of the earnings
boost, while occupation mobility is generating the remainder of the effect.
While the effect is lower than the baseline estimates, the use of the occupa-
tional standing creates a lower bound on the estimates and removes concern
over inter-life-cycle income differences driving the full effect.
After considering the main results with county fixed effects in Columns
(3), (7), and (11), I replace county fixed effects with household fixed effects
to remove time-invariant family characteristics. To ensure that only brothers
are compared against one another, the sample is limited to individuals who
are sons of the household head in 1920. Columns (4), (8), and (12) show the
results from the family fixed effects estimation. Across all three columns, the
coefficients maintain similar magnitudes to the county fixed effects estima-
tion. Early-life exposure to a health department improves later-life income,
even within households.
In Column (4), exposed younger brothers show higher annual earnings of
3.6 percent, an effect that is slightly larger than the baseline estimate of 3.1
percent. For hourly wage, the effect declines from 3.2 to 2.8 percent. For the
log of the occupational score, the effect also drops slightly and is estimated
to be 1.4 percent, as compared to the 1.7 percent with county fixed effects.
Utilizing household fixed effects gives a somewhat stronger interpretation to
the estimates: CHD exposed younger children, as compared with older broth-
ers, are improving their annual earnings. The relative magnitude resembles
the baseline estimates with county fixed effects. Furthermore, the compara-
tive increase in occupational score suggests that younger brothers are moving
into higher paid professions than their older brothers.
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6.2 Mobility
The results with the log of occupational score suggest that exposed chil-
dren are moving into better-paid professionals, instead of merely attaining
higher productivity within stagnant occupational choices. To further examine
mobility, Table 23 and Table 24 show the geographic and intergenerational
mobility of children. In Table 23 Column (1), I first test whether boys exposed
to CHDs have more professional mobility than non-CHD boys. In particular, I
estimate whether exposed boys are more likely to move out of their father’s
professions, including both upward and downward movements. This total
mobility is measured using the occupational groupings from Long and Fer-
rie (2013). The groupings include white-collar workers, farm workers, skilled
laborers, and unskilled laborers. From the estimated effect, sons are no more
mobile in the CHD group than the non-CHD group. This measure of overall
mobility includes both upward and downward movements.
To better define upward mobility, I test whether sons are leaving the pro-
fessions of their fathers. I define moving into a profession as a son working in
an industry that is different from his father. Likewise, moving out of a profes-
sion will be categorized as a son no longer being employed in a profession that
his father was. The results for each professional grouping are displayed in Ta-
ble 24. The coefficients capture whether a son moves into a grouping, or out of
a grouping, based on the above definition. With CHD exposure, men are more
likely to move into white collar professions, more likely to become skilled la-
borers, and less likely to become unskilled workers. However, individuals are
less likely to move out of farming professions and more likely to leave skilled
labor professions. Since farming professions exclude low skill farm laborers,
this immobility off farms is not necessarily a negative effect. Overall, if it is as-
sumed that unskilled professions are the least preferable, the mobility effect
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of the CHD is beneficial.
Table 23: Program Effect on Migration and Intergenerational Mobility, 1920-
40
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Mobility Higher Occ Leave County Leave State
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CHD x Under 5 -0.001 0.006* 0.008*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 1,307,986 1,979,573 1,979,573 1,979,573
Baseline FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (13). Reported coeffi-
cients capture the effect of CHDs on children who were exposed while under the age of five
in early-treated counties. This young cohort is compared against children in later-treated
and never-treated counties, as well as within-county older cohorts, a modified a difference-
in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals one if a CHD
is present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an indicator variable that equals
one if an individual is under five while the CHD is operating and zero otherwise. Controls
include the homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of
siblings, and indicators for race. Baseline fixed effects include the county of birth, the birth
year, state-by-place size, and tax-group-by-birth-year fixed effects. Data are a linked sam-
ple of census years 1920 to 1940 and includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count
U.S. Census.
Next, to measure whether sons earn more than their fathers, Table 23 Col-
umn (2) tests the likelihood of the son having a higher occupational score than
his father. This is measured with an indicator that equals one if the son earns
more than his father. Column (2) shows the results. Sons who are exposed to
the CHD are higher earners than their fathers, as measured by the likelihood
of having a higher occupational score. This result, combined with the pro-
fessional groupings and total mobility, reveals that CHD exposed children are
earning more and moving into better occupations than their fathers.
Finally, based on the intergenerational mobility results, it is likely that
CHD children may be more mobile across geographic lines. As occupational
mobility often requires migration between states, cities, and counties, health-
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ier sons may be more likely to migrate. The results for migration between
states and counties are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 23. CHD ex-
posed children are no more likely to move between states but are more likely
to migrate from one county to another. Individuals appear to be moving into
different counties within each state but are not crossing state lines.
6.3 Age of Exposure
The primary exposure group up to this point has been boys treated be-
fore age five. To understand how childhood disease exposure impacts lifetime
productivity, the assumption on the age of the effect can be relaxed to include
the full childhood age distribution (Equation 14). Mapping income gains over
childhood provides intuition into exactly when disease exposure is most detri-
mental when in childhood interventions can be most effective.
The CHD effect over the age distribution from pre-birth to age ten is shown
in Figure 22. Exposure that originates in utero yields the highest income boost
of eight percent, with the estimated coefficient declining across the age of in-
troduction to almost disappear by age ten. This declining effect is similar to
the reductions in child mortality seen with CHD adoption. With mortality,
infants also were the highest benefactors, with the estimated effect on mor-
tality declining through age 14 and disappearing in adulthood. Similarly here,
children in infancy and in utero develop the highest benefit from exposure,
with the productivity effect declining through childhood. This result implies
that the earlier the arrival of health services, the higher the gains in lifetime
earnings.
While the pre-birth indicator may appear to be a falsification test, in actu-
ality, health departments should be more beneficial if the interventions occur
before birth. The basic dissemination of information on healthy child-rearing,
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such a breastfeeding, will be most helpful if the mothers receive it while the
children are in utero. Prenatal efforts, such as examinations or midwife train-
ing, are also most helpful if received before birth. Finally, improved sanitation
before conception will improve the mother’s health before pregnancy and re-
sult in healthier babies in utero and at birth. These efforts will also reduce the
likelihood of mothers dying in childbirth and will benefit all children in the
household.
6.4 Intensive Margin
To test whether the effectiveness of the CHD varied based on the invest-
ment intensity, I replace the binary treatment indicator with five measures of
CHD intensity: the share received from external sources, the budget per capita
from general funds, the per capita amount received from child initiatives, the
number of nurses per 1,000, and the number of inspectors per 1,000.44 Ta-
ble 25 displays the estimated coefficients from Equation 13 across these mea-
sures of intensity. For ease of interpretation, the mean and standard deviation
are reported below the coefficients.45
Column (1) shows the fraction of the budget received from external sources.
This measure is tested to improve confidence in the reliability of estimates. As
discussed in the identification section, internal funds are more closely related
to the prior income and taxation level of treated areas. External funding was
not related to the disease levels or demographic factors of the counties in-
volved. Testing external funding boosts confidence that the final effect is truly
from health improvements and not selection. The coefficient in Column (1)
reflects a two percent increase at the mean level of external funds, with a one
44General funds include all funds not targeted towards children, county, state, USPHS, and
other funding sources. Child funds include mother-infant funds and RSC donations.
45The reported summary statistics are calculated only in areas with a CHD.
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Figure 22: 1920-40 Log of Income by Exposure Age
MEN 19-39
NOTES: Reported coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (14). Estimates cap-
ture the effect of CHDs over each age of exposure for early-treated counties, a modified
difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals
one if a CHD is present in county j and zero otherwise. Each age is represented with an
indicator variable for the age of the child when the CHD opened. Controls include the
homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and
indicators for race. Data are a linked sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and includes
men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Error bars on point estimates show the 95 percent confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count
U.S. Census.
percent increase in income for each standard deviation above the mean. This
result suggests that individuals in counties that required more external fund-
ing benefited more than those in counties that put up funds from internal
budgets. This may be due to needy individuals receiving external funds, but
there is no evidence for this based on the selection into treatment. Nonethe-
less, estimates here help to boost confidence in the baseline effect, as the ex-
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ternal funds are quasi-random.
Column (2) presents the effect of increasing the intensity of the CHD through
the budget per capita from general funds. The results show little effect with
the coefficient near zero and insignificant. CHDs were given a target budget
per capita, and therefore, had little variation per capita in their total budget.
This fixed budget helps to explain the lack of effect over the per capita spend-
ing. In Column (3), the child health funding per capita shows a more interest-
ing result. Counties that received more per capita from child health initiatives
had higher benefits from the CHD. This result as compared with the estimated
effect for budget per capita shows that the funding initiative for each health
department did matter. Areas receiving child health funds tailored their focus
to health services, which in turn, generated higher income effects. This helps
to confirm the intuition that child health effects are the main mechanism for
the income improvements.
Finally, the nurses and inspectors per 1,000 individuals are shown in Columns
(4) and (5). Both staff types show similar effects at the mean, around a per-
centage increase in income. The benefit from hiring inspectors increases by
more at each standard deviation above the mean. For a county that hires more
inspectors than the average, the income gains would go up by two percent for
each standard deviation above the mean. For nurses, the effect would only in-
crease by one percent. This higher benefit from inspectors suggests that either
there was an increasing benefit from better sanitation measures or that more
effective departments realized that sanitation was an important function of
CHD. Either way, increasing the intensity of the staff members increases the
benefit for individuals in the county.
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6.5 Preexisting Infectious Disease
Individuals in worse disease environments are expected to show a larger
response to CHDs than those in areas with lower levels of infectious illnesses.
Results here consider the effect of the CHD on income, with the exposure in-
dicator modified to the fraction of deaths due to specific illnesses. Table 25
displays the results from Equation 13 with the augmented treatment indica-
tor. Two measures of infectious illness are used: the fraction of deaths due to
all infectious disease and the fraction of deaths due to childhood infectious
disease.
Column (6) shows all infectious disease and reveals an effect that resem-
bles the baseline. The coefficient of 0.092 translates into a mean effect of 3.2
percent at the average level of infectious disease, 35 percent. Moving into a
worse-off area, where the fraction of deaths from infectious disease is 41 per-
cent, the estimated effect would increase to a 3.8 percent boost in earnings.
Individuals who are in areas with more infectious illness experience greater
benefits from the establishment of a CHD than areas with lower levels.
In Column (7), at the mean level of childhood disease, estimates reflect
an increase in income by 3.3 percent. This estimate is slightly higher than the
coefficient on all infectious disease. In a worse-off area, the benefit would
increase by one percent for each standard deviation above the mean level of
infectious disease. In a community with eight percent of deaths from child-
hood illness, there would be an income gain of 4.3 percent. This implies that,
in areas suffering a higher percentage of deaths from childhood illness, indi-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To unravel the channels by which declining morbidity and mortality im-
prove earnings I consider the adult education and health of exposed children.
Educational outcomes originate from the census, while health measures are
drawn from the WWII enlistment data and the Social Security Death Master
File. Based on the income results and Implications 1-5, both educational out-
comes and adult health are expected to improve with enhancements in child-
hood health.
7.1 Education
Children who are healthier as a result of exposure to CHDs may show an
increase in either the quantity or quality of schooling. Healthier children, with
lower levels of disability, should perform better in school. This better perfor-
mance should then increase the quantity of schooling attained due to higher
returns over each additional year of schooling. This increased human capital
investment through education would then lead to higher lifetime earnings.
Focusing on the years of schooling, based on Implication 4, exposed chil-
dren will increase their educational investment if healthier children have higher
returns to education. In other words, if children previously experienced dis-
ability or health issues that affected their ability to benefit from schooling,
then CHD exposure should increase total educational attainment. Columns
(1)-(2) of Table 26 in Panel A display the results for the binary implementation
of Equation 13 on the terminal year of education. The estimated effect in Col-
umn (2) reveals that CHD exposure does not affect the total years of schooling.
Individuals do not appear to be adjusting their total investment in education
based on improved health. This result contradicts the initial expectation and
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may be due to several factors, including the low returns to education in rural
areas.
Table 26: Program Effect on Educational Outcomes
PANEL A: ADULTS 1920-40
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Years Educ Grad Eighth Grad H.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHD x Under 5 0.013 0.015 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.019*** -0.014***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
N 3,044,699 3,042,421 3,044,699 3,042,421 3,044,699 3,042,421
Birth Year FE X X X X X X
Birth County FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
State x Place FE X X X
Tax Group x Birth Year FE X X X
PANEL B: CHILDREN 1930-40
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Years Behind Enrolled in School Working Fulltime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHD x Under 5 -0.123*** -0.063*** -0.015* -0.020*** -0.016* -0.003
(0.029) (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
N 781,127 780,189 974,462 973,358 974,373 973,269
Birth Year FE X X X X X X
Birth County FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
State x Place FE X X X
Tax Group x Birth Year FE X X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (13). Reported coeffi-
cients capture the effect of CHDs on children who were exposed while under the age of
five in early-treated counties. This young cohort is compared against children in later-
treated and never-treated counties, as well as within-county older cohorts, a modified a
difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals
one if a CHD is present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an indicator variable
that equals one if an individual is under five while the CHD is operating and zero other-
wise. Controls include the homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940,
the number of siblings, and indicators for race. Data are a linked sample of (1) census
years 1920 to 1940 which includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940 and (2) census years 1930 to
1940 that includes men who are 10 to 19 years old. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History
of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bul-
letin 222. Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete
Count U.S. Census.
To test whether individuals are investing differently over the years of school-
ing, I consider whether students alter their terminal degree level, instead of
their total years of schooling. The results for the likelihood of graduating from
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both eighth grade and high school are shown in Columns (3)-(6). CHD ex-
posed children are less likely to graduate from high school than comparison
cohorts. Simultaneously, there appears to be a small positive effect on the
likelihood of graduating from eighth grade. Here the educational changes are
benefiting the lower end of the distribution, with individuals graduating from
eighth grade at a higher rate. These same individuals, however, are failing to
increase their high school graduation rates. Two possible explanations for this
shift exist. First, the return to a high school degree may be relatively low in ru-
ral areas, which implies that the decline in graduation results from a weak in-
centive to invest in a terminal high school degree. Second, as improved health
raises the productivity of affected individuals, children may be leaving school
early to take advantage of the wage benefits from higher productivity. These
two explanations could combine in a way that would incentivize individuals
to leave school earlier with better health.
After finding no effect on total years of schooling, I consider whether CHDs
affected the quality of education. Unfortunately, the 1940 census does not re-
port literacy or writing ability, and instead an alternative measure of schooling
quality must be used. Grade regression, or how far behind from the correct
grade level a student is, provides an alternative measure of in-school produc-
tivity. The intuition behind this measure is that children who miss less school
are more likely to keep up in classes and maintain the appropriate grade level
for their age. An example of grade regression is noted in the documentation
surrounding the CHD:
The whole-time district health officer, in the course of his first round of phys-
ical examination of school children, found, in October, 1919, at one of the
large graded schools, 16 pupils of widely different ages who, because they
were unable to keep up with their respective classes, were regarded as men-
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tally backward and were assigned to a special room for simple instructions.
Upon carefully examining the 16 children, the health officer found that every
one had one or more marked physical defects, among which decayed teeth,
enlarged tonsils, adenoids, faulty eyesight, and poor hearing were common.
With the cooperation of the school directors, the health officer, within the
next few months, by appeals to the parents and through special arrange-
ments with local physicians, succeeded in having corrected almost all of the
physical defects found among the group. On reexamination of the pupils a
year later, it was found that all of the previously backward children had been
returned to their proper grades and were keeping up in them with their class-
mates. (Lumsden (1920-30), 1922 p. 2369)
To test whether CHDs decreased the probability of children being behind
in school, estimation considers the number of grades behind from the age-
appropriate level a child is.46 The results are shown in Panel B. The main effect
in Column (2) is a reduction in grade regression by 0.06 or about a month of
schooling. Thus, results confirm the anecdotal evidence and show that indi-
viduals exposed to the CHD are less likely to fall behind in classes and more
able to complete their education at the correct age. The improved health of
children benefits their performance in school and occurs despite the stagnant
quantity of education.47
In Columns (3)-(6), the estimation tests whether CHDs affect the likeli-
hood of boys working full-time or being enrolled in school. With lower grade
regression, individuals may finish school more quickly and enter the labor
force earlier. This earlier labor force participation could explain a portion of
46Grade regression is defined as the number of years away from the age-appropriate grade
level. Age appropriate grade level begins at year one of education, when the individuals
should be six or seven years old. Year two of education is when the individual should be
seven or eight years old and so on until the child is 18 years of age.
47Grade regression results should be interpreted with caution as the grade level suffers from
measurement issues due to ungraded schools, which is especially true in Southern states.
For further explanation on the issue, see Margo (1986b) and Margo (1986a).
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the income gains through more work experience at each age. Here results ap-
pear to show a slight reduction in the likelihood of being enrolled in school
but no increased likelihood of working full-time. Thus, it does not appear that
individuals are entering the labor force earlier with reduced grade regression.
While children are less likely to be enrolled in school, they do not appear more
likely to enter the labor force full-time.
7.2 Health and Cognitive Scores
Turning to the health measures available in the World War II Enlistment
Records, both the body mass index (BMI) and the cognitive scores of enlisted
men are considered. Health effects are tested to distinguish between the con-
trasting effect of decreased mortality selection and the lower morbidity lev-
els in the population (Implications 1 and 2). World War II records have the
added benefit of being collected by an objective third party, instead of the self-
reported measures collected by the census.
Table 27 shows the results for BMI and height. In Column (3), men ex-
posed to the CHD show an increase in BMI relative to control groups. While
from a contemporary perspective an increase in BMI signals poor health, dur-
ing the 1940s underweight and malnourished men were more common than
obese men.48 Most of the health concerns of the day surronded undernour-
ishment rather than obesity. This also means, however, that the worst cases
of malnourished men were rejected from enlistment and the data is bottom
censored. A 1942 New York Times article discussing the stature of rejected
men notes that "the number of youths who are soft, underweight and gen-
erally lacking in muscular development is very large" (Davis (1942)) and as
many as 45 percent of men were rejected from service. The direction of the
48See Grumstrup-Scott et al. (1992)
177
bias created from the selection of healthier recruits depends on the county-
level composition of rejected individuals. Unfortunately, I have not found a
way to gather information on rejected men.
Height in Column (1) tells a different story than the BMI. Men who are ex-
posed to the CHD are slightly shorter than untreated men. This result points
to some level of reduced mortality selection in the population. While chil-
dren who survive may have less scarring overall, they still retain evidence of
worse health. The lower height of exposed children suggests that there may
be a trade-off between mortality selection and lower morbidity in the popula-
tion. The selection dominating effect in height is likely due to the high initial
mortality conditions at the time. Similar findings by Bozzoli et al. (2009) have
shown that, at high mortality levels, selection will dominate scarring. While
the effect here is small, the reduction in height reveals the complex relation-
ship between disease and later-life health.
Table 27: Program Effect on Adult Health, 1930-WWII
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Height Weight BMI Army General Classification Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age of Exposure: <5 <5 <5 <2 <3 <4 <5
CHD x Young -0.032* 0.239* 0.059*** 0.679* 0.826** 0.760** 0.192
(0.018) (0.137) (0.020) (0.404) (0.386) (0.380) (0.385)
N 587,594 587,594 587,594 63,127 63,127 63,127 63,127
Baseline FE X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (13). Reported coefficients capture the
effect of CHDs on children who were exposed while under the age of five in early-treated counties. This young
cohort is compared against children in later-treated and never-treated counties, as well as within-county older
cohorts, a modified a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals
one if a CHD is present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an indicator variable that equals one
if an individual is under five while the CHD is operating and zero otherwise. Controls include the number
of siblings and indicators for race. Baseline fixed effects include the county of birth, the birth year, state-by-
place size, and tax-group-by-birth-year fixed effects. Data are a linked sample of the 1930 census data to
WWII records and includes men aged 18 to 35. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with
significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health
Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Individual-level records are
obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S. Census. U.S. Army World War II enlistee records
are obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration.
Finally, considering cognition in Columns (4)-(7), men exposed to the
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CHD while under the age of five fail to show an improvement in cognition.
Instead, I consider ages before five and show that younger cohorts do have
improved cognitive scores. The effect for under four is around 0.8 or almost a
point increase in cognition. Why the effect is not seen for the under-five pop-
ulation but is seen at younger ages is an important question. One explanation
may be that the smaller sample, 63,000, is more sensitive to the choice of spec-
ification. A second explanation may be that cognitive benefits occur for those
exposed near infancy and the inclusion of older cohorts diminishes the effect
in smaller samples. Despite the smaller age range for the effect, CHDs do ap-
pear to improve the cognition of children up to age four.
Overall the CHD appears to benefit the cognition of children exposed at
younger ages. In turn, this cognitive boost aids in increasing both worker pro-
ductivity and occupational mobility. Since the CHD does not increase edu-
cation quantity, the cognitive improvement is not driven by increased educa-
tional aptitude
7.3 Longevity
I next consider whether CHDs affected the lifespan of adults using the So-
cial Security Death Master File. Matching this data to the 1930 census, I find
that CHDs did not affect the lifespan of exposed individuals. Instead, CHDs
increased the likelihood that individuals would live into their 80s and 90s but
decreased the probability of men living past age 60. This finding corroborates
the perceived presence of mortality selection in the population. From both
the results here and the results with height, at the tail end of the distribution
individuals with lower levels of health survive into adulthood. The diminished
probability of reaching age 60 suggests that exposed children manage to live
into adulthood but still die earlier than control groups. CHDs, however, ap-
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pear to benefit healthier men, as exposure increases the likelihood that indi-
viduals live past age 80. These estimates are shown in Table 28, for the overall
longevity, and the probability of living past each age, 60, 70, and 80. At the top
end of the longevity distribution, exposed men live longer, but at the tail end,
exposed men have shorter lifespans.
Table 28: Program Effect on Longevity, 1930-SSDM
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Log of Lifespan P(Lifespan>60) P(Lifespan>70) P(Lifespan>80)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CHD x Under 5 -0.000 -0.005*** -0.002 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
N 2,453,719 2,453,719 2,453,719 2,453,719
Baseline FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (13). Reported coefficients capture the effect of
CHDs on children who were exposed while under the age of five in early-treated counties. This young cohort is
compared against children in later-treated and never-treated counties, as well as within-county older cohorts, a
modified a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals one if a CHD is
present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an indicator variable that equals one if an individual is under
five while the CHD is operating and zero otherwise. Controls include the number of siblings and indicators for
race. Baseline fixed effects include the county of birth, the birth year, state-by-place size, and tax-group-by-birth-
year fixed effects. Data are a linked sample of the 1930 census data to SSDM records and include birth years 1900
to 1930. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Individual-level records are obtained
from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S. Census. Longevity measures taken from Social Security Death
Master File.
These results suggest that CHDs helped the healthiest men to attain bet-
ter health while allowing sicker men to survive into adulthood. This corrobo-
rates findings from the WWII enlistment records. Over all measures of health,
exposure produces higher cognitive scores, BMI, and the probability of living
past age 80 but lowers adult height and the probability of living to age 60. Put




8.1 Program Effect with Young Adult Exposure
A fundamental assumption in Equations 13 and 14 is that children un-
der the age of five experience the highest benefits from CHDs. Since health
effects are large in infancy and decline into adulthood, the income pattern is
expected to be similar. CHDs should be less advantageous for adults or older
children.
To test different age groups of exposure, Equation 13 is re-estimated over
CHD entry at older ages. Instead of marking the exposure group as those un-
der the age of five, the treatment group encompasses individuals between 10
and 30. The four adult groups tested are 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, 20 to 25, and
25 to 30. Table 30 Panel A Column (2) presents those exposed between 10 and
15 who are 30 to 49, in 1940. Similarly, Column (3) tests exposure between 15
and 20 for those 35 to 49, and so on for Columns (4) through (6). Across all five
columns of Table 30, older children and young adults are either negatively af-
fected or not affected by CHD exposure. The lack of effect in adulthood is the
same as noted under the mortality benefits of CHDs. Results here strengthen
confidence in the chosen specification and the baseline results.
8.2 Changing Life-cycle of Income
Identification further rests on the supposition that the life-cycle earnings
pattern are constant within each county and over time. Comparison across
age cohorts is reasonable only if income trends maintain a similar pattern. A
portion of this effect was tested using the occupational score in Table 22. Here
this assumption is tested using two additional methodologies. First, I limit the
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exposure window for the older cohorts. The smaller exposure window com-
pares those who received a CHD before age five with those who just missed
the cutoff age and were five and ten when the CHD opened. This restricted
comparison bounds the divergence in life-cycle income experienced between
cohorts. Second, I restrict the age window for the older group. The drawback
here is that early-treated individuals lack a comparison group, but overall it
serves to lessen concern over diverging life-cycle patterns.
Table 30 Panel A Column (1) displays the results from Table 22 on the sub-
sample of exposed cohorts. Column (1) shows the effect with the older cohort
limited to ages five through ten. The estimated effect on this restricted sample
is comparable to the baseline estimates in Table 22. There is a 0.04 percent de-
cline in the estimated coefficient, but the effect is still near three percent. This
coefficient shows that, even with the restricted age range, exposed cohorts
still maintain a substantial effect, which alleviates concern over divergence in
life-cycle income patterns.
Next, I limit the age window of the sample to an upper bound of age 30
and 35. Initially, the upper bound of 39 is chosen to encompass all treated
individuals. Instead, I limit the sample to men between 18 and 31 as well as
18 to 36. Table 30 Panel B Columns (1)-(2) show the results with the lower
age ceiling. For those who are 19 to 30, the income gain is now estimated at
two percent and represents a smaller improvement than the baseline effect of
three percent. For those who are 18 to 36, the benefit is 2.4 percent. Through
both adjustments to the specification, the coefficient remains between two
and three percent and significant. The decline in magnitude is likely due to
the loss of first treated individuals as well as early control groups for treated
counties.
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8.3 Excluding Higher Education
Next, I exclude individuals with higher levels of education to address three
concerns. First, higher returns to education may be inflating the effect for
younger cohorts. Second, individuals who graduate from college may be un-
derrepresented in the 19 to 39 sample. Third, the average could be inflated by
a small number of high-achieving men with better education levels. To allevi-
ate these concerns, I exclude individuals who graduate from college and high
school from the sample.
The first two columns of Table 30 Panel B show the estimates excluding in-
dividuals with higher levels of schooling, specifically those who graduate from
high school and college. Column (3) shows estimates excluding high school
graduates. The effect declines by 0.2 percent from the baseline. Despite this
drop, the CHD results in a 2.8 percent income boost. The effect is similar in
Column (4) in the sample without college graduates. The results without high
school and college graduates suggest that the earnings increase is mainly af-
fecting those at the lower end of the income distribution. This corroborates
earlier education results, where individuals were more likely to graduate from
eighth grade but less likely to graduate from high school.
8.4 Adjusted Age Linking
The baseline linked sample includes individuals whose mismatch in age
by as many as three years and may generate concern that the sample contains
mislinked men. To accommodate this concern, I re-estimate results over a
restricted sample and only include individuals who differ in age by no more
than one and two years. Table 30 Panel B shows the results. Column (5) con-
tains individuals who differ in age by no more than one year, and Column (6)
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presents the sample of men who match within two years. Across Column (5)
there is a slight dip in effect, where exposure results in a 2.8 percent income
boost. Column (6) shows no difference from the baseline effect of 3.0 percent.
8.5 Additional Controls
The baseline specification employs fixed effects for the year of birth, county
of birth, and the number of siblings, and the home ownership status. To test
whether additional controls alter the outcome the original specification, I add
controls for the number of years of schooling and the 1920 household income.
The results are shown in Table 30 Panel C for both children exposed under
five and infants exposed under one. Columns (1)-(3) repeat the original spec-
ification for children under age five. Columns (2) and (3) add controls for the
years of education and the household income in 1920. These additional con-
trols only slightly affect the coefficient, decreasing it to 2.8 when controlling
for the years of education and increasing the estimates slightly when control-
ling for household income.
Columns (4)-(6) show the same estimation with the young cohort restricted
to infants. As in Figure 22, the results here show a larger effect for children ex-
posed earlier in life, suggesting that the earlier the child receives the health
investment, the more beneficial it is for long-term productivity. In Columns
(5) and (6), after controlling for education and household income, the coeffi-
cient increases to 4.9 and 5.1 percent.
Columns (3) and (6) require a different interpretation than the previous
columns. Here estimates reflect the benefit of the CHD within occupation.
Holding occupational score constant decomposes the within profession ef-
fect from the between occupation effect. In Table 22, the occupational score
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shows an increase of 1.4 percent with CHD exposure. Here, controlling for the
specific occupation, income increases by 2.0 percent. Thus, the income effect
of CHDs is composed of a 1.4 percent gain from occupational mobility and
a 2.0 percent gain from within-occupation productivity. For exposed infants,
the effects are 3.7 percent and 1.2 percent respectively.
9 | Conclusion
This paper investigates the lifelong benefits associated with improved ac-
cess to public health in rural areas during the early twentieth century. I study
the benefits related to the rollout of county-level health department in the
United States and find that exposed children have higher adult productiv-
ity than control groups. From the baseline estimates, exposed male children
show annual earnings improvements of three to four percent. I then consider
the mechanisms underlying the income gains and find that the higher pro-
ductivity of exposed children originates from better adult health rather than
increased investment in education. Lower childhood illness levels lead to re-
ductions in lifelong scarring, which is evident in adult BMI, grade regression,
cognition, and the probability of living past age 80.
The lower-bound dollar value of the investment can be computed based
on the percentage increase in annual income. Assuming the baseline earnings
increase of 3.0 percent, along with an average annual income of 690 dollars,
on average, the exposed children would earn $21 more annually. Thus, if the
CHD served 2,000 children in a county, the benefit would be roughly $42,000
per year for the average county. If the target CHD was intended to operate
with a budget of $10,000, this income gain would more than cover the cost. In
today’s dollars, this would translate into $741,800 per year, with an averae op-
erating cost of $216,000. This estimate, however, cannot capture the full bene-
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fit to exposed individuals through better overall health, fewer illness episodes,
and a reduced probability of dying early. Thus, the raw income calculations
underestimate the impact on individual utility and societal welfare.
To understand how such health investments should be prioritized rela-
tive to other public interventions, the CHD cost can be compared with paral-
lel investments of the period. In the historical literature, it is noted that "the
money spent for 1 mile of paved road would buy adequate health service for
three of the counties for a year" (Lumsden (1920-30), 1926 pp 2413). Thus,
health services were a relatively small cost, compared with the infrastructure
investments that coincided with the movement. When considering the in-
come benefits for the residents, the relatively small initial cost is offset by the
future increase in taxable base.
Finally, it is informative to consider the complementaries of improved
health with public investment in schooling. If poor child health diminishes
the returns to schooling, then educational investments make little sense. The
historical literature draws this comparison and notes that the poor health of
rural children ensured that "the efficiency of the public-school system is nec-
essarily low, and it seems certain that by diverting to efficient public-health
work some of the money appropriated for schools-even to the extent, if nec-
essary, of causing all the public schools to be closed for one year in five-a net
gain could be realized in the specifically educational results from the public-
school system" (Lumsden (1920-30), 1926 pp 2413). Thus, the benefit of in-
vesting CHDs complemented the schooling improvements of the period. This
complementarity was to the degree that it even made sense to close public
schools, for a time, to pay for the health investment.
Overall, this paper quantifies the benefit associated with local health ini-
tiatives that target childhood illnesses and sanitation. The lasting improve-
186
ments for individuals in term of health and productivity provide evidence for
the necessity of targeted health investments in rural areas today. The direct re-
lationship between health and income motivates similar programs to mitigate
preventable illnesses in both developed and developing areas of the world.
The rural section of developing countries, in particular, continue to struggle



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 30: Program Effect on Adult Log of Income with Adjusted Exposure,
1920-40
PANEL A: ADJUSTED EXPOSURE AGE
DEP. VAR.: LOG OF INCOME Age of Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure at: Age <5 Age 5-10 Age 10-15 Age 15-20 Age 20-25 Age 25-30
CHD x Cohort 0.026*** 0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
N 1,659,581 1,695,120 1,428,152 1,085,622 899,734 615,017
Baseline FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
PANEL B: RESTRICTIONS ON AGE, EDUCATION, AND LINKING
DEP. VAR.: LOG OF INCOME Age Restriction Schooling Restriction Adjusted Linking Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Excluding: Over 30 Over 35 H.S. College >1 >2
CHD x Under 5 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
N 1,252,024 1,657,204 1,404,377 2,028,771 1,863,926 2,039,360
Baseline FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
PANEL C: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
DEP. VAR.: LOG OF INCOME CHD x Under 5 CHD x Under 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHD x Cohort 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.037***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
N 2,116,916 1,463,560 2,116,916 2,116,916 1,463,560 2,116,916
Baseline FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Years Educ X X X X X X
HH Occscore X X
Occscore X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates of β from specification (13). Reported coefficients capture the effect
of CHDs on children who were exposed while under the age of five in early-treated counties. This young cohort is
compared against children in later-treated and never-treated counties, as well as within-county older cohorts, a
modified a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals one if a CHD
is present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an indicator variable that equals one if an individual is
under five while the CHD is operating and zero otherwise. Controls include the homeownership status in base
years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and indicators for race. Baseline fixed effects include
the county of birth, the birth year, state-by-place size, and tax-group-by-birth-year fixed effects. Data are a
linked sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Individual-level records are obtained





Figure 23: Detail of Health Department Activities (Lumsden (1920-30))
191
Figure 24: Original Health Department Record for Alabama and Louisiana
(Public Health Bulletin 222)
192
Figure 25: Example of Overall Mortality (U.S. Vital Statistics)
Figure 26: Example of Infant Mortality (U.S. Vital Statistics)
193
Figure 27: CHD Operational Structure
SOURCE: Diagram from State Biennial Public Health Reports of Ten-
nessee (1926-1929).
194
Figure 28: Example CHD Activities
SOURCE: Examples from State Biennial Public Health Re-
ports of Tennessee (1926-1929).
195
Figure 29: Example CHD Activities
SOURCES: Figure retrieved from Ten Years of Rural Health
Work, Rutherford County, Tenn., 1924-1933.
196
Figure 30
SOURCE: Figure is published in the Cooperative Rural Health Work
of the Public Health Service from U.S. Public Health Reports.
197
Figure 31: Sanitation Efforts of CHDs, 1925-1928
NOTES: Table includes relative CHD efforts on sanitary services. Fig-
ure excludes activities that did not require presence of trained health
worker.
SOURCE: Data are retrieved from the Cooperative Rural Health Work of
the Public Health Service, 1925-1928 and are available in various years
of U.S. Public Health Reports.
198
Figure 32: Distribution of External Funds
Panel A: External Funds
Panel B: State Funds
Notes: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public
Health Bulletin 222.
199
Figure 33: Distribution of External Funds
Panel C: RSC Funds
Panel D: USPHS Funds
Notes: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public
Health Bulletin 222.
200
Figure 34: Distribution of External Funds
Panel E: Sheppard-Towner Funds
Panel F: Other Funds
Notes: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
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Table A.31: External Funds and Per Household Public Finances
PANEL A: WEALTH, DEBT, AND TAXATION
DEP. VAR.: EXTERNAL PROPERTY VALUES PROPERTY TAXES TOTAL DEBT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.014
(0.003) (0.001) (0.038) (0.016) (0.035) (0.015)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Indep 0.67 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X
PANEL B: COUNTY, STATE, AND MUNICIPAL TAXATION
DEP. VAR.: EXTERNAL COUNTY TAXES STATE TAXES MUNICIPAL TAXES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita 0.047 0.017 0.189 0.086 -2.900 -0.097
(0.029) (0.019) (0.471) (0.238) (1.918) (0.283)
N 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832
Mean Indep 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Controls X X X X X X
State FE X X X
NOTES: Notes: Reported coefficient estimates of β from specification 1. Estimation in-
cludes only the treatment sample. Controls include the homeownership status in base
years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and indicators for race. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the state level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1
percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the His-
tory of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health
Bulletin 222. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated from the IPUMs
Restricted Complete Count Census data. County-level data on property taxes, property
values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Public Debt,
and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932.
210
Table A.32: Pre-Adoption Demographic Characteristics and CHD Entry
DEP. VAR.: Population % Urban # Cities School Revenue White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1910 Control 0.913*** -0.228 0.333*** 0.046 0.091*** 0.005 0.100*** 0.032 -0.223 -0.162
(0.179) (0.392) (0.072) (0.060) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.134) (0.143)
Property Tax 0.122** 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.074*** 0.101***
(0.046) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019)
N 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832 2,795 2,795 2,840 2,832
State FE X X X X X X X X X X
Log Population X X X X X
Share Urban
DEP. VAR.: Under 5 Under 18 Rent Occscore Illiterate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1910 Control -0.111 0.046 -0.562 0.079 0.520*** 0.164 0.430*** -0.072 0.009 0.030*
(0.119) (0.121) (0.486) (0.487) (0.126) (0.143) (0.121) (0.097) (0.015) (0.018)
Property Tax 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.094*** 0.108*** 0.104***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
N 2,830 2,828 2,830 2,828 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832 2,839 2,831
State FE X X X X X X X X X X
Log Population X X X X X
Share Urban
DEP. VAR.: Physician Rural Physician All Females Working Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1910 Control 0.107 -0.059 0.489*** 0.001 1.290* -0.250 -0.776***-0.132 -0.220 -0.330
(0.125) (0.107) (0.177) (0.110) (0.670) (0.574) (0.246) (0.184) (0.261) (0.273)
Property Tax 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.104***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
N 2,830 2,828 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832 2,840 2,832
State FE X X X X X X X X X X
Log Population X X X X X
Share Urban
NOTES: Panel A displays coefficients from a linear regression estimating the likelihood of implementing a CHD.
Panel B reports the slope from a linear regression estimating the year the county received the CHD. Panel C
represents the fraction of external funding received by the CHD, with zero values for never-treated areas and
those that received no outside support. Estimates control for the size of the county using the log of the 1910
county population. Column (1) tests the number of large cities within the county. Columns (2)-(12) test the
share of the population that are urban, white, black, under five, medical doctors, women over 21, working,
married, renting their dwelling, under 18, and literate. Occscore in Column (12) reflects the averge occupational
score, or the medium income by profession.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health
Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.34: State Health Spending
State State Health 1914 CHD Activity Highest Year Board
State P.C. Expend. Rating % CHD P.C. Expend. Selection of Exec. Members
AL 0.3 105 81 2.0 Association 10
AR 0.1 74 40 0.4 Board 7
AZ 0.1 39 40 0.6 Governor/Senate 3
CA 1.1 342 24 0.1 Board 7
CO 0.2 106 2 0.0 Board 9
CT 0.3 393 0 0.0 Board 7
DE 0.1 131 100 5.1 Board 7
FL 1.3 253 4 0.1 Board 3
GA 0.3 156 20 0.1 Board 13
IA 0.3 225 3 0.0 Appointment 9
ID 0.2 127 5 0.1 Board 5
IL 1.3 346 4 0.0 Board 7
IN 0.7 526 1 0.0 Board 5
KS 0.5 499 11 0.1 Board 9
KY 0.3 393 65 2.2 Board 8
LA 0.9 315 48 1.4 Governor 7
MA 1.8 745 7 0.0 Governor 7
MD 1.4 507 84 4.2 Board 7
ME 0.2 280 0 0.0 Board 7
MI 0.5 370 36 0.4 Governor 7
MN 0.7 574 1 0.0 Board 9
MO 0.3 152 12 0.2 Board 7
MS 0.2 297 29 0.6 Board 13
MT 0.2 246 7 0.1 Board 7
NC 0.6 411 39 0.7 Board 9
ND 0.1 139 0 0.0 Governor 3
NE 0.1 66 0 0.0 Board 3
NH 0.2 320 0 0.0 Board 6
NJ 1.3 555 0 0.0 Board 8
NM 0.0 0 27 0.2 Secretary 7
NV 0.1 94 0 0.0 Governor 3
NY 2.9 730 6 1.6 Governor 7
OH 9.2 462 55 0.8 Board 8
OK 0.3 97 14 0.2 Governor 4
OR 0.1 227 19 0.2 Board 7
PA 10.5 716 9 0.3 Governor/Senate 6
RI 0.2 432 0 0.0 Board 7
SC 0.4 165 50 0.5 Governor 9
SD 0.1 101 4 0.2 Governor 5
TN 0.2 122 44 1.2 Board 4
TX 0.5 116 4 0.1 Governor/Senate 7
UT 0.1 161 21 0.3 Board 7
VA 0.5 397 15 0.8 Governor 12
VT 0.3 486 0 0.0 Board 3
WA 0.2 262 21 0.0 Board 5
WI 0.4 392 0 0.0 Board 7
WV 0.1 113 29 0.3 Governor/Senate 7
WY 0.0 10 4 0.1 Governor 3
Notes: Data sourced from Chapin (1916). MD stands for physician, ENG represents engineers,





Figure B.I: CHD Rolll Out
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222.
Table B.35: State Year of Initiation: Overall Mortality and Infant Mortality
Overall Mortality Infant Mortality
# Counties Year Rate 1934 Rate Year Rate 1934 Rate
AL 67 1925 103.8 101.1 1927 61.7 62.7
AR 75 1927 89.9 84.0 1927 59.0 48.3
AZ 12 1926 100.2 113.1 1926 124.8 131.4
CA 57 1910 123.0 126.7 1919 78.8 61.9
CO 58 1910 125.6 117.8 1928 91.2 79.0
DE 3 1919 165.6 125.0 1921 102.8 74.3
FL 40 1919 116.9 114.4 1924 79.5 61.7
GA 122 1922 93.4 104.0 1928 76.6 66.0
IA 99 1923 93.1 99.3 1924 50.4 42.7
ID 10 1922 97.2 101.0 1926 63.5 51.3
IL 102 1918 140.5 118.3 1922 68.3 50.4
IN 92 1910 127.3 125.7 1917 77.6 46.5
KS 105 1914 92.4 103.0 1917 73.0 48.7
KY 117 1911 123.6 108.1 1917 84.8 65.4
LA 59 1918 153.6 87.0 1927 72.6 63.6
MA 13 1910 161.5 122.2 1917 91.3 45.1
MD 21 1910 132.2 115.8 1917 123.3 70.0
MI 83 1910 132.9 119.5 1917 80.5 45.7
MN 85 1910 101.5 103.6 1917 63.8 45.1
MO 114 1911 119.7 119.2 1927 57.2 60.4
MS 72 1919 118.7 105.7 1921 66.2 55.4
MT 17 1910 88.1 100.6 1922 67.7 62.0
NC 95 1916 124.3 94.0 1917 95.8 62.6
NM 21 1929 143.7 126.6 1929 144.1 122.1
NY 57 1910 159.6 131.0 1917 85.4 50.3
OH 88 1910 127.7 109.5 1917 79.2 49.3
OK 76 1928 81.0 80.4 1928 66.8 57.5
OR 34 1918 116.7 106.7 1919 58.6 45.2
PA 66 1910 143.9 102.8 1917 109.5 50.5
SC 38 1916 129.4 105.4 1919 110.8 76.5
SD 62 1930 76.0 76.7 1932 49.8 49.4
TN 95 1917 124.1 102.0 1927 66.6 62.1
TX 238 1933 88.5 97.3 1933 68.4 65.5
UT 27 1910 98.4 80.7 1917 70.6 56.6
VA 96 1913 126.7 114.5 1917 90.2 70.9
WA 38 1910 91.5 100.7 1917 74.9 49.7
WV 55 1925 95.1 96.6 1925 76.8 68.3
WY 7 1922 104.4 94.7 1922 73.2 57.4
Observations 38
NOTES: Table displays the 38 treatment states by the number of counties, the year the state
entered the mortality statistics, the mortality rates for the first year in the vital statistics,
and the mortality rate at the close fo the CHD program, 1934. Infant mortality is the rate
is per 1,000 births. Overall mortality is the rate per 10,000 individuals.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of
County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin
222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for rural counties.
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Figure B.II: Baseline Effect of CHD on County Mortality for Rural Areas
PANEL A: MORTALITY
PANEL B: INFANT MORTALITY
217
PANEL C: BIRTH RATE
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares estimation of
Equation 7. Each plotted point represents the time before and after CHD implementation, excluding the period
just before treatmentm = −1. The dependent variable in Panel A is overall mortality, in Panel B is infant mor-
tality, and in Panel C is the birth rate. Infant mortality is weighted by the number of births. Overall mortality
and the birth rate are weighted by the population. Dark lines represents the entire county, light lines represent
the rural areas of the county, dashed lines display the 95 percent confidence intervals. Overall mortality is per
10,000 individuals. Infant mortality is per 1,000 births. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state
by year, urban group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the homeownership status in
base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and indicators for race. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCE: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital
Statistics for rural counties. Vital statistics are from the U.S. Vital Statistics for the entire full county. County-level
data on property taxes, property values, and public debt are available in Census publications entitled Wealth, Pub-
lic Debt, and Taxation for years 1912, 1922, and 1932. County-level demographic characteristics are calculated























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.38: Separate Estimation for Rural Counties and Urban Counties
SAMPLE: RURAL-ONLY RURAL-TOWNS URBAN-RURAL
Mortality: Rural Full Rural Full Rural Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years up to -2 -4.50*** -1.68 1.02 -0.02 -0.95 -4.23
(1.10) (1.20) (1.37) (1.19) (4.72) (9.40)
Year -1 -0.85 -1.88* 3.43* 0.90 3.99 -3.99
(1.02) (1.03) (1.98) (0.87) (2.81) (3.97)
Years 1 and 2 -1.71 -2.05** 0.59 -0.17 -1.28 -4.60
(1.12) (0.91) (0.90) (0.83) (3.26) (4.00)
Years 3 and 4 -2.42** -2.05* 0.62 -0.33 -2.17 -5.75
(1.12) (1.17) (1.15) (1.06) (4.29) (5.18)
Years 5 and after -3.39** -3.05** -2.29 -0.98 -3.06 -16.21
(1.34) (1.33) (1.56) (1.35) (4.89) (10.15)
N 26,041 19,797 19,867 15,116 2,445 1,821
N CHD x Year 2,450 2,349 3,429 3,160 742 681
Mean Dep 99 99 110 121 111 205
Baseline FE X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables, βm, from a
weighted least squares estimation of Equation 7. The first row represents the coef-
ficient two periods before treatment, the second row represents the coefficient one
period before treatment. The third row is one and two periods after treatment, and
so on. Zero is the excluded period. The dependent variable is overall mortality and
estimates are weighted by the population. Overall mortality is per 10,000 individ-
uals. The plotted coefficients include all treatment states outside of the Northeast.
Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban group by
year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the homeownership sta-
tus in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and indicators
for race. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance
levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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Table B.39: Heterogeneity of the Effect with Mortality
SPLIT SAMPLE: WHITE PROPERTY PHYSICIANS FUNDING
<50% >50% Low High Low High M-I RSC USPHS State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Years up to -2 2.41 -2.04* -1.12 -0.48 -1.79 -0.36 -1.55 -0.96 -2.16 -1.39
(2.93) (1.18) (1.30) (1.38) (1.37) (1.28) (3.05) (1.16) (1.61) (1.23)
Year -1 -0.36 -1.08 -0.53 -0.55 -2.00 -0.98 -4.21 0.12 -1.74 -0.90
(2.40) (1.43) (1.71) (1.18) (2.65) (0.95) (5.46) (0.98) (2.40) (1.49)
Years 1 and 2 2.05 -2.46*** -1.88* -1.83 -1.56 -2.02** -2.81 -0.57 -0.98 -1.50
(1.76) (0.90) (1.11) (1.11) (1.69) (0.84) (2.88) (0.97) (1.51) (0.98)
Years 3 and 4 3.18 -1.58 -1.32 -1.60 -0.73 -1.11 -1.20 0.61 -0.84 -1.18
(2.66) (1.13) (1.31) (1.65) (1.77) (1.16) (3.10) (1.33) (1.95) (1.25)
Years 5 and after 3.59 -0.32 -0.61 -1.36 0.97 -0.64 1.21 1.31 -0.10 -0.41
(3.39) (1.19) (1.33) (2.06) (1.60) (1.50) (2.62) (1.54) (1.91) (1.22)
N 3,321 33,461 24,798 11,955 21,492 15,360 13,865 25,178 24,908 29,680
Baseline FE X X X X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables, βm, from a weighted least squares es-
timation of Equation 7. The first row represents the coefficient two periods before treatment, the second row
represents the coefficient one period before treatment. The third row is one and two periods after treatment, and
so on. Zero is the excluded period. The dependent variable is overall mortality and estimates are weighted by the
population. Crude and adult mortality are per 10,000 individuals. The plotted coefficients include all treatment
states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the state by year, urban group
by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the homeownership status in base years, the urban
status in 1940, the number of siblings, and indicators for race. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county
level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
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Table B.40: Heterogeneity of Effect with Size of County Population
PERCENTILE 1910: >50 >20 >10 10-90 <90 <80 <50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years up to -2 -0.97 -0.90 -0.99 0.39 0.25 -0.76 -0.89
(0.91) (0.85) (0.84) (1.19) (1.18) (1.41) (2.37)
Year -1 -0.31 -0.34 -0.35 0.35 0.32 -0.22 -1.44
(0.87) (0.80) (0.80) (1.16) (1.15) (1.39) (2.24)
Years 1 and 2 -1.98** -1.98*** -2.10*** -1.85* -2.02** -2.46** -3.83**
(0.78) (0.73) (0.72) (0.97) (0.96) (1.12) (1.80)
Years 3 and 4 -1.28 -1.54* -1.59* -1.10 -1.22 -1.79 -3.83*
(0.94) (0.86) (0.85) (1.09) (1.09) (1.24) (2.07)
Years 5 and after 0.48 0.19 0.06 0.20 0.03 -1.14 -4.56*
(1.13) (1.03) (1.02) (1.39) (1.38) (1.59) (2.49)
N 19,317 30,213 33,888 29,572 32,269 28,325 17,235
N CHD x Year 5,033 5,868 6,065 4,321 4,449 3,102 1,160
Mean Dep 71 70 70 69 68 66 63
Baseline FE X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X X
NOTES: Plotted coefficient are grouped event-study dummy variables, βm, from a
weighted least squares estimation of Equation 7. The first row represents the coefficient
two periods before treatment, the second row represents the coefficient one period before
treatment. The third row is one and two periods after treatment, and so on. Zero is the ex-
cluded period. The dependent variable is infant mortality with the estimates weighted by
the number of births. Infant is per 1,000 births. The plotted coefficients include all treat-
ment states outside of the Northeast. Fixed effects are included for the county level, the
state by year, urban group by year, and priod health spending by year. Controls include the
homeownership status in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and
indicators for race. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with signifi-





Additional Figures and Tables
Table C.41: Census Summary Statistics, Men 1920-40
By Linking
Linked Not Linked Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Age 28.59 5.38 28.61 5.34 -0.02∗∗∗
White 0.91 0.29 0.82 0.38 0.09∗∗∗
Black 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.38 -0.08∗∗∗
# Siblings 3.02 2.21 3.10 2.26 -0.08∗∗∗
On Farm 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 -0.02∗∗∗
Rural 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.39 -0.02∗∗∗
West 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.01∗∗∗
South 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.50 -0.12∗∗∗
Northeast 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.02∗∗∗
Midwest 0.34 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.08∗∗∗
N 3,795,953 9,188,279 12984232
NOTES: The above table shows the difference in means between linked and unlinked samples. Data are a linked
sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S. Census.
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Table C.42: Probability of Linking Men, 1920-40





















# Siblings 0.994*** 0.994***
(0.001) (0.001)











NOTES: The above table represents a logit estimation on the individual characteristics affect-
ing the linking of Census samples. Data are a linked sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and
includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level
with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count
U.S. Census.
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Table C.43: 1940 Maximum Age
by Exposure Year
1920-40 Census WWII
Year CHD Under 5 Under 1 Under 5 Under 1
1908 37 33 40 36
1909 36 32 39 35
1910 35 31 38 34
1911 34 30 37 33
1912 33 29 36 32
1913 32 28 35 31
1914 31 27 34 30
1915 30 26 33 29
1916 29 25 32 28
1917 28 24 31 27
1918 27 23 30 26
1919 26 22 29 25
1920 25 21 28 24
1921 24 20 27 23
1922 23 19 26 22
1923 22 18 25 21
1924 21 17 24 20
1925 20 16 23 19
1926 19 15 22 18
1927 18 14 21 17
1928 17 13 20 16
1929 16 12 19 15
1930 15 11 18 14
1931 14 10 17 13
1932 13 9 16 12
1933 12 8 15 11
Notes: Calculated maximum ages in the 1940 Census based on year




Age Distribution of Mortality Effects
To measure the mortality effect of the CHD from childhood to adulthood, es-
timation exploits variation in observable geographic location and year of health in-
vestment. The baseline mortality effect of instituting a CHD in county j and year t is
estimated as:
Mjst = β(CHDj,t−1) + X ′jtγ+ aj + ηst + φjt+ jst (16)
whereMjst is the mortality rate in county j and year t = 1910, ..., 1934. CHDj,t−1 is a
measure of CHD presence in county j, year t− 1 = 1909, ..., 1933.1 aj captures county
fixed effects. ηst captures state-by-year fixed effects, such as state-level adoption of
the Sheppard-Towner funding or higher state participation in the overall CHD pro-
gram. φjt are county-specific time trends. jst is the regression error. Xjt are time-
varying county controls, including the log of population, the population per square
mile, the log of the crop value, the log of the farm value, the percent black, the per-
cent of female household heads, and the percent of households who rent. Due to the
asymmetric timing and location of adoption, the estimation captures the difference
between treated and untreated counties before and after health investments. Adding
time trends measures the effect of the CHD at its deviation from the county mortality
trend.
Table C.44 displays the binary implementation of Equation 16. The dependent
variable in each column is a variation of county-level mortality at time t. Panel A
shows the direct mortality measures and Panel B displays the computed mortality.
Results show a reduction in child deaths for counties implementing CHDs.
1CHDj,t−1 is used in place of time t, CHDjt for two reasons. First, CHDs are enacted
throughout the calendar year, with frequent appearances between October and Decem-
ber. The asymmetry of treatment throughout the year lowers the ability of the CHDs to
show an effect in the year t since the majority of the year passed before the CHD opened.
Second, it is unlikely that large volumes of spending in time twill alter health outcomes in
the current period and are more likely to have an effect the following year.
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Table C.44: Baseline Effect of CHD on Mortality
PANEL A: MORTALITY
Overall Infant Stillbirths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CHD -2.29** -0.23 -0.21 -2.25*** -1.79*** -1.72*** 0.05 -0.21 -0.24
(0.90) (0.86) (0.86) (0.55) (0.66) (0.66) (0.48) (0.63) (0.63)
N 43,019 43,019 42,785 30,411 30,411 30,331 24,644 24,644 24,597
County FE X X X X X X X X X
Year X State FE X X X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X
Controls X X X
PANEL B: ADJUSTED MORTALITY
1 to 4 5 to 14 Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CHD -0.91** -1.32*** -1.15** -0.71* -0.93*** -0.80** -0.17* -0.09 -0.07
(0.46) (0.36) (0.45) (0.42) (0.30) (0.38) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
N 30,607 30,607 30,526 30,590 30,590 30,509 30,389 30,389 30,309
County FE X X X X X X X X X
Year X State FE X X X X X X X X X
Time Trend X X X X X X
Controls X X X
NOTES: Reported coefficient estimates ofβ from specification (16). Administrative records covering CHD oper-
ation are retrieved from the History of County Health Organizations in the United States published in U.S. Public
Health Bulletin 222. Crude and adult mortality are per 10,000 individuals. Infant and child mortality are per 1,000
births. Controls include the log of population, the population per square mile, the log of the crop value, the log
of the farm value, the percent black, the percent of female household heads, and the percent of households who
rent. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved from the History of County Health Orga-
nizations in the United States published in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. County-level demographic charac-
teristics are calculated from the IPUMs Restricted Complete Count Census data. Vital statistics are from the U.S.
Vital Statistics for the entire full county.
Panel A Columns (1)-(3) tests the effectiveness of CHDs on overall mortality. For
the full population, mortality is only responsive in the specification without time
trends, Column (1). After the specification adds county time trends, in Column (2),
any beneficial effect of the CHD disappears. Under the full specification, in Column
(3), CHDs do not appear to be effective at improving overall population health.
In Columns (4)-(6), infant mortality displays a more resolute drop than overall
mortality. The initial estimate in Column (1) persists into the full specification, in
Column (3), with county time trends and county-level controls. The final estimated
effect of the health investment is a reduction by 1.7 infant deaths per 1,000 births.
Infants as a subset of the population, appear to benefit from the health services. The
distinction between infants and the overall population reveals that CHDs dispropor-
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tionately benefited the population’s weakest members, children under one year of
age.
The differing response between the overall effect and the subset of infants begs
the question of how effective CHDs were at reducing mortality within the age distri-
bution of the population. To answer this, Panel B displays the relationship between
opening a CHD and the calculated age-specific mortality. Here the effect is strongest
for ages one to four years old (Columns (1)-(3)), reducing one death per 1,000 births.
The estimated coefficient becomes smaller across ages five to 14 years old, prevent-
ing a little less than one death (Columns (4)-(6)). For adults the effect completely
vanishes (Columns (7)-(9)).2
The results within the population age distribution illuminate that health services
were solely effective for children. This childhood-specific effect is muted in the overall
population when considering the crude mortality rate. The benefit of CHDs is mainly
realized by children, the most vulnerable portion of the population. Even amongst
children, the largest mortality reductions are for those under the age of five.
Conceptual Framework
The maximization problem is considered through the parent who trades off adult
health of the child with consumption. In a one child household, parents maximize
their utility:
U(Z, h) (17)
which is composed of consumption (Z) and adult health (h).
The household budget is based on the income Y allocated over expenditures on
consumption goods Z, the investment in the child’s education e, and the care of the




pee+ pcc+ Z = Y (18)
where the price of each good j is p. Thus the price of parental investment in education
is pe and the price of the parental care is pc. Based on the utility and the budget
constraint, the parental constrained optimization appears as:
max
e,Z,c
L = U(Z, h) + λ(Y − pee− pcc− Z) (19)
































) − λpc = 0 (22)
∂L
∂λ
= Y − pee− pcc− X = 0 (23)
From the first order conditions (Equation 21 and 22), care for sick child and the
educational investment will be traded-off based on the ratio of the marginal cost to









Therefore, the parental optimal choice of care and education will depend on the
exogenous variables, the illness level and the price of each input. This is expressed as
c = c∗(φ, pe, pc) and e = e∗(φ, pe, pc).
231
Linking Methodology
The primary sample of interest, men between 20 and 40 in the 1920 sample, be-
gins with 12,025,272 individuals living in rural areas. Of these men, 3,465,269 are
uniquely linked to individuals in the 1940 Census, a match rate of 29%. Individuals
fail to be linked for several reasons. First, they have a common name combination,
which makes records impossible to distinguish. Second, the person may be deceased
in the 1940 census and thus unable to locate. Third, misreporting of names, place of
birth, birth year, or race are common occurrences, and despite data cleaning, these
misstatements rule out record linking.
Table C.41 presents summary statistics across the linking. Across the means, the
linked sample has fewer nonwhite individuals and fewer men located in the South.
Whites are typically easier to link between Census years, which is in line with the
related linking literature. Of the regions reported, the South has the lowest linkage,
especially when compared to the West or Midwest. This is likely due to several fac-
tors, including the high number of blacks, the size of states, as well as differences in
naming practices across regions.
Table C.42 displays the likelihood of linking individuals based on permanent
characteristics. Panels A Column (1) tests the specific features used to link samples.
Panels B adds the number of siblings and whether an individual is located on a farm,
two factors that are expected to vary across linked and unlinked samples.3 Over the
four panels, the characteristics of individuals do vary across the linkage, particularly
race and region. This lack of representativeness is standard in linked samples, and
the focus is instead on whether the treatment assignment is related to the linking
methodology.4 To test this, Column (2) adds the CHD assignment. Over all specifica-
tions, the treatment assignment does appear to be systematically related to the record
3 In Bailey et al. (2017a) the authors find that "‘linked individuals tend to have fewer siblings,
be native born, have native-born parents, be married, and live in urban areas."’ Since the
present study considers native born men in rural areas, only siblings and whether located
on a farm are factors most likely to affect linking.
4 For a more elaborate discussion of issues related to linked samples see Bailey et al. (2017a).
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linkage. Therefore, even though the characteristics of individuals are not comparable
across the linking, the difference does not vary over exposure to a CHD.
To link individuals across Census years, the literature standard relies on the re-







• Birth year (within three years)
Of these characteristics, not all are required to be exact matches. Permanent charac-
teristics may vary over Census years due to both expected errors in the Census data,
as well as variations in reporting over time. Errors in the data arise both from person
to enumerator misreporting, as well as the transcription of the text records to digital
records. Individuals may also report their permanent characteristics differently de-
pending on the year of the Census. For instance, individuals may report nicknames
in childhood and switch to their proper names in adulthood.
To account for these errors or changes in reporting my preferred linking method-
ology follows ten steps:
To see how well my linking methodology performs with related methods, I compare
my preferred linking methodology, outlined above in Table C.45, with two alternative
algorithms. The first, more conservative linking methodology does not replace proper
names for nicknames (excludes Step 4). The second, more standard linking process,
replaces phonetic equivalents for individual names.
To compare the three linking methods: preferred, conservative, and traditional,
I compare the resulting samples across four metrics:5
1. Comparison of Results (specific to this paper): If my main results are similar
across algorithms, there is less concern over the particular method chosen.
5Following Bailey et al. (2017a).
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Table C.45: Linking Methodology
Step 1 Select 1920 sample, including rural men in
38 treatment states.
Step 2 Separate men into birth states.
Step 3 Split given name into middle and first.
Step 4 Replace nicknames with proper equiva-
lents.
Step 5 Link 1920 with 1940 using race, first name,
and last name.
Step 6 Choose linked individual with the closest
age.
Step 7 Drop those with more than three year dif-
ference in age (within 3 years).
Step 8 Break ties with middle name.
Step 9 Exclude duplicate links.
Step 10 Linking percentage – 30 percent.
2. Match Rate: The share of records matched from the original sample.
3. Representativeness of the Sample: Linked samples are biased towards groups
of individuals that have fewer reporting errors and have unique names. These
groups include individuals who are white, have higher incomes, and live in ur-
ban areas are easier to match.
4. Match Quality: To account for poor matches the linked data is assessed for Type
I errors (see Bailey et al. (2017a)). In other words, the number or percent of
incorrectly linked individuals.
The literature standard is to outline the linking performance based on (2) and (3),
Bailey et al. (2017a), however, make an important critique, that we also care about
the quality of the match. To assess quality, I rely on one of the analyses in Bailey et
al. (2017a) and compare linked individuals across the reported birthplaces of their
parents. This parental birthplace should be time invariant and is also not used to
link individuals across Census years. Currently, the parental place of birth is not well
reported in the 1940 sample. To quantify (4), I test the 1920 Census linked to the 1930
Census using the same three algorithms.
Before moving into the standard comparisons of linked samples (metrics 2-4), I
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first evaluate the algorithms based on my main results (metric 1). Testing Equation 13
on the three samples reveals that coefficients change only slightly depending on the
sample. Table C.46 shows the baseline results over the three linking procedures: pre-
ferred, conservative, and traditional. The effect varies by 0.001 across each result,
a very slight shift between the specifications. With each linking methodology, the
theme of the results is the same; income improves by 3-4% with CHD exposure. The
similarity in estimates between the three samples alleviates concern over the results
being dramatically affected by choice of the algorithm.
Next, I assess the algorithms based on the linking percentage (2) as well as the
representativeness of the samples (3). Table C.47 reports the summary statistics over
samples produced by the three different algorithms. In Panel A, the use of proper
names gives an end linkage of 28.8 percent. For the conservative approach, using
names as reported, the linking percentage is 27.7. Finally, for the traditional ap-
proach, using phonetic spellings, I achieve a linking percentage of 37.2. This tra-
ditional approach achieves the highest linking percentage but is likely due to inac-
curately matched individuals. Based on Bailey et al. (2017a), the phonetic spelling
results in type I errors that inflate the match rate.
For sample representativeness, metric (3), I compare the three samples with both
summary statistics that compare the means across the linkage as well as a Logit re-
gression testing the likelihood of linking based on permanent characteristics. In the
summary statistics displayed in Table C.47 the means of the three samples differ from
the original sample in consistent ways. The preferred linking and the conservative
linking in the top two panels are slightly more representative as compared with the
traditional linking. Turning to the likelihood of linking in Table C.47, the results are
similar. The preferred method is more representative in region, while the conserva-
tive method is slightly more representative in race. Both the conservative and pre-
ferred method are more representative than the traditional approach in Panel C.
Finally, metric (4) is evaluated using the 1920-30 sample. Following Bailey et al.
(2017a), I assess the linking quality using the reported parental birthplaces. I con-
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sider individuals an incorrect link if their parent’s reported birthplace differs across
both mother and father. Table C.I shows the performance of the three linking algo-
rithms. The traditional method has the highest error rate, almost seven percent of the
original sample is made up of incorrectly linked individuals. Across the conservative
and preferred methods, the errors percentages are similar, 4.5 percent for the conser-
vative an 4.8 for the preferred method. Overall, across the preferred and conservative
methods, the resulting percentages of correctly linking and incorrectly linked individ-
uals varies only slightly. The correct links are higher in the preferred sample, while the
incorrect links are lower in the conservative approach. Overall, for all three methods,
the Type I error rate is on the lower side when compared the spectrum of findings in
Bailey et al. (2017a). For the three algorithms, my Type I error rate is 0.14-0.16, while
the majority of the papers are between 0.2 and 0.35. A portion of the lower error rate
may be due to the use of the 1920-30 sample, the particular selection criteria applied,
or the fact that the sample is limited to native born children.
From the four metrics assessed, the conservative and preferred algorithms are
preferable to the traditional linking method. The more traditional approach results
in a higher linking percentage, but this percentage suffers from low-quality links.
Over the conservative and traditional methods, the results appear fairly similar, with a
slight trade off in error rate between the two. The conservative method returns fewer
incorrect links while the preferred method returns a higher linking percentage with
only a small increase in the Type I error rate. Regardless of the choice of the algo-
rithm, for this paper, the results maintain their magnitude and significance.
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Table C.46: Program Effect on Log Income
1920-40 Men 19-39
Panel A: Preferred Linking
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Log Income Log Hourly Wage Log Occscore
(1) (2) (3)
CHD x Under 5 0.037*** 0.018*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
N 2,127,679 2,105,017 1,803,267
Birth Year FE X X X
Birth County FE X X X
Controls X X X
Panel B: Conservative Linking
DEP. VAR.: Log Income Log Hourly Wage Log Occscore
(1) (2) (3)
CHD x Under 5 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
N 2,049,648 2,027,860 1,737,050
Birth Year FE X X X
Birth County FE X X X
Controls X X X
Panel C: Traditional Linking
DEP. VAR.: Log Income Log Hourly Wage Log Occscore
(1) (2) (3)
CHD x Under 5 0.036*** 0.017*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
N 2,733,667 2,704,631 2,315,528
Birth Year FE X X X
Birth County FE X X X
Controls X X X
NOTES: The coefficients reflect estimates ofβ from specification (13). Re-
ported coefficients capture the effect of CHDs on children who were ex-
posed while under the age of five in early-treated counties. This young co-
hort is compared against children in later-treated and never-treated coun-
ties, as well as within-county older cohorts, a modified a difference-in-
difference-in-differences approach. CHD is a binary variable that equals
one if a CHD is present in county j and zero otherwise. Under five is an in-
dicator variable that equals one if an individual is under five while the CHD
is operating and zero otherwise. Controls include the homeownership sta-
tus in base years, the urban status in 1940, the number of siblings, and in-
dicators for race. Data are a linked sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and
includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. The
three linking methods include: (1) the traditional approach, which uses the
phonetic spelling of the last name, (2) the conservative linking approach,
which uses first names as reported, and (3) the preferred method, which
replaces nicknames with proper equivalents.
SOURCES: Administrative records covering CHD operation are retrieved
from the History of County Health Organizations in the United States pub-
lished in U.S. Public Health Bulletin 222. Individual-level records are ob-
tained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S. Census.
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Table C.47: Probability of Linking Men, 1920-40
Panel A: Preferred Linking
Linked Not Linked Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Age 28.59 5.38 28.61 5.34 -0.02∗∗∗
White 0.91 0.29 0.82 0.38 0.09∗∗∗
Black 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.38 -0.08∗∗∗
# Siblings 3.02 2.21 3.10 2.26 -0.08∗∗∗
On Farm 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 -0.02∗∗∗
Rural 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.39 -0.02∗∗∗
West 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.01∗∗∗
South 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.50 -0.12∗∗∗
Northeast 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.02∗∗∗
Midwest 0.34 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.08∗∗∗
N 3,795,953 9,188,279 12984232
Panel B: Conservative Linking
Linked Not Linked Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Age 28.57 5.37 28.62 5.33 -0.05∗∗∗
White 0.91 0.29 0.82 0.39 0.09∗∗∗
Black 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.38 -0.08∗∗∗
# Siblings 3.07 2.22 3.14 2.27 -0.07∗∗∗
On Farm 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.50 -0.01∗∗∗
Rural 0.87 0.33 0.87 0.34 0.00∗∗∗
West 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.01∗∗∗
South 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.50 -0.12∗∗∗
Northeast 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.03∗∗∗
Midwest 0.33 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.08∗∗∗
N 3,334,425 8,690,847 12,025,272
Panel C: Traditional Linking
Linked Not Linked Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b
Age 28.57 5.36 28.63 5.33 -0.07∗∗∗
White 0.90 0.29 0.81 0.40 0.10∗∗∗
Black 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.39 -0.09∗∗∗
# Siblings 3.11 2.23 3.13 2.28 -0.03∗∗∗
On Farm 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 -0.00∗
Rural 0.88 0.33 0.87 0.34 0.01∗∗∗
West 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.01∗∗∗
South 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.50 -0.12∗∗∗
Northeast 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.02∗∗∗
Midwest 0.33 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.09∗∗∗
N 4,471,465 7,553,807 12,025,272
NOTES: The above table shows the difference in means be-
tween linked and unlinked samples. Data are a linked sample
of census years 1920 to 1940 and includes men aged 19 to 39 in
1940. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level
with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. The three
linking methods include: (1) the traditional approach, which
uses the phonetic spelling of the last name, (2) the conservative
linking approach, which uses first names as reported, and (3)
the preferred method, which replaces nicknames with proper
equivalents.
SOURCES: Individual-level records are obtained from the
IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S. Census.
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NOTES: The above table represents a logit estimation on the individual characteristics affecting
the linking of Census samples. Data are a linked sample of census years 1920 to 1940 and
includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level
with significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. The three linking methods include: (1) the
traditional approach, which uses the phonetic spelling of the last name, (2) the conservative
linking approach, which uses first names as reported, and (3) the preferred method, which
replaces nicknames with proper equivalents.
SOURCES: Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count
U.S. Census.
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Figure C.I: Quality of Performance 1920-30
NOTES: The above figure compares the quality of the linked samples, which is based on whether the
parent’s birthplaces match across the linkings. Data are a linked sample of census years 1920 to
1940 and includes men aged 19 to 39 in 1940. The three linking methods include: (1) the traditional
approach, which uses the phonetic spelling of the last name, (2) the conservative linking approach,
which uses first names as reported, and (3) the preferred method, which replaces nicknames with
proper equivalents.
SOURCES: Individual-level records are obtained from the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count U.S.
Census.
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